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Personal Network of the Neapolitan Angevins and Hungary (1290–1304)

The paper tries to uncover the Angevin – Hungarian relations during a chaotic period in the Hungarian history. The main goal of the study is to examine the personal network built by the Sicilian King Charles II in order to ensure the succession of his descendants on the Hungarian throne. The Hungarian nobles and prelates put the son of the Bohemian King up against them. Both parties used all means that were at their disposal to ensure the loyalty of the barons: donation of land and title was the most common way to do so. However the Bohemian Prince fled the country and it seems that the House Anjou could utilize its personal relations better. The paper tries to answer the forthcoming question: could the personal acquaintances of Angevins have a role in this?

Key words: Hungary, Sicily, Angevins, Charles Robert, personal network, Angevin – Hungarian relations, 14th century



I. Introduction

On many occasions Hungarian historiography tried to reveal the affairs of the turbulent period, started with the death of the last king of the House Árpád at the beginning of the 14th century. The reticence of the chronicles incited the researchers to rely mainly on diplomatic sources during the reconstruction of the course of events.¹ Fortunately for the posterity bequeathed documentary material is significant despite the destruction over

¹ Enikő CSUKOVITS: *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I. Károly és uralkodása (1301–1342)* [The Angevins in Hungary I. The Reign of Charles I], Budapest, 2012, p. 10. (hereafter: CSUKOVITS 2012); Pál ENGEL: *Az ország újraegyesítése. I. Károly küzdelmei az oligarchák ellen (1310–1323)*.

the centuries: in the first volume of the grandiose work – which begun under the supervision of Gyula Kristó and aimed to release all Angevin diplomas, that are related to the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary –, more than eight hundred diplomatic sources are published.² This notable amount of documents made not only possible to reveal the most important historical events, but it also encouraged numerous authors to examine the contemporary political structures, social relations and among many other things the commerce and military affairs as well. Pál Engel drew the attention to the fact, that the significant quantity of data that has been preserved in the sources are sufficient – when used as a chronological guide – to compile the royal itinerary, which conferred with certain sub disciplines, makes the historical past more knowable.³

This paper mostly tries to uncover the personal relations of the Neapolitan Angevins with Hungary in this chaotic era. Due to the lack of central authority and the collapse of institutional structures the political, economic and military influence were primarily based on personal relations. We must add, however, that the Hungarian kingdom, namely the concept of the *regnum Hungariae*, was embodied by the Holy Crown during the 14th century.⁴ Charles Robert could use the papacy's particular adherence to this tradition as an advantage in addition to his connections. The personal network of the young Angevin claimant decisively affected the turn events: it initially helped him to accept his rule through a delicate consensus with the prelates and magnates of the country, and later on he managed to crush the oligarchs' power and took the reins of his kingdom. The research is based on the premises formulated by Gerd Althoff and the Münster School: the medieval man was willingly or unwillingly a member of certain social groups and during his life he could leave this groups or he could even form new ones. The clan, kinship and the political connections, alliances and friendships were established by the parents, affected all areas of life.⁵ Although the achievements of the research published by Althoff were based on the observations of the personal networks of nobles and prelates in the Empire during the Carolingian and Ottonian era, but perhaps it is not difficult to see that this general wording is valid for

[The Reunion of the Country. The Struggles of Charles I against the Oligarchs (1310–1323)] *Századok* 122 (1988), p. 89–146. (hereafter: ENGEL 1988) here: p. 90–93.

² Gyula KRISTÓ: *Anjou-kori Oklevéltár. Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia I. 1301–1305.* (Budapest–Szeged. 1990.) (hereafter: AOkl)

³ ENGEL 1988, p. 93.

⁴ József DEÉR: *A magyarok Szent Koronája.* [The Holy Crown of the Hungarians] Mária-besnyő – Gödöllő. 2005. p. 184–185. (hereafter: DEÉR 2005)

⁵ Gerd ALTHOFF: *Verandte, Getreue und Freunde. Zum Politischen Stellenwert der Gruppenbildung im Frühen Mittelalter.* Darmstadt. 1990. p. 1–5.

the period of our study as well. It does not need any further explanation to emphasize the importance of the personal relations during a chaotic time when the oligarchs possessed a very high proportion of the royal prerogatives and in many cases without any legal authorization.⁶ To get a bigger picture on the connections of the young *Caroberto* we must examine the personal networks that were largely shaped by his grandfather and that he inherited upon his father's death.

II. Inherited rights, inherited personal networks

In 1300, when Charles Robert began his journey from Italy to claim his prospective kingdom, his main supporter and guardian was his own grandfather, the Sicilian ruler. Charles II (the lame) was well aware of the current situation in Hungary because he has tried on many occasions to strengthen the positions of the Neapolitan Angevins and to protect the rights of his family by sending envoys and emissaries.⁷ His grandson, who was only twelve years old at that time and was raised at the royal court in Naples, hardly had similar skills on the Hungarian political stage. Let us add that initially there was no need for him to acquire such skills, since the well-organized work that supposed to establish the Angevin rule in Hungary was in full swing since a decade at least and the Neapolitan court designated his father Charles Martell, as the prime candidate on the Hungarian throne. As it is widely known, Queen Mary, the sister of the Hungarian king Ladislaus IV, announced the claim for the Hungarian throne

⁶ According to Gyula Kristó, the phenomenon of exercising sovereign power of the oligarchs had the following criteria: bearing high offices, having own coinage and pursuing an independent foreign policy. See: Gyula KRISTÓ: *A feudális széttagolódás Magyarországon* [Feudal Fragmentation in Hungary]. Budapest. 1979. p. 185–191. (hereafter: KRISTÓ 1979). The royal power brought a series of measures to restore the law and order and thus to limit the oligarchs' power during the 13th century. To the features of abuse of power by the oligarchs See: József GERICS: *Árpád-kori jogintézmények és terminológia törvényhozásunk egyik keltezetlen emlékében* [Legal Institutions of the Árpád Age and Terminology in an Undated Legislative Memory]. *Századok* 103 (1969), p. 611–640, here: p. 628–633. Cf. Pál ENGEL: *Az „1300 körüli” tanácsi határozat keltezéséhez* [To the Dating of the Council Resolution „around 1300”]. In: *Magyarország a (nagy)hatalmak erőterében. Tanulmányok Ormos Mária 70. születésnapjára*. Ed. Ferenc FISCHER – István MAJOROS – József VONYÓ. Pécs. 2000. p. 125–132. here: p. 125; Jenő SZÜCS: *Az utolsó Árpádok* [The Last Árpáds]. Budapest. 2002. p. 461–462, 476. (hereafter: SZÜCS 2002)

⁷ This can be best observed in a diploma which was issued by King Charles II in Paris on the 21st of September 1291. The king tried to introduce the reign of his son with the Hungarian nobles by sending envoys (“[...] *legitimos procuratores et nuncios speciales eundum ad partes Regni Nostri Vngarie* [...]”) and he also demanded oath of fealty (“[...] *homagia et fidelitatis sacramenta* [...]”) from them. *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek az Anjou-korból* [Hungarian Diplomatic Memories from the Angevin Era]. Ed. Gusztáv WENZEL. I–III. Budapest, 1874–1876 (hereafter: MDEA) I. p. 78–79.

short after the death of her brother. By doing so, she basically demanded the crown of Hungary not only for herself but for her descendants too, based on the royal ties between the Árpáds and the Angevins.⁸ The royal court in Naples did not recognize the rule of Andrew III, the successor of Ladislaus. “Andrew the Venetian” as he was called in that time in Naples was considered as a usurper by the Angevins, thus King Charles II began his tough organizing work right after the death of his brother-in-law. This hard work was not without results: in the end, a new dynasty could sit on the throne of Hungary. Hereinafter we’ll try to review those connections and relations that the young *Caroberto* has inherited in 1300 when he arrived to the city of Spalato (Split).

Charles the Lame and his wife, Queen Mary from the House Árpád certainly knew: if they want to ensure the rule over Hungary for their descendants they have to earn the support of the Hungarian prelates and barons. To do so, they had to be familiar with the rather messy and chaotic affairs in Hungary and they had to obtain faithful supporters and followers. It was a common practice in order to gain knowledge on a situation in a foreign country and to convince potential groups by sending emissaries and messengers.⁹ During the selection of an emissary, two main aspects dominated: faithfulness (*fidelitas*) and personal acquaintance (*familiaritas*). Undoubtedly the phrases “faithful follower” and “faithful man”, which are well preserved in the contemporary diplomas, were commonly used over the ages and became simple inevitable forms of a diploma but in such important matters – we are speaking of a crown after all –, it was quite important that the entrusted envoy should be truthful and should represent his lord notions during the negotiations. The exchange of messengers began immediately after the death of the Hungarian king Ladislaus IV: the diploma, that was issued on the 16th of September 1290 and is known from the registry book of the Neapolitan Angevins, disposes that a certain Cosmas,¹⁰ who was the envoy (*nuncius*) of Isabelle,¹¹ widow of the deceased Hungarian king, of the payment of

⁸ MDEA I. p. 82–84.

