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MUSEUMS TO STRENGTHEN YOUNG PEOPLE'S RESILIENCE AFTER THE COVID-19 JUVENTOCID

Abstract

Hungary is one of those European countries whose subsoil resources are close to zero. The future of the country lies essentially in the human capital of Hungarian youth. Potentially, the Hungarian museum system plays a key political role in helping Hungarian society to overcome the political immunosenescence of the Corona episode, so that state, municipal and private funding of museum activities achieve a significant return-on-investment.

The aim of the research is to determine some of the factors by which the human capital of young people today is greatly reduced after they have had to live for a long time without social recognition by their peers during the Corona period. The result of the research is that we can speak of a COVID-19 Juventocide. The long theft of the resonance space on the one hand, and the shifting of costs into the future and thus to the detriment of the now young on the other, led to a lasting material and immaterial weakening also of Hungarian society the Cultural Long-Covid. It is therefore a central political task to strengthen the resilience of the young again and to take countermeasures after the Covid-19 Juventocide. Our hypothesis - to be verified in the coming years in a renewed Hungarian museum practice - is that Hungarian museums can play a crucial role in this re-resilience task. The Hungarian government should prioritise the funding of artists and cultural institutions to dampen the long-term impact of the Corona measures.

Introduction

Let us first look at the terminology. Oxford University has developed an index for the Corona measures of governments and coined an appropriate term for them: stringency. In Latin, stringere means to tie up, to bind together; the same root can be traced back to Latin strangulāre or Greek strangalūn (στραγγαλοῦν) 'to strangle, to suffocate' (*Pfeifer et al., 1993).* Translated, the Oxford term thus means: Index of the worldwide strangulation of societies by their own governments. To our knowledge, there has never been such a global strangulation of social, cultural and economic life in history outside of war events as there has been since January 2020.

Fig. 1.: Worldwide Strangulation of Societies
by their own governments (01.01.2020.- 28.02.2021.)

Source: Stringency Index (2021.02.28); Graph: Vogt, 2021

Young people are the most affected by the stringency. Their schools have been closed to a significant extent––contrary to the determination of the global community, which was confirmed once again in 2019.

Schools were closed at around 80% in the two Americas over the 14 months from January 2020 to February 2021, 54.3% in Europe, slightly more in Hungary at 56.3%, most restrictive in Ukraine at 79%, least in Belarus at 2%.

Fig. 2.: School Closures by continent (01.01.2020-28.02.2021.)

Source: The Oxford Stringency Index (28.02.2021.); Calculation and Graph: Vogt, 2021

UNESCO has recorded partial or full closures day by day. If one assigns a -1.0 for each day of closure and a reduction to +0.5 for each partial day of closure with a view to the uncatchability of learning achievements, the result is an overall loss of -33% for Sweden, -65% for Germany and -97% for Italy. At the individual level, one month of learning loss corresponds to a lifetime income loss of 1%, so Italy's youth lose about 14% of their lifetime income according to previous empirical measures.

The policy demanded extreme acts of solidarity from young people and at the same time violated the motto of intergenerational justice "in unitate Robur -in unity strong" (Badische Landeskirche). With "Fratelli tutti" (03.10.2020.), in the middle of the Corona

crisis Pope Francis has assigned not only intercultural justice but also intergenerational justice a high rank within Catholic social teaching.

Fig.3.: Educational losses in schools in Italy (-97%), Sweden (-33%), and Germany (-65%) due to COVID-19 Lockdowns (16.02.2020.-02.02.2021.)
Key: Fully open 1.0; Partially open 0.5; Academic break 0.0; Closed due to COVID -1.0.

Source: UNESCO (2021); Calculation and Graph: Vogt, 2021

First estimates for health damage to the global community

A look beyond Europe shows the extent of the damage done to the global community by the Corona measures. The Karolinska Institute Stockholm (Peterson & Ekström, 2021) has calculated that the approximately 2.5 million registered COVID-19 deaths at the time were offset by another estimated 2.5 million deaths from interventions (other researchers arrive at 3.9 million), most of them among children: with infant mortality from omitted vaccinations, from starvation after their parents failed to feed them informally as day la-bourers, from a doubling of malaria deaths. At the same time, there is (as we can see by now) neither high covid mortality nor significant excess mortality in sub-Saharan Africa.

Fig.4.: Stefan Swartling Peterson & Anna Mia Ekström: Midpoint summation of 2,5 million deaths globally (min. 1,8; max, 3,4 million) from the "indirect" effects of reduced health care utilization (03.03.2021.)


