# Repose, Stasis, Rhythm: Walter Pater and James Joyce

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It is a fairly reliable indicator of Walter Pater's stature that his work is now studied both for its literary-stylistic and its philosophical interest. Oscar Wilde, W. B. Yeats, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf are all in his debt, and not even those who disliked or thought him harmful, such as T. S. Eliot and Henry James, remained unaffected.[1] His significance reaches well beyond English literary Modernism. J. Hillis Miller, claiming that Pater "is the nearest thing to Nietzsche England has, as Emerson is Nietzsche's nearest match in America," calls him one of "the progenitors of modern subjectivistic, 'impressionistic,' phenomenological criticism," and traces a line from Ruskin through Pater and Wilde to Proust, and beyond Proust to Walter Benjamin, Derrida, Paul de Man, and Harold Bloom (Bloom, *Walter Pater* 75-76). For my part, I will focus attention mainly on aspects of Pater's influence on Joyce. The lessons of my essay, will, however, have some bearing on the wider literary and philosophical context as well.

As one of the new stars in the orbit of "the sage at Oxford"—as Yeats called Pater (*Autobiographies* 303)—Joyce seems to be taken with the master's style rather than with any of his clearly articulated ideas. It does not, however, require any specific insight to discover that style in Pater is a function of thought, so, presumably, stylistic affinities reflect kindred ways of thinking.[2] Critical inquiry, therefore, cannot stop at the comparative analysis of forms of verbal clothing.

The study of style in Joyce is a vast field and understandably so as his *matter* is also his *manner*, the one is unthinkable without the other. Yet, despite the substantial amount of work expended on the problem, there are still a few blind spots concerning the role of Pater in the evolution of that style. John Paul Riquelme, in an essay expressly about questions of style in *Stephen Hero*, *Dubliners* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, discusses Joyce's ironic treatment, in *Ulysses*, of both the language and the ideas the language conveys in "Pico della Mirandola," one of the essays in *The Renaissance*. The irony, however, implies a relatively late judgement as "[t]he earlier styles of *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait* [. . .] present Stephen's enthusiasm for Pater and for aesthetic, mystical writings and experience with much less (if any) irony" (Attridge, *The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce* 107, Attridge, *CC* in all subsequent references). The practical consequences of this enthusiasm: passages of obvious (and probably conscious) imitation (such as the ending of part IV of *A Portrait*) that Riquelme cites bear out this claim (Attridge, *CC* 112).

There is, however, a good deal more to Joyce's fascination with Pater's style than what a mere demonstration of the fact may suggest. Judged from the vantage-point of Joyce studies, the fact seldom amounts to more than the use of certain idiosyncrasies of the older writer's prose by his brilliant disciple. A good deal of effort has gone into exploring the aesthetical and philosophical implications of the ways in which Pater

bends his medium to a spectacular range of uses; more recent studies by scholars like J. Hillis Miller, Harold Bloom, and Jay Fellows have unravelled much that seemed tangled in the *oeuvre*. Yet, while students of *The Renaissance* and *Marius the Epicurean* (1885) tend to be susceptible to whatever anticipates the mature forms of Modernism, Joyce included, Joyceans tend to refer to the "Paterian" strain in *A Portrait* and elsewhere as if the state of affairs were still what it was when those books first saw the light of day. A situation has arisen in which we have two areas of research, each of which is in need of fertilization by the other and, owing to inadequate communication, each of which fails to have that need satisfied. As my objective is to highlight those constituents of the Paterian element in Joyce that have hitherto been neglected, it is indispensable to have a brief review of what, in the light of recent scholarship, passes for "received wisdom" in the field and what, for that matter, calls for further study.