⁹ To the emissaries and envoys in general see: Volker SCIOR: Bemerkungen zum frühmittelalterlichen Boten- und Gesandtschaftswesen. In: *Der frühmittelalterliche Staat – europäische Perspektiven*. Hrsg. Walter POHL – Veronika WIESER. Wien. 2009. (Forschungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 16.), p. 315–329.

¹⁰ To his identity: Attila ZSOLDOS: *Az Árpádok és asszonyaik* [The Árpáds and their Wives]. Budapest. 2005. p. 114. (hereafter: ZSOLDOS 2005)

¹¹ Isabelle (a. 1264/65 – a. 1304) was the daughter of Charles I and thus the sister of Charles II. In Hungary she used the name Elisabeth (Erzsébet) which was more frequent than Isabelle. ZSOLDOS 2005. p. 191–192.

twelve ounces of gold.¹² Cosmas, who was in Italy after two months of the death of king Ladislaus,¹³ certainly served with important news from Hungary, including that Prince Andrew, the grandson of the late king Andrew II was crowned to king of Hungary on the 23rd of July. Cosmas already performed messenger services for Queen Isabelle on numerous occasions, later on he was found in the service of Charles Martel.¹⁴ Next to him the sources preserved the names of several other people who, in return for various duties, such as diplomatic or apparently unspecified servitium, were awarded with the ruling dynasty's favour and in fortunate cases even their social status could have changed. In this manner the Italian Drugeth family could achieve an admirable career later on. The Drugeths despite the fact that they possessed little influence in the kingdom of Sicily, but due to their loyalty and personal connections in Hungary became one of the most prestigious baronial families, on several occasions their descendants bore the office of the palatine.¹⁵

The exchange of information and maintenance of good relations by sending emissaries worked on the basis of a well-designed system, since the political relations between Hungary and the Angevins ran back over several decades. If we try to find the first liaisons between the two courts, we have to look back in time as far as the reign of the Hungarian king Béla IV (1235–1270). At that time a series of negotiations began, that resulted in

¹² „Cosma [...] de Ungaria, nuncius et familiaris Isabelle regine Ungarie sororis Caroli II, habet pro se [...] uncias auri duodecim”. MDEA I. p. 73.

¹³ The 14th century chronicle composition reports about the date of king Ladislaus's death as follows: „Post hec in brevi ipse rex [Ladislaus] anno Domini M-o CC-o IX-o C-o feria secunda proxima ante festum Sancte Margarethe virginis et martyris prope castrum Kereszeg ab ipsis Cumanis quibus adheserat, est miserabiliter interfectus.” *Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV.* Ed. Alexander DOMANOVSKY. In: *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum. Edendo operi praefuit Emericus SZENTPÉTERY.* I–II. Budapest. 1999. (hereafter: SRH), I. p. 219–505, c. 184. here: p. 473–474.

¹⁴ „Cosma de Ungaria vallictus et familiaris Caroli Martelli Regis Ungarie.” MDEA I. p. 102.

¹⁵ The Drugeth family served the Neapolitan Angevins since generations. In the registry book of Charles I – around 1271 – appeared a certain Nicolaus (“*Nicolaus Drugetti familiaris et fidelis noster*”). MDEA I. p. 33.), who was one of the progenitors of the family. Twenty years after another member of the family, John, showed up as an emissary of Queen Mary (“*Johannes Drugettus miles mittitur per Mariam Reginam cum certis legationibus ad Karolum Regem Vngarie*”). MDEA I. p. 91.) The registry book calls John as a knight thus the family was not among the most illustrious ones. Around 1298, as the registry book of Charles II states, Nicolaus was entrusted with the servitude of Charles Martell's children (“*Nicolaus Drugeti deputatus extitit ad servitium liberorum Karoli Martelli Regis Vngarie*”). MDEA I. p. 132.).

a formal alliance of the two dynasties sealed by a dual marriage.¹⁶ The Neapolitan envoys¹⁷ who appeared in the royal court of the Hungarian king, certainly sent reports to their lord about the existing situation in Hungary, that the real authority over the country is possessed by the barons, who grew increasingly rich in the shadows of the crown. So it is not surprising that after the Angevins became familiar with the prevailing chaotic conditions in Hungary they received some of the most influential barons and their family members or representatives at the royal court in Naples. Until 1301, that indicates the death of King Andrew III, John¹⁸ the son of *ban* Henry, Dujam Frankapan and Radislaus Babonić assuredly visited the court of Charles II. Paulus Šubić or his brothers were summoned in 1294 to the Neapolitan court by Charles Martell and his father.¹⁹ These visits correlates with the statement, which has been confirmed in many cases by the Hungarian historiography, namely the barons pursued an independent “foreign policy” thereby also imitating the royal power.²⁰

Both parties shared common interest to make contacts with each other. The barons did not intend to seize the whole kingdom, even Ladislaus Kán, the voivode of Transylvania did not lower to crown himself, although he had the Holy Crown in his possession. But the emergence of another pretender held forth the possibilities of donations of land and title.²¹ This obvious common interest was organized upon the well-conceived interests of both parties. The diploma,²² issued for the above mentioned *ban* Paulus says that Charles Martel and his father Charles II tried to summon the powerful baron before their presence to be benefited with wise counsel.²³ In this case, it is evident that Charles II asked for help from

¹⁶ More from the connections between the two dynasties, see: Mór WERTNER: *Az Árpádok családi története* [The Family History of the Árpáds]. Nagybecskerek. 1892. p. 510–514; Ferenc PATEK: *Az Árpádok és Anjouk családi összeköttetése* [Family Connections between the Árpáds and the Angevins]. *Századok* 52 (1918), p. 449–495; CSUKOVITS 2012. p. 45–48.

¹⁷ MDEA I. p. 35, 37–38, 64–65.

¹⁸ „*Magister Johannes filius Henrici bani recipitur in militem et familirem Karoli II.*” MDEA I. p. 68.

¹⁹ MDEA I. p. 114.

²⁰ KRISTÓ 1979. p. 191–192; Iván BERTENYI: *Magyarország az Anjouk korában* [Hungary in the Angevin Era]. Budapest. 1987. p. 32–33.

²¹ Pál Engel: *The Realm of Saint Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526*. London – New York. 2001. 129. (hereafter Engel 2001)

²² “[...] *cum nos super prosecutionem negotii nostri predicti Regis Ungarie de Regno nostro Ungarie cum viro nobili Paulo Bano conferre ac eius consilio uti volentes [...]*” MDEA I. p. 114.

²³ Jenő SZÚCS correlated the text of the above mentioned diploma with the ease of tension between King Andrew III and the Šubići (SZÚCS 2002. p. 457), since the king donated the office of the *banus maritimus* to Paul Šubić with hereditary rights. In compensation, the *ban* had to equip 500 armed men against the external and internal enemies of the king. (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*. Ed. Georgius FEJÉR. I–XI. Budae. 1829–1866. vol. VII, t. 4. p. 225–228. (hereafter: FEJÉR); *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*.

ban Paulus to support his and his family's matter in Hungary.²⁴ The Neapolitan court assuredly guaranteed safe passage and personal security for the *ban*, but we can be sure that the king wanted much more than counsel. The counsel (*consilium*) was long since one of the obligations of a vassal to his lord and it was within living memory in Naples, all the more so because this kind of social bond manifested most clearly in France, where the ancient domains of Neapolitan Angevins lied. In addition to the wise counsel the Sicilian king reckoned upon the military support (*auxilium*) of the above mentioned *ban* for his son and after the tragic death of Charles Martel, for his grandson Charles Robert. This meant according to the contemporary political rules, that Paulus Šubić and his *familia*²⁵ should demonstrate allegiance to the House Anjou and its candidate for the throne. As already mentioned above the Neapolitan court was well informed through the continuous exchange of envoys about the precarious balance of power between the king of Hungary and the barons, who made it possible to earn the crown of St. Stephen for Andrew III. However another group that consisted powerful barons from the southern part of the

Ed. Tadija SMIČIKLAS. I–XVIII. Zagreb. 1904–1990. VII. p. 163. However there are good reasons to believe that the diploma was forged. Imre SZENTPÉTERY: *Az Árpád-házi királyok okleveleinek kritikai jegyzéke* [Critical Record of the Kings from the House Árpád]. I–II. Budapest. 1987. (A Magyar Országos Levéltár kiadványai II. Forráskiadványok 13.), nr. 3954. *Ban* Paul previously, on the 19th of August 1292 was donated with nearly the whole territory of Croatia from Hulm (*Comitatus de Chelum*) to Gozd Mountains and Modrus (Modruš). (MDEA I. p. 95–96.) The *ban* finally reached an agreement with the Neapolitan court through his emissaries and he was confirmed in his office in the 17th of June 1295. (MDEA I. p. 124.).