Peterson, Ekström 2021-03-03: midpoint summation of 2,5 million deaths fróm the "indirect" effects of reduced health care utilization					
	Estimation	min	max	others' min	others' max
Tuberculosis	300.000	300.000	400.000	300.000	400.000
AIDS	100.000	69.000	148.000	69.000	148.000
Malaria	187.500	125.000	250.000	520.000	768.000
Malnutrition	90.000	60.000	120.000	60.000	120.000
Stillbirths	130.000	60.000	200.000	60.000	200.000
Maternal mortality	65.000	30.000	100.000	30.000	100.000
Newborn deaths	168.000	168.000	168.000	168.000	168.000
Under-five Child mortality	1.500.000	1.000.000	2.000.000	1.000.000	2.000.000
	2.540.500	1.812.000	3.386.000	2.207.000	3.904.000

Source: Peterson & Ekström, 2021; Calculation and Graph: Vogt, 2021

The "intertemporally disproportionate loss of freedom" (Lepsius, 07.05.2021.) of the young in Europe is an indirect consequence of demographic shifts. To take Görlitz on Germany's border with Poland as a typical example: it is one of the cities where the proportion of over-80s has increased dramatically in the course of just thirty years: it has virtually tripled from 4.09% in 1990 to 11.05% at present.

Fig.5.: Tripling of the proportion of people aged over eighty in Görlitz
from 1990 to 2018 and forecast 2019 to 2035 (4.09% to 11.05%)

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen, 2020; Graph: Vogt, 2021

The share of young people aged 0-19 at Görlitz has almost halved from almost 20% to around 10%. By 2035, it is assumed, the share of the working-age population 20-64 will fall to below 50% and the share of the population actually working will be around 30%. Economically and socially, this will not be feasible.

The political implications of societal imunosenescence

Even more important is the mental impact of immunosenescence (Chigangaidze & Chinyenze, 2021; Okun, 1976; Barsky et al, 1997; Tymula et al, 2012; Bonsang et al, 2015; Dohmen et al, 2017). Young people are willing to take risks, older people are already risk-averse because their immune systems are beginning to show systemic weaknesses and they are urged to be more cautious if they want to survive. In 1975, South Korea had a median age of less than 20 years, today it is 45 years, and the United Nations predicts a median age of almost 60 years for 2060.

Fig. 6.: Median age of the total population 1950-2020-2100.
2020: Japan 48.4; Italy 47.3; Germany 45.7

Source: United Nations World Population Prospects, 2019; Graph: Vogt, 2021

This in turn has implications for politics. In the US, the 0-17 population is excluded from the polls, the 18-29 population is mostly abstinent, the 30-44 and 45-59 populations participate less and less, while the 60+ population already accounted for 50% of the votes cast in 2014. The situation is similar in Germany and Switzerland.

Fig. 7.: US-elections. Share of electorate age cohorts adjusted by age-specific turnout rate

Source: Vogt 2021 based on (McDonald, 2019); Graph: Vogt, 2021

Since democracy follows a very specific mathematics (McDonald, 2019), the Distorted Census Weight has extreme effects on the voter orientation of politicians. A politician who wants to be re-elected must first and foremost satisfy the fears and hopes of the old and the very old. He would not be re-elected if he put the hopes and fears of the young and very young at the centre of his election promises. This is the political-demographic background to why so few countries in Europe are investing in a sustainable social and economic future and why pension and health care for the old is swallowing up ever larger shares of the gross national product.

Fig.8.: World: National Governments' Spending on Education
as Share of national Tax 'revenue

Source: UNESCO and ICTD / UN-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset, 2020
Calculation and Graph: Vogt, 2021.

When we have a look on the true ratio, which is the share governments will spend on education from their tax revenue, we see Africa and Latin America very much on top – they spend up to 45% of all taxes for education. This is an enormous investion in the future of these countries.

But in Europe, if we take a look at Hungary or France or Italy, we see them in a rather low position, similar to Azerbaijan.

In Europe, Iceland, Sweden and Estonia are at the top. Almost 20% of their tax revenues go to education, investing in their youth and the future of their countries.