²⁴ The Angevins had a quite different approach towards the feudal rights and the system that was indigenous in Hungary. Charles Martell found it necessary to express the apropos of a donation of land to the Kószegis that the benefaction is in accordance with the French customs. It is very likely that he was not aware of the legal practice in Hungary but it is also obvious that he expected in return those servitudes that were prevalent in France at that time. Hungarian historiography treated the uncovering of the differences between the classic feudal system and the Hungarian donation practice of high importance. The following overview is non-exhaustive: Péter VÁCZY: A királyi serviensek és a patrimonális királyság [The Royal Servients and the Patrimonial Kingdom]. *Századok* 61 (1927), p. 243–290; Péter VÁCZY: A hűbériség szerepe Szent István királyságában [The Role of Feudalism in the Kingdom of St. Stephen]. *Századok* 66 (1932), p. 369–392; Elemér MÁLYUSZ: A patrimonális királyság [The Patrimonial Kingdom]. *Társadalomtudomány* 13 (1933), p. 37–49; Elemér MÁLYUSZ: A karizmatikus királyság [The Charismatic Kingdom]. *Társadalomtudomány* 14 (1934), p. 153–178; György BÓNIS: *Hűbériség és rendiség a középkori magyar jogban* [Feudalism and Estates in the Medieval Hungarian Law]. Budapest. 2003. p. 87–92. (hereafter: BÓNIS 2003)

²⁵ The “political family” means the *familia* of a baron. To its development and functioning in Hungary, see: Gyula SZEKFŰ: *Serviensek és familiárisok* [Servients and Familiars]. Budapest. 1912; ENGEL 2001. p. 126–128.; Gyula KRISTÓ: *Magyarország története 895–1301* [History of Hungary 895–1301]. Budapest. 2007. p. 257–258, 274; BÓNIS 2003. p. 165–231; KRISTÓ 1979. p. 167–179.

Hungarian Kingdom, namely the Kőszegi, Babonić and Šubić families disposed enough power²⁶ so with the aid of these families another claimant could act successfully.

Since in this chaotic period the loyalty of the barons in Hungary was dubious, it is worth to examine the ways and means whereby Charles II and his son Charles Martell tried to preserve their allegiance. As already mentioned, Charles Martell and his wife Clemence²⁷ addressed themselves as rules of the Hungarian Kingdom and they tried to emphasize this through their appearance²⁸ as well. As king of Hungary, Charles Martell felt authorized to grant possessions and various donations. There is a well known diploma that ordains the donations of the whole counties of Sporon and Vas to the son of *ban* Henry Kőszegi by Charles Martell.²⁹ Interestingly this diploma expresses that the donations³⁰ are not only based on royal privilege but also on French customs.³¹ As Enikő Czukovits also noted, this diploma is entirely different from the Hungarian legislative

²⁶ The rebellion of the Šubići and Babonići was temporarily suppressed by Queen mother Tomasina with the occupation of castle Orbászokó, but King Andrew III could not crush the power of the Kőszegis, he was unable to do so even with the military help of Albert, Duke of Austria. Although he managed to capture the castle of Kőszeg, afterwards the siege his troops dissolved. After the military fiasco Andrew tried to enforce his will through diplomacy: he married the daughter of Duke Albert, so the domains of the Kőszegis were surrounded. In addition, he favoured thereafter the Csáks of Trencsén (Trenčín) who were at feud with the Kőszegis on account of the possession Pozsony (Bratislava). Despite all these efforts the king could not bring the powerful family on its knees. Therefore the Angevins had good reasons to believe that they can build upon the military potential and power of the Kőszegis. SZÜCS 2002. p. 457–458; ÉNGEL 1988. p. 107.

²⁷ „*Clementia regina Ungarie, consors Karoli [...]*”. MDEA I. p. 92.

²⁸ “[...] *vetem unam de samito rubeo, laboratam auro traceo ad diuersa opera, orantam pelle urie ad modum Vngaricum [...]*”. MDEA I. p. 93; *Árpádkori új okmánytár. Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus*. Ed. Gusztáv WENZEL. I–XII. Pest – Budapest. 1860–1874. (hereafter: ÁÚO) X. p. 189. The Florentine Chronicle by Giovanni Villani also reports on the fancy clothes of Charles Martel: “[...] King Charles went into France in person, and when he returned with the compact made, and with his sons whom he had set free from prison, he came to the city of Florence, whither was already come to meet him Charles Martel, his son, king of Hungary, with his company of 200 knights with golden spurs, French and Provençal and from the Kingdom, all young men, invested by the king with habits of scarlet and dark green, and all with saddles of one device, with their palfreys adorned with silver and gold, with arms quarterly, bearing golden lilies and surrounded by a bordure of red and silver, which are the arms of Hungary. And they appeared the noblest and richest company a young king ever had with him.” Villani’s Chronicle. *Being Selections from the First Nine Books of the Croniche Fiorentina of Giovanni Villani*. Transl. Rose E. SELFE, ed. Philip H. WICKSTEED. London. 1906. p. 315–316; *Croniche di Giovanni, Matteo e Filippo Villani*. Ed. D. A. RACHELL. I–II. Trieste. 1857–1858. (hereafter: VILLANI 1858) I. p. 175. The cronicle informs about the coronations of Charles Martel as well: VILLANI 1858. I. p. 164–165.

²⁹ MDEA I. p. 87.

³⁰ “[...] *in perpetuum in pheidum [...]*”. MDEA I. p. 87.

³¹ “[...] *iuxta usum et consuetudinem regni Francie [...]*”. MDEA I. p. 87.

customs and written traditions and therefore it was very unlikely that the installation into possession could be reached in this way.³² Enikő Csukovits was right in this matter, however in our opinion, this fact not necessarily put the barons into a disadvantageous position. Especially not Henry Kőszegi and his family, if we take a closer look on the strongholds – that were in the hands of this powerful family – it is clear that these two counties were already in their possession.³³ Hungarian historiography made it clear and proved on numerous occasions that the different crimes committed by the oligarchs while they were preoccupied by forming their domains, they used every single opportunity to put a gloss on the truth and appear legitimate.

Next to John Kőszegi, *ban* Paulus Šubić and his brothers, Grgur and Mladen³⁴ as well as Radislaus Babonić³⁵ received donations. The above mentioned magnates were also confirmed in their possessions³⁶ and titles³⁷ by Charles Martel.

The donations of land and the confirmation in titles were intended to ensure the loyalty of the selected barons and those who could potentially come into question, and as it was mentioned above this loyalty implicated not only the counselling but the protection of the rights of the donator with military means as well. In many cases the Sicilian king himself called on his supporters to wage war against King Andrew III. In January 1292 Charles II and Queen Mary authorized John Kőszegi to raid the domains of the supporters of the Hungarian King as long as they remain in their error and delusion.³⁸ The proposal contained even guarantees that further on the barons do not need to be afraid of any legal consequences.³⁹ Of course, this would have been only possible, if the Angevins had seized the kingdom. In April, “magister John, the noble man” was again entitled for

³² CSUKOVITS 2012. p. 50.

³³ The Kőszegi family possessed the following castles and domains in the county of Vas by the time the diploma was issued in the 12th of April 1291: Borostyánkő (Bernstein), Kőszeg, Léka (Lockenhaus), Újvár (Güssing) (later on: Németújvár), Rohonc (Rechnitz), Szalónak (Stadtschlaining). Pál ENGEL: *Magyarország világi archontológiája 1301–1457* [The Lay Archontology of Hungary 1301–1457]. I–II. Budapest. 1996. (hereafter: ENGEL 1996a) I. p. 285, 350, 357, 375, 401, 420.; Erik FÜGEDI: *Castle and society in Medieval Hungary*. Budapest. 1986. p. 112, 156, 161, 170, 182, 194. (hereafter: FÜGEDI 1986). To the domains of the Kőszegis s. KRISTÓ 1979. p. 151; ENGEL 1988. p. 107.

³⁴ MDEA I. p. 95.

³⁵ MDEA I. p. 98.

³⁶ To the confirmation of the donations of John Kőszegi s. MDEA I. p. 121–122. To the confirmation of the donations of Paul Šubić s. MDEA I. p. 134, 421; As for the Babonić s. MDEA I. p. 139. To Dujam Frankopan s. MDEA I. p. 145.

³⁷ To the office of *ban* of Paul Šubić s. MDEA I. p. 124.

³⁸ “[...] *quandiu eos in ipsius erroris devio perdurare contigerit* [...]”. MDEA I. p. 82.

³⁹ “[...] *ita quod nullam penam, nec etiam iudicii faciem propterea formidetis* [...]”. MDEA I. p. 81–82.

another attack by the king.⁴⁰ King Charles II appealed to the prelates, barons, counts and nobles of Hungary to send an army to validate and protect the rights of his firstborn son.⁴¹ The Šubići were also encouraged by the Neapolitan court to wage war and defend the Angevin interests in Hungary.⁴² Charles II contributed this matter in every possible way: he not only authorized his men to ship grain and food⁴³ to Hungary but he also aided his supporters with arms⁴⁴ and horses. Several sources confirm that the king lent money and respectively provided financial support to his son and later on to his grandson.⁴⁵

Charles Robert's grandfather tried to develop beneficial relations not only with the Hungarian barons. The Neapolitan Angevins and the papacy traditionally had good relations and of course, King Charles aimed to utilize this for the good of his grandson.⁴⁶ Based on the texts of several diplomas, the king tried to reach an agreement with the Hungarian Church as well. According to the charter which was issued in Naples in April 1300, Peter, the prior of the Dominican monks of the city of Kassa, took the future king's affairs under his wings and represented the Angevin offspring's interests in Hungary.⁴⁷ King Charles II wanted to forge a loose alliance with Venice too against the Hungarian king, Andrew III, whom he held as usurper.⁴⁸

⁴⁰ MDEA I. p. 90.

⁴¹ MDEA I. p. 114.

⁴² MDEA I. p. 85–86.

⁴³ There are numerous command letters in which the king allows the exportation of food, supplies and grain. In this case the diploma which was issued in 1295 reveals the motive behind these command letters. Charles II issued this charter to provide grain to certain castles that were on his son's loyalty in Slavonia. ("[...] *castrorum sitorum in partibus Sclavonie que nuper ad Karolii primogeniti nostri regis Ungarie [...] fidem et dominum peruenerunt [...]*") These castles became even more important after the arrival of Charles Robert to Slavonia. MDEA I. p. 123. To the strategical role and military importance of the castles in general, see: FÜGEDI 1986. p. 46–50. and Pál ENGEL: "Honor, castrum, comitatus". *Studies in the Government System of the Angevin Kingdom*. In: *Questiones medii aevi novae* 1 (1996), p. 91–100. here: p. 91.

⁴⁴ MDEA I. p. 134.

⁴⁵ Among others: MDEA I. p. 90, 148. The Neapolitan Angevins had business ties primarily with the bank house of the Bardis in Florence.

⁴⁶ It is evident that the Holy See and Naples maintained close connections. During the exchange of emissaries the Hungarian affairs of the Angevins were also discussed: "*Procuratorium Magistri Guillelmi missi a Karolo primogenito etc. ad Romanam Curiam pro negotiis tam Regni Sicilie quam Vngarie promouendis et prosequendis.*" MDEA I. p. 120.

⁴⁷ MDEA I. p. 144–145.

⁴⁸ "[...] *contra Andream occupatorem regni Ungarie [...]*." MDEA I. p. 419.

Before the young Angevin prince was going to start his journey to his new home, his grandfather, Charles King of Sicily and Jerusalem encouraged several Hungarian dignitaries⁴⁹ again to accept his grandson as King of Hungary.⁵⁰ The most important statement was made by Queen Mary after all, when she resigned her rights in favour of her son in Provence in the city of Aix on the 6th of January 1292.⁵¹ Surely Enikő Csukovits is right to state that “the incoming news from Hungary made the Angevins realize that a male claimant could have better chances”.⁵² However, it should be added that these news and wise counsel would not have reached the court at Naples, if the ruling family had not had trustful and loyal relations. After the sudden and tragic death of Charles Martell this right was inherited by his son Charles Robert as well as the above discussed personal network.

III. Nominal loyalty, personal loyalty

Charles II made extensive preparations in order to send his grandson to Hungary, he also entrusted the Anjou-party’s strength and loyalty. Before the departure, the number of the Neapolitan envoys visiting Hungary have multiplied, particularly towards Slavonia (Slavonija) and the southern parts of the country.⁵³ Isabelle, the widow of Ladislaus IV and the sister of Charles the Lame returned from Hungary during the year. The Sicilian monarch already disposed of the return journey prior to the year 1300. He sent his personal trustees, Petrus Sura and Petrus Pillezo with heavily armed galleys to the city of Spalato.⁵⁴ The homecoming of Queen Isabelle was important to King Charles as he wanted her in safety and assured that she could not be used against the Angevins during the forthcoming frays. The king himself was held in captivity in his youth, he was used during a series of political bargains and was well aware that his sister as a hostage can be beneficial for the future opponents of his grandson.

⁴⁹ “[...] *diversis principibus regni Vngarie pro titulando Karolum nepotem suum in regem Ungarie* [...]”. MDEA I. p. 422.

⁵⁰ Charles II made pleas in order to support his son’s and grandson’s cause on several times to the nobles and clergymen of Hungary. He stated on every occasion that the “Venetian Andrew” is holding the kingdom by force and his rule is illegitimate, the rightful heir to the throne is none other than the descendant of Queen Mary, sisiter of the memorable king Ladislaus IV. Queen Mary was his wife, so he was referring to his son and later on his grandson. MDEA I. p. 76, 84, 422.

⁵¹ MDEA I. p. 82.

⁵² CSUKOVITS 2012. p. 49. Quotation translated by P. B.

⁵³ MDEA I. p. 143, 144, 145.

⁵⁴ MDEA I. p. 138.

Furthermore he assigned a commander, Odo at the head of the castles of Slavonia.⁵⁵ Dujam Frankopan⁵⁶ and the Babonići⁵⁷ were also confirmed in their possessions. The king took care of the armament and provisions of the young prince and designated a captain to command the ships. The king supported his grandson with money as well, while the prince was staying in Apulia, according to the above cited registry book.⁵⁸ The young Anjou offspring arrived to the city of Spalato in August 1300, from where his aunt began her journey to home. The chronicle of Micha Madius de Barbazanis⁵⁹ reports the landing of *Caroberto* at Spalato as follows: “*Anno Domini MCCC. mense Augusto, tempore Bonifacii papae, D. Carolus, nepos Caroli regis Siciliae, per mare cum galeis Spalatum applicuit, ubi per mensem vel fere duos stetit. Egreadiensque de civitate Spalatensi, in comitatu Pauli bani, versus Ungariam, ad usurpandum regnum praedictum de manu regis Andreae, venit Sagrabiam, et ibi in manibus magistri Hugrini traditur.*”⁶⁰

The young scion had no significant army at his disposal, but when we take a closer look at the castles (*castrum*), which were under the lordship of the barons, mentioned by the chronicle, namely Paul and magister Ugrinus,⁶¹ we could state that the claimant and his party established a strong beach-head in the territory of Slavonia and Croatia.⁶² There were no major campaigns and notable battles, although Petrus de Bonzano, the envoy of King Andrew III in Rome, encouraged his monarch that he should capture the pretender in assistance with Henry Kőszegi and other barons as

⁵⁵ MDEA I. p. 144.

⁵⁶ MDEA I. p. 145.

⁵⁷ MDEA I. p. 146–147.

⁵⁸ MDEA I. p. 155.

⁵⁹ To his identity see: Éva B. HALÁSZ: Micha Madius de Barbazanis – a történetíró és spalatói nemes patricius [Micha Madius de Barbazanis – the Historian and Noble Patrician of Spalato]. In: *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis Acta Historica CXXXV*. Eds. László VESZPRÉMY – Ferenc PITI. Szeged. 2013. p. 59–70.

⁶⁰ Ioannes Georgius SCHWANDTNERUS: *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum veteres ac geniui I–III*. Vindobonae. 1746–1748. III. p. 638. (hereafter: SRHVG)

⁶¹ To his identity see: Kornél SZOVÁK: ‘Ugrin’. In: *Korai magyar történeti lexikon (9–14. század)*. [Lexicon of the Early Hungarian History (9–14th centuries)] Ed. Gyula KRISTÓ – Pál ENGEL – Ferenc MAKK. Budapest. 1994. p. 697; János KARÁCSONYI: *A magyar nemzetségek a XIV. század közepéig* [Hungarian Genera until the Middle of the 14th Century]. (reprint) Budapest. 1995. p. 358–365. (hereafter: KARÁCSONYI 1995)

⁶² Considering that the number of castles possessed by Šubići, Babonići and Ugrinus Csák around 1300 was circa 30 (FÜGEDI 1986. passim, ENGEL 1996a, ENGEL 1988. p. 107.) and in comparison with the 55–56 castles of Matthew Csák at the peak of his power (Gyula KRISTÓ: *Csák Máté* [Matthew Csák]. Budapest. 1986. (hereafter: KRISTÓ 1986), p. 162.) It is clear that Charles Robert could be expelled only with notable military force.

the perfect opportunity has showed up.⁶³ The king had no chance to take his envoy's advice because he unexpectedly died on the 14th of January 1301. The news from the king's death reached *Caroberto* in Zagreb where he enjoyed the hospitality of the bishop.⁶⁴ His most loyal supporters acted quickly, Gregory Bicskei the elected archbishop of Esztergom crowned him to king of Hungary in the same year when Andrew III died. Since Fehérvár, the traditional crowning city of the Hungarian kings, where the Holy Crown was also kept, closed its gates before Gregory Bicskei, the archbishop could only perform the crowning ceremony with an occasional diadem in Esztergom.⁶⁵ The prelate was certainly aware of the illegality of the crowning since he could only fulfil one from the three traditional conditions of the crowning of the Hungarian kings.⁶⁶ With this act he openly identified himself with the Angevin claims, believing that the Hungarian clergy would line up behind him. He had to err in his calculations. The opposite side, which did not wish for the rule of the Anjou claimant, alluded to the free election of the Hungarian kings, and so they called in the son of the Bohemian King Wenceslaus, who likewise stemmed from the strips of the Árpáds by the female line and later on he ruled in Hungary by the name

⁶³ "[Interea procedatis – editors addition, G. WENZEL] *cum filiis Henrici Bani, et cum aliis vestris Baronibus, cum quibus potestis, qui de facili pete stis habere puerum in manibus vestris, si vultis. [...]*" ÁÚO V. nr. 169.

⁶⁴ SRHVG III. p. 638.