Fig. 9.: Europe: National Governments' Spending on Education
as Share of national Tax 'revenue

Source: UNESCO and ICTD / UNU-WIDER, 2020; Calculation and Graph: Vogt, 2021

Human capital is defined by the World Bank as those resources associated with the knowledge and skills of individuals. They are a critical component of economic and social development. Angrist et al. (2021) comment on data measuring human capital using global data on average education (2000-2017): "These data […] demonstrate a substantial gap in the formation of human capital: students are in school, but do not learn enough." We see that Hungary, Germany and Iceland are almost identical at scoring (511–519–526), but none of them can compete with Singapore 583).

Fig.10.: Human Capital: Average learning (2000-2017)

Singapore	583,339
Germany	526,354
Hungary	519,507
Iceland	511,259

Source: Worldbank, 2021 Graph: Angrist et al, 2021

Who is to pay for the probably largest non-bellicose allocation of funds in human history, the Crown-VII Discretionary Fiscal Measures and the other costs, with its approximately $24 trillion worldwide? It is too early to calculate (a) the costs of the discretionary fiscal measures adopted by the countries of the world in response to COVID-19, (b) the losses to the world economy and, in turn, to the state and communities in the coming years, (c) the individual losses, especially of young citizens. What can be said with the analyses of Brugel Brussels 2020 and Deutsche Bank Research 2020 is that the gross costs of the Corona measures of about two trillion euros are roughly in the order of magnitude of the costs of German reunification, with the difference, however, that reunification was amortised within one generation with a considerable plus of about one trillion euros, while the costs of the Corona measures were handed over to the future by politics. If Avenir Suisse is correct in its estimate of a global cost of around $24 trillion, the response to COVID-19 may be the largest non-bellicose allocation of resources in human history.

Fig. 11.: Most Preliminary Overview of various Discretionary Fiscal Measures
adopted in response to COVID-19

Measures per capita in Euro, and measures as ratio of GDP

Discretionary 2020 fiscal measures	Disc Measures per capita (EUR)	Disc Mesaures as percent of GDP (2019)	Disc Measures total (mio EUR)	National Disc Measure (mio EUR)	pop 2020-01-01	NextGenEU per country	Immediate fiscal impulse	Deferral	Other liquidity /guarantee	NextGenEU per country	GDP 2019 (mio EUR)	share GDP 2019 of EU-27
Italy	16.226	54%	967.736	967.736	59.641.488	5,37%	3,40%	13,20%	32,10%	96.130	1.789.747	12,82%
Germany	18.775	45%	1.561.424	1.561.424	83.166.711	5,37%	8,30%	7,30%	24,30%	185.253	3.449.050	24,70%
Sweden	15.535	34%	160.443	160.443	10.327.589	5,37%	28,44%			25.484	474.468	3,40%
Belgium	13.833	33%	159.391	159.391	11.522.440	5,37%	1,40%	4,80%	21,90%	25.577	476.203	3,41%
France	12.024	33%	809.486	809.486	67.320.216	5,37%	5,10%	8,70%	14,20%	130.288	2.425.708	17,37%
United Kingdom	9.688	26%	649.340	649.340	67.025.542		8,30%	2,00%	15,40%	0	2.526.615	0,00%
Portugal	5.070	24%	52.197	52.197	10.295.909	5,37%	2,50%	11,10%	5,50%	11.457	213.301	1,53%
Spain	5.857	22%	277.225	277.225	47.332.614	5,37%	4,30%	0,40%	12,20%	66.858	1.244.772	8,91%
Denmark	11.908	22%	69.340	69.340	5.822.763	5,37%	5,50%	7,20%	4,10%	16.798	312.747	2,24%
Netherlands	9.482	20%	165.056	165.056	17.407.585	5,37%	3,70%	7,90%	3,40%	43.519	810.247	5,80%
Hungary	2.104	14%	20.553	20.553	9.769.526	5,37%	0,40%	8,30%	0,00%	7.845	146.062	1,05%
Greece	2.014	12%	21.590	21.590	10.718.565	5,37%	3,10%	1,20%	2,10%	9.851	183.414	1,31%
Europe [paritally]	12.274	35%	4.913.780	4.913.780	400.350.948						14.052.334	
United States	8.311	14%	2.735.311		329.135.084		9,10%	2,60%	2,60%		19.128.046	
USA+[EU11]	10.486	23%	7.649.090		729.486.032						33.180.380	

Source: Bruegel, 2020 Brussels and Deutsche Bank research 2020,
complement by OECD, IMF and others; Graphic: Vogt, 2021

In the case of the young Italians, it can be calculated that each of them will have to pay 140 euros a month for the rest of their working lives, just for interest and repayment of the Italian Corona measures in 2020/21.