⁶⁵ The exact date of the coronation is unknown but it seems that it took place during spring-time. The letter of Boniface VIII to Nicolaus bishop-cardinal on the 17th of Oktober 1301 reports that the coronation event has already occurred. (*Anjou-kori oklevéltár. Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regnum Andegavensium illustrantia*. Ed. Tibor ALMÁSI – László BLAZOVICH – Lajos GÉCZI – Tamás KÓFALVI – Gyula KRISTÓ – Ferenc MAKK – Ferenc PITI – Ferenc SEBŐK – Ildikó TÓTH. Budapest – Szeged. 1990–. I–XXXI. I. nr. 89.). Most recently on the coronation see: Attila ZSOLDOS: Anjou Károly első koronázása [The First Crowning of Charles Anjou]. In: *Auxilium historiae. Tanulmányok a hetvenesztendő Bertényi Iván tiszteletére*. Ed. Tamás KÖRMENDI – Gábor THOROCZKAY. Budapest. 2009. p. 405–413.

⁶⁶ The right to crown the Hungarian kings of the archbishop of Esztergom is known from long ago. King Béla III (1172–1196) disposed that he would accept the crown from the hands of the archbishop of Kalocsa however in the future this act should not damage to crowning rights of the archbishop of Esztergom. Gergely KISS: *Az esztergomi érsek királyi egyházak feletti joghatóságának kialakulása a 11–13. században* [The Development of the Authority of the Archbishop of Esztergom Over the Royal Churches in the 11th to 13th Centuries]. *Századok* 145 (2011), p. 269–292. here: p. 274–275. The sources call the diadem that had been used during the coronation ceremony of the Hungarian kings as St. Stephen's crown since the reign of Andrew III. Andrew, who had difficulties to accept his rule with the nobles, needed this new kind of legitimization based on the first king of Hungary. DEÉR 2005. p. 181. Cf. Erik FÜGEDI: *A Magyar király koronázásának rendje a középkorban* [The Coronation Ordo of the Hungarian Kings in the Middle Ages]. In: *Eszmetörténeti tanulmányok a magyar középkorról*. Budapest. 1984. (Memoria Saeculorum Hungariae 4.), p. 265–268.

of Ladislaus.⁶⁷ The majority of the “Bohemian party” consisted by clergymen and their leader, John, archbishop of Kalocsa crowned the Bohemian Prince to the king of Hungary on the 27th of August 1301.⁶⁸ At the beginning of the next year Charles Robert and his allies organized a military campaign against Buda,⁶⁹ where Wenceslaus was settled in, to preclude further feuds. However this action was unsuccessful, they could not capture Wenceslaus, and the city of Buda remained in the hands of the Bohemian Prince. Hungary was divided into fractions.⁷⁰

As Gyula Kristó stated, Gregory Bicskei performed a coup with the illegitimate crowning. This was a planned scheme – as the professor furthermore pronounced – whereas Charles had no significant societal support except the barons of the southern regions and a certain ecclesiastical circle.⁷¹ We must agree with Gyula Kristó in the fact the archbishop tried to seize the power for Charles Robert by illegitimate ways, but as far as the social support goes, we are determined that the supporting force of the Anjou Prince was not insignificant. In our opinion the chances to acquire the throne of Hungary for Charles Robert were by no means negligible. To interpret the current situation in Hungary, researchers often rely on the words of Mario Marignon, the Venetian emissary of James II (1291–1327), king of Aragon. The emissary reported to his lord that the chances to acquire the power over Hungary are better for the son of the Bohemian king.⁷² Professor Kristó also published a study about the baronial elite of Charles Robert. In this study he collected all the names of those barons and nobles who could influence the political situation in Hungary between the years 1301 and 1309 based on nine different sources.⁷³ In the first column of the table, where the names are presented, 44 items are enumer-

⁶⁷ SRH I. p. 479–480. (Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV)

⁶⁸ „Eodem autem anno in die Rufi martyris per Colossensem archiepiscopum in civitate Alba Regali regum Ungarie sacro diademate cum preclara solemnitate festive coronatus est, ubi archiepiscopi, comites ac plurimi nobiles affuerunt et peracto illius festivitatis gaudio ipsum regem novum in Budam honorifice deduxerunt. Sic igitur heres Bohemie factus est rex Ungarie.” *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum. Prameny dejin ceskych*. I–VIII. Ed. Josef EMLER. Pragae. 1873–1932. IV. p. 84.

⁶⁹ Gyula KRISTÓ: *Az Anjou-kor háborúi* [The Wars of the Angevin Era]. Budapest. 1988. (hereafter: KRISTÓ 1988), p. 14.

⁷⁰ KRISTÓ 1988. p. 12.

⁷¹ KRISTÓ 1988. p. 11.

⁷² Vilmos FRAKNÓI: Wenczel király megválasztása 1301-ben [The Election of King Wenceslaus in 1301]. *Századok* 48 (1914), p. 81–88. (hereafter: FRAKNÓI 1914) here: p. 81–82; Heinrich FINKE: *Acta Aragonensia. Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen Kirchen und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II. (1291–1327)*. I–III. Berlin – Leipzig. 1908–1923. (hereafter: FINKE 1923) here: I. p. 241–242.

⁷³ Gyula KRISTÓ: I. Károly főúri elitje (1301–1309). [The Baronial Elite of Charles I (1301–1309)] *Századok* 133 (1999), p. 41–62. (hereafter: KRISTÓ 1999) here: p. 42–43.

ated and according to the chapter 188 of the 14th century chronicle composition, only three barons were assuredly on Charles loyalty. In contrast, we can find six magnates on Wenceslaus' side. However if we complete this list with the barons from the southern regions of the country, although the chronicle does not mention them, but as we have stated above, they were the main supporters of Charles, we would see a quite similar number on the list of names. The Angevins tried to make long lasting ties with them above others (i.e. the Šubić and Babonić families etc.) and so the number of barons supporting Charles would be equal with the supporters of Wenceslaus. It is obvious that the balance of power was shifted towards Wenceslaus, but the fact should not be side-lined that the supporting barons of Wenceslaus never undertook a joint military action against the Anjou party. In 1302 when Charles Robert and his allies threatened the city of Buda, where Wenceslaus resided, only the Kőszegis mobilized their forces.⁷⁴ It is also known from this chapter of the chronicle, that the majority of the prelates supported Wenceslaus as well. However the head of those clergymen, John, archbishop of Kalocsa died in 1301 short after the coronation of Wenceslaus.⁷⁵ The prelates' commitment towards Wenceslaus was further weakened by the fact that pope Boniface VIII sent his legate, brother Nicolaus, bishop of Ostia and Velletri to Hungary with the unconcealed intention, to turn the balance on Charles' side.⁷⁶ Even profes-

⁷⁴ Pál ENGEL – Gyula KRISTÓ – András KUBINYI: *Magyarország története 1301–1526* [History of Hungary 1301–1526] Budapest. 1998. p. 46. To the details of the skirmishes at Buda see: KRISTÓ 1988. p. 14–15; Antal PÓR – Gyula SCHÖNHERR: *Az Anjouk kora az Anjou ház és örökösei* [The Angevin Era. House Anjou and its Successors]. In: *A magyar nemzet története*. I–X. Ed. Sándor SZILÁGYI. Budapest. 1895. III. p. 3–84. (hereafter: PÓR–SCHÖNHERR 1898) here: p. 15.

⁷⁵ Boniface VIII called him as late in his letter to the chapter of Kalocsa in the 8th of November 1301. (“[...] *archiepiscopus Colocensis diem clausit extremum* [...]” *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*. I–II. Ed. Augustinus THEINER. Romae. 1859–1860. I. p. 390. (hereafter: VMH)

⁷⁶ The command letter of pope Boniface VIII that he wrote on the 17th of October 1301 to cardinal Boccassini contains specific details regarding the proceedings of the legate in accordance to the vacant Hungarian throne. VMH I. p. 388–389; Gergely KISS: *Hatalmi legitimációs elképzelések Magyarországon 1290–1310* [Concepts of Legitimization of Power in Hungary 1290–1301]. Conference presentation. *Hatalmi reprezentáció Közép- és Kelet-Európában a 11–18. században*. Pécs. 25–26. September 2014. (hereafter: KISS 2014); Regarding the actions of Boccassini see: Gergely KISS: *A pápai legátusok és a magyar egyházjog az Anjou-kor elején* [Papal Legates and the Hungarian Ecclesiastical Law in the Beginning of the Angevin Era]. In: *Pécsi történeti katedra. Cathedra historica Universitatis Quinqueecclesiensis*. Ed. Zoltán CSABAI – Anna DÉVÉNYI – Ferenc FISCHER – Péter HAHNER – Gergely KISS – József VONYÓ. Pécs. 2008. p. 271–285. here p. 272–273, 280; Gergely KISS: *Les légats pontificaux en Hongrie au temps des rois Angevins (1298–1311)*. In: *La diplomatie des états Angevins aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*. Actes

sor Kristó is very careful with the chapter 188 of the chronicle and expresses his doubts over its trustworthiness.⁷⁷ So before we could express our opinion in the matter we have to examine another source with caution, which is a diploma⁷⁸ issued on the 26th of September 1302. In this document King Wenceslaus donates lands formerly belonged to the Queen to Ladislaus, son of *comes* Ladislaus and to Stephen, son of John for their merits they earned during the skirmishes in 1302 in the outskirts of Buda. The king enumerates all those barons in the diploma who raided his kingdom as the supporters of Charles.⁷⁹ According to this source we can line up eight barons on the side of Charles, and next to Wenceslaus there are seven barons to be found, but it is true that the most powerful lords in principle sided with the son of the Bohemian king.⁸⁰ The chapter 189 of the chronicle composition provides information about why the barons sided Wenceslaus only in principle: “*nullum castrum, nulla potentias seu potestas, nullum ius regale, sicut Carolo puero, ex parte baronum restituuntur.*”⁸¹

In our opinion and in the lights of the sources, Charles had his chances to seize the crown even if he had to flee to the southern parts of the kingdom after the venturesome enterprise in Esztergom, namely his crowning. After the ceremony the city was taken by force,⁸² by John Kőszegi the baron, whom the Angevins tried to forge an alliance on several occasions. Back in 1292, John was a stalwart member of the Angevin party, he even

du colloque international de Szeged, Visegrád, Budapest 13–16 septembre 2007. Sous la direction de Zoltán KORDÉ et István PETROVICS, Rome – Szeged, 2010. 101–116.

⁷⁷ KRISTÓ 1999. p. 41. However he rated as reliable in his former work. See: KRISTÓ 1986. p. 102–103.

⁷⁸ KRISTÓ 1999. p. 41; AOkl. I. nr. 287.

⁷⁹ “[...] *quo Karolus cum Ugrino filio Pous Stephano filio Marci Leukes filio Laurentii dicti Chete et Opour ac aliis infidelibus nostris et devastatibus regni nostri contra nostram insurrexat maistatem [...]*”. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára. Mohács előtti gyűjtemény. Diplomatikai Levéltár. [National Archives of Hungary. Collection Antemohacsiana. Diplomatic Collection] 86 892. (hereafter: DL)

⁸⁰ In 1302 the baronial support was divided between the two parties as follows (the offices of the barons are shown in brackets): supporters of Charles: Ugrinus Csák (*comes* of Szerém, Valkó, Bács and Pozsega), Stephen Csák, Lőkös Kán, Apor Péc, Paul Šubić (*ban* of Croatia), Stephen Babonić, John Babonić, Radislaus Babonić (*ban*); supporters of Wenceslaus: Matthew Csák (palatine, *comes* of Trencsén), Kakas Rátót, Domonkos Rátót (master of the treasury, master of the doorkeepers, *comes* of Nógrád and Szepes), Stephen Ákos (palatine), Ladislaus Rátót (*ban*, master of the Queen’s treasury), Henry Kőszegi (Héder) (master of the treasury, *ban* of Slavonia, *comes* of Somogy and Tolna), Demeter Balassa. ENGEL 1996a. II. p. 16, 47–48, 122, 135, 187, 202–203, 218.

⁸¹ SRH I. p. 481. (Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV)

⁸² *Monumenta ecclesiae Strigoniensis*. I–IV. Ed. Ferdinandus KNAUZ – Lodovicus CRESCENS DEDEK – Gabriel DRESKA – Geysa ÉRSZEGI – Andreas HEGEDŰS – Tiburcius NEUMANN – Cornelius SZOVÁK – Stephanus TRINGLI. Strigonii – Budapestini. 1874–1999. II. p. 356. (hereafter: MES)

took King Andrew III in captivity and by this act he was excommunicated from the church by the Hungarian prelates.⁸³ It is true that Charles Robert did not have an army large enough to enforce his will but this statement stands valid in regard of Wenceslaus as well. The most powerful barons who possessed the strongest military might, Matthew from the genus Csák and the Kőszegis, did not seek to undertake a joint military enterprise against Charles. Matthew and John bore the title of palatine at the same time, so there was no chance for both of them to take arms for Wenceslaus's cause, and beside that, they were interested in maintaining the feud between the two kings and preserve the chaotic situation in Hungary, thereby they could fish in troubled waters and gain more and more power and wealth. The biggest military success for Wenceslaus's party was the capture of Esztergom, although some barons marched against the castles of Charles in the south before autumn 1302. Later on we will discuss this event in details but in advance it can be said that the purpose of this action was to capture Charles Robert. In any case, it seems that after the crowning of Wenceslaus a stalemate situation has emerged and none of the two parties could mobilize such force by which the other side could be overthrown. Therefore the key of the situation lay in diplomatic actions and by luring the members of the other party either by force or material wealth. As we will see at the end, the Angevins were more successful to seize their political relations than Wenceslaus and his family.

The indicated chronicle chapter notes that likewise Wenceslaus, the barons gave no authority to Charles either. The question then becomes: from which barons is this information preserved on the pages of the chronicle? It is certain that those magnates who have sided with Wenceslaus did not bother themselves to respect the rights of Charles, as they did not accept him as the king of Hungary. What about the lords who supported Charles's rule? If we take a closer look on the relations forged by the Neapolitan court, we might see that the barons from the southern regions remained loyal to Charles and we might reckon with the archbishop of Esztergom and the bishop of Zagreb as well. The sons of *ban* Henry, whom the Angevins tried to forge an alliance, ratted from the cause. Moreover, as it was mentioned above, in 1302 they attacked the strongholds in the county of Pozsega (Požega), which was the base of Charles.⁸⁴ The castle was handed over to Charles's possession by Paul Garai, son of *comes* Stephen from the genus Dorozsma by the urge of magister Ugrinus. Paul repulsed the attack of the Kőszegis and crushed the rebellion that followed the attack

⁸³ KARÁCSONYI 1995. p. 605; SZŰCS 2002. p. 456.

⁸⁴ KRISTÓ 1988. p. 14.

in the county. His father, comes Stephen served magister Ugrinus⁸⁵ and was also the sword bearer of King Béla IV. Later on, in 1310 according to a charter, when Charles Robert rewarded his loyalty by land, in the text of the diploma his father was called as *ban*.⁸⁶ Paul Garai, who certainly belonged to the *familia* of Ugrinus, remained loyal to Charles Robert, and for this and other merits he not only received land but also bore the title of *ban* of Macsó between the years 1320 and 1328.⁸⁷ The southern barons of Charles stuck up for the king and when it was necessary they even took up arms against his enemies. The deliverance of castle Pozsega is such kind of gesture that simply does not fit in the situation depicted by the chronicle. Of course this does not mean that every single castle and royal prerogative was handed over to Charles by the Anjou party, but the handover of the castle Pozsega was a symbolic act. We would find no similarities on Wenceslaus's side. Though the Kőszegis handed over the city of Esztergom for a huge amount,⁸⁸ but before the crowning of Charles the archiepiscopal seat was never under their control.⁸⁹

King Wenceslaus and his father tried to gain supporters in a similar way as the Angevins: they donated land to several barons and nobles including Kakas,⁹⁰ son of Stephen from the genus Rátót, comes Stephen the Red, castellan of Esztergom and his brother⁹¹ Matthew from genus Csák⁹² as well as Jordanus comes of the Saxons.⁹³ They have confirmed the donations of their predecessors, namely King Ladislaus IV and Andrew III, furthermore at the request of the barons they donated lands for their *familiars*. Nonetheless Wenceslaus had to leave the kingdom, although he was initially supported by the majority of the Hungarian clergy: Nicholas bishop of Ostia and Velletri, the papal legate reported to the pope that nearly every single prelate turned against the elected archbishop of Esztergom,⁹⁴ who was widely known as a quarter-master of the Angevin interests. The long-term and hard work of Charles II paid off as later on the legate and

⁸⁵ KARÁCSONYI 1995. p. 438.

⁸⁶ *Anjoukori Okmánytár. Codex diplomaticus Andegavensis. I–VII.* Ed. Imre NAGY – Gyula NAGY. Budapest. 1878–1920. (hereafter: AO) I. p. 195–196.

⁸⁷ ENGEL 1996a. I. p. 27.

⁸⁸ PÓR – SCHÖNHERR 1898. p. 10.

⁸⁹ On the 31st of July 1305 the late *ban* Henry and his sons were excommunicated by Thomas, elected archbishop of Esztergom for the occupations of the archiepiscopal seat and for the destruction of church property. The damage was worth of 500 thousand silver mark. FEJÉR vol. VIII, t. 1. p. 183–190; MES. II. p. 556–559.

⁹⁰ AOkI. I. nr. 67.

⁹¹ AOkI. I. nr. 91.

⁹² AOkI. I. nr. 184, 185, 186.

⁹³ AOkI. I. nr. 132, 268.

⁹⁴ AOkI. I. nr. 103.

pope – Boniface, as it was mentioned before, maintained good relations with the king of Sicily – achieved that the prelates finally turned side.