Even more serious than the economic ruin of the community of states due to the costs of the COVID-19 measures of about 24 trillion Swiss Francs (Avenir Suisse 2020, Deutsche Bank Research 2020) worldwide, which must be borne by the generation of the young, are the psychological and social consequences of the measures. Social distancing is contrary to human nature. The juventocide is essentially a theft of the resonance space.

An example: raising awareness through image analysis provided by museum education

If now, this is my thesis, the future of the country of Hungary lies essentially in the human capital of Hungarian youth, then a prioritisation of state expenditure in the direction of strengthening the resilience of the young is urgently required. My second thesis is that Hungarian museums can play a decisive role in this. For example, by sharpening the aesthetic awareness of the young - to name just one example - with workshops, interactive seminars and critical instructions for raising awareness through image analysis, so that they can weather the storm of fake images better than the generation of the now old.

Let's take a critical look with Frank Fehrenbach, professor at the Department of Art History at the University of Hamburg and co-speaker of the DFG Research Group "Imaginaries of Power" Munich, at that photo from Bergamo from 18.03.2020., which the 28-year-old Ryanair flight attendant Emanuele di Terlizzi shot on Via Borgo Palazzo and which has gone around the world as the incunabulum of the Corona-Harmaggedon (Fehrenbach, 2020; Scherrer, 2020).

Fig. 12.: ZI SPOTLIGHT München (01.07.2020) featuring the photo, taken at Bergamo, Via Borgo Palazzo on 18.03.2020. by Emanuele di Terlizzi from Ryanair

Source: Fehrenbach, 2020

Frank Fehrenbach interprets the photo: „The perspective creates a sharply falling diagonal from top right to bottom left. The photographer was obviously trying to depict as many vehicles as possible. In reality, the convoy consisted of thirteen trucks, but the dramatic cut of the picture creates the impression of an infinitely long convoy. Thus, the picture triggered horror worldwide. The connotation was clear: the conditions in Bergamo are so bad that the army has to remove the overwhelming number of pandemic victims. The power of the image is based on the (apparent) contingency of the detail, the falling diagonal (against the direction of reading) and the emptiness of people, which contributes to the impression of an anonymous nocturnal military action: a spectatorless pompe funèbre without beginning or end." (Fehrenbach, 01.07.2020.)

In terms of music history, for the soundtrack of the picture Richard Wagner's funeral march at Siegfried's death from the last 'Aufzug' of Götterdämmerung suggests itself. Especially in a pathos analysis of the functional mechanisms in comparison with Roby Facchinetti: Rinascerò, Rinascerai / per la mia città ferita [I am reborn, you are reborn / for my wounded city].

Fig. 13.: Roby Facchinetti: Rinascerò, Rinascerai / per la mia città ferita.

Source: Facchinetti, 2020

Similarly, the necessary functional mechanism analyses of counterfeiters, counterfeit divulgators and counterfeit recipients in the fake image from Lampedusa 2013, which was promoted via Facebook as "Bergamo 2020".

Fig. 14.: Fake picture (originally from Lampedusa, 2013),
which was advertised via Facebook as showing Bergamo, 2020

Source: archive.today, 19.03.2020.

Or the 10,000 Heroes on the front page of the New York Times of 24 May 2020, which suggested a link to national heroes from the Vietnam War and others. What must be going on in the mind of journalists who, in full hubris, demagogically use war terms for a natural process they do not understand sufficiently?

Fig. 15.: New York Times, front page 24 May 2020

Source: New York Times, 24.05.2020.

Conclusion

As far as I know, the Military History Museum Dresden is unique in its genre. It critically discusses the contribution of the military and propaganda in the coexistence of states (Kibel, 2021). With this enlightening mission, it brings to life the concept of the responsible citizen and thus lays a decisive foundation for West German democracy, which is based on the responsibility of the citizen.

In the same sense, I can imagine Hungary's museums creating a creative social space for the young and thus setting the course for future democracy in Central Europe. Grimm's fairy tale of the Grim Reaper (Grimm, 1812) is particularly worth re-reading today, as it highlights the historical disadvantage of the poor and disadvantaged. Today, both Corona and the Corona Measures have contributed decisively to the worldwide worsing of the poor's and disadvantaged's position. Against this background, museums might put an inclusive approach at the heart of their future youth work - everyone who is lost is missing for Hungary's future.

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