As the Sicilian king used his time well over more than a decade he successfully built up a reliable personal network and in contrast, the other party was hastily and loosely connected. The prelates and barons only arrived to Prague in July 1301 to create a king from the son of the Bohemian ruler. The entourage that escorted the young prince to Hungary consisted by noblemen, who wanted a weak king and until they were certain that the Holy Crown of Hungary would get on the head of the young Wenceslaus, not on his father's, who would be quite though for them, they held out on Wenceslaus's side. The prelates and barons chose the son of the Bohemian king Wenceslaus II, because they feared that the country would have lost its freedom, if they had supported a king given by the papacy.⁹⁵ This kind of fear arose among the educated prelates who were also learned in the ways of law, since the barons, even those who bore the highest offices violated the laws and customs of the country and they just wanted to keep up the appearance.⁹⁶

In the meantime Charles II continued his work: he helped the supporters of his grandson with grain,⁹⁷ horses⁹⁸ and by raising taxes at home.⁹⁹ The Sicilian king, according to his often cited registry book awarded *ban* Paul with 100 ounces of gold yearly.¹⁰⁰ The *ban* however traded this amount of money almost immediately to 1000 *salmae* of grain that was to be shipped yearly.¹⁰¹ Queen Mary, the wife of Charles II put a golden

⁹⁵ SRH I. p. 480. (Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV). Pope Boniface VIII, who was convinced by the primate of the spirital authority over lay power, formulated the legal claims for the Hungarian throne in a letter to legate Nicholas: since St. Stephen the first Christian king of Hungary offered his country to the Roman Church and he also received his crown from the pope, thus the the right of designating a new king belongs to the pope. He justified this with documents from the papal archives. Most likely he assumed no resistance from the Angevins since the papacy played a significant role during the events in which the Angevins seized the throne of Sicily. *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*. I–II. Ed. August POTTHAST. Graz, 1957. nr. 25159; VMH I. p. 392–393. This kind of argumentation was a source of series of misunderstandings between the Árpáds and the papacy. For more details, see: József GERICS – Erzsébet LADÁNYI: A Hartvik legenda keletkezési körülményeiről [About the Circumstances of the Origin of the Hartvik Legend]. *Magyar Könyvszemle* 120 (2004:4), p. 317–324; Gábor THOROCZKAY: *Egyháztörténeti forrástanulmányok a XI. századi magyar történelemről* [Ecclesiastical and Source Studies on the 11th Century Hungarian History]. Budapest – Szeged. 2003. p. 61–132.

⁹⁶ KRISTÓ 1986. 170–172.

⁹⁷ MDEA I. p. 161, 164.

⁹⁸ MDEA I. p. 162.

⁹⁹ MDEA I. p. 165.

¹⁰⁰ "Paulus Banus Croatorum pro seruitiis presentis maxime in prosecutione negotii Regni Vngarie habuit vncias auri centum annuas." MDEA I. p. 168.

¹⁰¹ MDEA I. p. 170.

crown, decorated with different precious stones in pledge, into a Florentine bank house in order to help her grandson with 300 ounces of gold.¹⁰² At the beginning of the 14th century *ban* Paul received an invitation to Naples,¹⁰³ and Dujam Frankopan and Radislaus Babonić visited again the court in person.¹⁰⁴ To the young *Caroberto*, who was merely a boy when he arrived to Hungary, the above mentioned magister Ugrinus was his guardian and protector (*conservator*),¹⁰⁵ despite the fact that the members of the Anjou party held him in captivity in 1292 and *ban* Radislaus had to intervene in order to regain Ugrinus's freedom.¹⁰⁶

Based on the preserved sources, aside from the interlude in Esztergom and the venture in Buda, Charles was found at the southern regions of the kingdom. In 1300 his journey started from Spalato and he shortly arrived to Zagreb. To attend on the crowning ceremony he headed towards Székesfehérvár with Gregory Bicskei and when he could not enter the city he travelled to Esztergom. In September 1301, when Mario Marignon made a report on the situation in Hungary to his lord, James II king of Aragon,¹⁰⁷ he also noted that the papal legate, Niccolò Boccassini arrived to Venice and later on he went to Hungary: "An archbishop, the former prior of the Dominican order arrived to Venice; he is going to Hungary as a legate in order to install the son of king Charles, who resides in Slavonia, to the kingdom."¹⁰⁸ According to a command letter that was issued by Charles II in the name of his grandson in December about a shipment of 600 *salmae* grains, also reports that the young king is dwelling in Slavonia.¹⁰⁹ As it was noted before, *ban* Paul handed over Charles Robert under the protection of magister Ugrinus in Zagreb. The domains of Ugrinus lied in the southern parts of the country, in the region of Szerémség (Syrmia), and Újlak (Ilok) was its centre.¹¹⁰ Beside this, he was also *comes* of Bács, Pozsega, Szerém and Valkó and he was definitely controlling the royal castles and lands through his familiars of these counties. Probably Pozsega

¹⁰² "[...] *coronam unam de auro cum diuersis lapidibus pretiosis* [...]." MDEA I. p. 174.

¹⁰³ MDEA I. p. 172.

¹⁰⁴ MDEA I. p. 174.

¹⁰⁵ KARÁCSONYI 1995. p. 368.

¹⁰⁶ *Hazai okmánytár. Codex diplomaticus patrius. I–VIII.* Ed. Imre NAGY – István PAUR – Károly RÁTH – Dezső VÉGHÉLYI. Győr – Budapest. 1865–1891. VII. p. 230–231.

¹⁰⁷ AOkI. I. nr. 69.

¹⁰⁸ Translated by the author, based on the Hungarian translation by Vilmos Fraknói. See: FRAKNÓI 1914. p. 81–82; "Un gardenal, ce fo general de li frar Predicator, pasa per Venesia a lensita de Cullio, va in Ongaria per a legato e per a dourar a so potere de meter lo figlo de lo rey Carillo en lo riane, lo qual [...] en Sclauenia." FINKE 1923. I. p. 241–242.

¹⁰⁹ "[...] *ad partes Sclauenie ad predictum Karolum pro usu hospitii sui* [...]." AOkI. I. nr. 127; MDEA I. p. 164. (nr. 207.)

¹¹⁰ KARÁCSONYI 1995. I. p. 451.

castle was handed over to Charles by that time, what we have already discussed above. According to another source the young king resided between the years 1301 and 1307 at the monastery of BÉLAKÚT, located near ÚJLAK.¹¹¹ There is a charter known from 1302, in which the king donates the royal village of BÖSZÖRMÉNYTELEK to magister Beke, son of Thomas and where the king and his barons made a stay.¹¹² In this charter the king tells why magister Beke was awarded by this donation. He stood up for the king since he had arrived to Hungary, and Beke had accompanied the king in his campaigns as well. From the year 1303 several sources indicate the movement of Charles Robert. On the 16th of September a legal document was issued before the presence of the king in Tomica,¹¹³ another donation was made by the king on the 29th of September near the village of Kabol,¹¹⁴ and an undated privilege letter tells us that Charles was staying in Salamonharasztja.¹¹⁵ To localize the medieval settlement of BÖSZÖRMÉNYTELEK is a bit difficult, but considering all the sources about the whereabouts of Charles, all of these sources mention Slavonia and the southern region, so it is possible that this village was lying in the county of Keve, west from the manors of PÁRDÁNY (Medja) and TÁRNOK (Torak).¹¹⁶ Initially, Charles remained among his trustful followers and their familiars in the southern regions, so the lion's share of diplomatic negotiations fall on the papal legate. Legate Boccassini visited the barons who openly supported Wenceslaus on several occasions and he also tried to gather information about the situation in Hungary.¹¹⁷ He summoned the clergy of the Hungarian Church to a synod in Buda and he informed Wenceslaus and his father about the pope's disapproval in regard to the illegitimate crowning by John, archbishop of Kalocsa and also warned them that they have to cooperate with the papacy.¹¹⁸ Pope Boniface VIII allowed him to punish and summon the disobedient clergymen before the presence of the Holy See.¹¹⁹ Since the legate could not reach an agreement between the

¹¹¹ MES II. p. 447.

¹¹² AOkl. I. nr. 317; DL 40 285.

¹¹³ AOkl. I. nr. 446; DL 9157.

¹¹⁴ AOkl. I. nr. 451; DL 2071 (transcription); György GYÖRFFY: *Az Árpád-kori Magyarország történeti földrajza. Geographia historica Hungariae tempore stripis Arpadianae.* I–IV. Budapest. 1963–1987. (hereafter: GYÖRFFY 1987) I. p. 222. It lay next to Barlad in the county of Bács, today it is a village between Újvidék (Novi Sad) and Titel.

¹¹⁵ AOkl. nr. 509; AO I. p. 67; DL 1658.

¹¹⁶ GYÖRFFY 1987. I. p. 312. fn. 55; Dezső CSÁNKI: *Magyarország történelmi földrajza a Hunyadiak korában.* I–III. [The Historical Geography of Hungary during the Hunyadi Era I–III.] Budapest. 1890–1913. I. p. 205.

¹¹⁷ AOkl. I. nr. 96.

¹¹⁸ AOkl. I. nr. 107.

¹¹⁹ AOkl. I. nr. 109.

two parties, the pope beckoned the head members of the opposing groups before his personal presence through his legate: Queen Mary, Charles Robert, Wenceslaus and his father, the king of Bohemia. The pope also forbade using the Hungarian royal titles to Wenceslaus.¹²⁰ The contending parties sent representatives to papal tribunal: in the name of the Angevins Steven archbishop of Kalocsa, Michael bishop of Zagreb, Tivadar bishop of Győr and Benedek bishop of Veszprém and numerous provosts and archdeacons appeared,¹²¹ while Wenceslaus was represented by Ulricus, doctor of canon law, John prebend of Óbuda and John doctor of roman law.¹²² Boniface decided in favour of the Angevins, he released everyone from the oaths of fealty sworn to Wenceslaus and upon excommunication he ordained for everyone obedience to Charles Robert. As it is clearly visible, the Hungarian clergy forsook from the cause of Wenceslaus due to the papal intervention, but the fact that the pope used a more delicate tone in this sentence regarding Charles's rights to inherit the throne as he did before in his diploma in the 17th of October 1301, contributed heavily in this event. While in the above mentioned diploma, the pope expressed the privilege of the Holy See to appoint a ruler on the vacant throne of Hungary based on the famous offering made by St. Stephen. In contrast to this, in the letter of judgement that was issued in Anagni, the pope recognized the inherited claim of the Angevins to the throne.¹²³ Although the papal judgement did not bring victory for Charles all of a sudden, but his positions significantly strengthened.

As Wenceslaus saw the disloyalty of the Hungarian clergy, he wrote a desperate letter to Elisabeth, Queen of Bohemia, in order to ask for intervention from his father: *“Reverencie vestre preces nostras offerimus sinceris ex affectibus supplicantes, quatenus karissimum patrem nostrum dominum [Wenceslaum], B[ohemiam] et P[oloniam] regem frequenter et familiariter pro defensione sui et nostri honoris et nominis invocetis. [...] In promptum enim multa sunt nobis pericula, quibus ad presens occurrere non possumus, nisi nobis sua consuet a paternalis dileccio contra nostros adversarios prestet auxilium et*

¹²⁰ AOkI. I. nr. 232, 233.

¹²¹ The absence of Gregory Bicskei could seem strange. The pope – since Bicskei had been a divisive personality – accepted him only as the administrator of Esztergom and the provost of Székesfehérvár. Kiss 2014; György RÁCZ: Az Anjou-ház és a Szentszék [The House Anjou and the Holy See]. In: *Magyarország és a Szentszék kapcsolatának 1000 éve*. Ed. István ZOMBORI. Budapest. 1996. p. 55–82. (hereafter: RÁCZ 1996), p. 57; László SZENDE: Bicskei Gergely [Gregory Bicskei]. In: *Esztergomi érsekek 1001–2003*. Ed. Margit BEKE. Budapest. 2003. p. 134–142.

¹²² AOkI. nr. 392.

¹²³ VMHI. p. 397–399.

subsidium opportunum."¹²⁴ From this point on, Wenceslaus and his supporters knew that the papacy will use its influence in every single way to justify Charles's rights to the throne. Surely they must have known that Charles's maternal uncle, the duke of Austria was asked by numerous occasions to provide help to his nephew.¹²⁵ An Angevin-Habsburg coalition would have been troublesome even for the powerful Bohemian king. He mobilized his connections and found his natural ally in the French king.¹²⁶ Philip IV (1285–1314) had his own differences with the Church as the pope proclaimed in his famous bull *Unam Sanctam* the primacy of the papacy over lay authorities, thus over the French king himself as well. Wenceslaus chose his ally carefully and the following events brought him the ray of hope: by the order of King Phillippe, Guillamue Nogaret and his men broke upon the pope in his residence in Anagni, who died short after in mental shock. Gregory Bicskei, the archbishop of Esztergom also died in this incident.¹²⁷ The Bohemian king hoped with reason that the wheel of fortune would turn in his and his son's favour, in addition, he listened the young Prince's call for help and invaded Hungary in 1304. He charged Henry Kőszegi with the government of the kingdom and left the country with his son.¹²⁸ With this move the Bohemian king only increased the margin for Charles. In the Szepes (Spiš) region Charles achieved partial successes, but the most influential local baron, Amade from genus Aba and his sons joined his cause. Matthew Csák also left Wenceslaus's side, although he was supporting him from the beginning. This was very unfortunate for Wenceslas since Matthew was one of the most powerful barons at that time.¹²⁹ From now on nothing could inhibit Charles to move with his entourage to Pozsony (Bratislava) and forge an alliance with Rudolf, his cousin, the son of the German king Albert on the 24th of August 1304. The

¹²⁴ György BÓNIS: Petrus de Vinea leveleskönyve Magyarországon II. [The Letter-book of Petrus de Vinea in Hungary II.] p. 173–193. In: *Filológiai Közlöny* 4 (1958:2). p. 173–193, here: p. 191; *Árpád-kori és Anjou-kori levelek. XI–XIV. század.* [Letters from the Árpád and Angevin Era. 11–14th centuries] Ed. László MAKKAI–László MEZEY. Budapest. 1960. p. 219–220.

¹²⁵ Pope Boniface on the same day when he declared his judgement notified Albert, the Roman king and the Hungarian dignitaries and called upon their help. (AOkl. I. nr. 393.) He renewed his request towards Alberd and his son on the 11th of June. (AOkl. I. nr. 404, 405.) Stephen, the bishop of Várad (Oradea), wrote a similar letter to King Albert and he asked for help for Charles, based on the papal judgement. (AOkl. I. nr. 510.) Nicolaus, the bishop of Zengg (Senj), also wrote a letter to Albert and according to the letter the king already made a promise to aid his nephew.

¹²⁶ AOkl. I. nr. 505.

¹²⁷ RÁCZ 1996. p. 140.

¹²⁸ SRHL p. 481. (Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV)

¹²⁹ KRISTÓ 1988. p. 18–20.

majority of the clergy lined up behind Charles as well: Michael, archbishop of Esztergom who arose to this office from the episcopal seat of Zagreb and was always the supporter of the Angevin claimant over the time, Stephen, archbishop of Kalocsa, successor of John, who crowned Wenceslaus, Peter, bishop of Transylvania, Tivadar, bishop of Győr, Nicholas, bishop of Bosnia and John, bishop of Nitra.¹³⁰ Magister Ugrinus held the first place among the lay potentates, followed by palatine Amade, who recently turned sides and many high office bearing barons. The alliance resulted in a military campaign, since Wenceslaus still entitled himself as king of Hungary and he also took the Holy Crown away, and without the crown Charles could not hope a legitimate crowning. It is the strange mop of fate that only his third coronation was properly executed by the laws and customs of the Kingdom of Hungary, thus this third and last coronation took place in Székesfehérvár, where the archbishop of Esztergom put the “crown of St. Stephen” on his head.¹³¹

IV. Summary

After reviewing and examining the political connections of Charles Robert and his family, also in the light of the contemporary sources the following statements can be made: Charles received the biggest help from his family, Charles II, the king of Sicily exerted himself with the challenging work of building a personal network, which he could successfully utilize in order to obtain the crown of Hungary. He not only used envoys and messengers to shape up this system of connections but he also tried to meet with the most powerful barons in person. The relations were based on personal servitude and on mutual assistance proved long-lasting and working except the Kőszegis. After the tragic death of Charles Martell his son *Caroberto* inherited not only the rights and claims to the throne but this personal network as well. Contrary to the general opinion, not all members of the family were ready to help the young claimant. Albert, the German king assisted Charles Robert upon papal urge, however he had strong family ties with the Angevins. Even Charles II, who supported his grandson widely to seize the throne of the Hungarian Kingdom but he disinherited *Caroberto* from the line of succession in Sicily.¹³² Charles II was succeeded by his third son, Robert, who was awarded with the cognomen of “Wise” by the posterity. We don’t want to take sides whether he earned

¹³⁰ AOkl. I. nr. 644.

¹³¹ SRH I. p. 486 (Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV); MES II. p. 710–711.

¹³² István MISKOLCZY: *Magyar-olasz összeköttetések az Anjouk korában* [Hungarian – Italian Connections in the Angevin Era]. Budapest. 1937. p. 10–12.

this good sounding name or not, but he was wise enough to keep his nephew away from Naples.

During the timeframe of this short paper, the most influential enemies of Charles put up the son of the Bohemian king against him. Their margin was quite tight because they had to found a claimant who was also originated from the genus of the “holy kings of Hungary”. Surely there were some among these magnates and prelates, who knew Wenceslaus in person, because the prince had already betrothed with Elisabeth, the daughter of the late king Andrew III since February 1298. Wenceslaus II also announced his claim to the Hungarian throne short after the death of Ladislaus IV, but he could not forge such a powerful party as the Angevins.

Both house, the Angevin and the Bohemian royal court followed the practice that had already been common during the centuries in order to gain loyal supporters: they donated land and title to those barons and prelates whom they expected to strengthen their cause or simply they wanted to reinforce and retain their loyalty. Those magnates who sided with Charles from the beginning on remained loyal to him.¹³³ In our opinion, these relations which were based on personal acquaintance and thus a mutual trust could have developed between the king and the barons, gave Charles a good start – in addition to the substantial support of the papacy – which he could utilize as an advantage in order to seize the throne through a tiresome and arduous venture.



¹³³ Later on Charles Robert could not avoid the conflict with the barons who supported him during the timeframe of this work. However all of this happened only after 1317. With the death of Ugrinus Csák the king regained the southern counties, so there were no major battles. (ENGEL 1988. p. 108.) The sons of Stephen Babonić did not receive the office of ban after the death of their father in 1317, therefore they rebelled against the king. In the name of the king, Demeter Nécsei, Paul Garai and Stephen Bogár led an army against them. (Ibid. p. 122.) However the king was unable to crush the power of the Šubići, this task fell on his son, Louis the Great, who finally pacified Croatia in 1345. (Ibid. p. 131.)