## Confusing the Issues: Hegel, Pater, Yeats, and Joyce

There are many ways in which a writer may exert his influence on another; for easy handling I reduce these ways to the basic subdivisions of *direct* and *indirect*, and will first deal with the former. Right at the start of his career, in the essay "Drama and Life" (1900), Joyce seems to have absorbed some essential Pater. His contention that "[b]eauty is the swerga of the aesthete; but truth has a more ascertainable and more real dominion" militates against such an impression, yet almost in the same breath he fulminates not only against aestheticism, but also against the ethical claims of instruction, elevation and amusement on the grounds that satisfying these claims would undermine the integrity of drama and, by implication, of art in general (*The Critical Writings of James Joyce* 43; *CW* in all subsequent references). It is also noteworthy that the conceptual frame in which Joyce presents his argument recalls Pater's way of dealing with such demands in "Style" (1888). "I do not say that drama may not fulfil any or all of these functions," Joyce writes, "but I deny that it is essential that it should fulfil them." What is essential, instead, is what I have cited him as recommending in place of beauty: truth, as "[a]rt is true to itself when it deals with truth" (*CW* 43). The idea that informs Pater's "Style" on this point stems from similar convictions: "Truth! there can be no merit, no craft at all, without that. And further, all beauty is in the long run only *fineness* of truth, or what we call expression, the finer accommodation of speech to that vision within" (*Three Major Texts* 396, emphasis added by Pater; *TMT* in all subsequent references). To be fair to both parties, one should add that in the 1873 text of the "Conclusion," the controversial last essay in *The Renaissance*, any possible conflict between an "abstract morality"—*ethical claims*, that is—and experience was to be resolved in favour of the latter,[3] the concept of life as sensation clearly taking precedence over everything else. Also in the name of fairness, and in anticipation of later arguments of mine, it must be noted that *truth*, for Pater, is relative not only in the "Conclusion," but also in the somewhat earlier "Coleridge" (1865), where he first elaborates the thesis that "[t]o the modern spirit nothing is, or can be rightly known, except relatively and under conditions" (*TMT* 431). It would be a pointless exercise to discuss in any depth the question of philosophical relativism in the young Joyce, but if his essay does not display any overt concern with the precise meaning of the word *truth*, neither does it suggest an absolutist position that might undercut the analogy.

"James Clarence Mangan" (1902), another early essay of Joyce's, was born out of uncommonly great ambitions (Ellmann, *Joyce* 95). Its highly rhythmic prose and the allusion to the *Mona Lisa* in the manner of "Leonardo da Vinci" (1869), perhaps the most famous of the essays in *The Renaissance*, betray the Paterian nature of those ambitions. Among the symbolic figures whose presence he feels in Mangan's poetry is the lady "upon whose face many lives have cast that shadowy delicacy, as of one who broods upon distant terrors and riotous dreams, and that strange stillness before which love is silent, Mona Lisa" (*CW* 79). Joyce's youthful emulation of the master might even pass unnoticed, were it not for a special aspect of the appropriation, the idea of immortality. "In those vast courses which enfold us and *in that great memory, no life, no moment of exaltation is ever lost* and all those who have written nobly have not written in vain, though the desperate and weary have never heard the silver laughter of wisdom," a vastly overconfident Joyce declares (*CW* 83, emphasis added). Ellmann believes that the identification of immortality with "that great memory" in which "no life, no moment of exaltation is ever lost" is traceable to Yeats, who in turn had taken it from Henry More and the occultists (*Joyce* 95). Stylistic evidence—we should consider only the phrase "the silver laughter of wisdom"—seems to underpin the attribution. Yet in the light of what we know of Yeats's philosophical and aesthetic orientations in the 1890s, it is more likely that the ultimate source of the idea is Pater rather than Henry More and the occultists. Assuming this to be the case, we may still hesitate between two possible attributions: that the idea reached Joyce either through the mediation of Yeats or directly from Pater. The ultimate clue in deciding which of these is the correct one is the explicit reference to the *Mona Lisa*. It suggests that Joyce found his peculiar form of immortality where Yeats had found it before him, in Pater's essay on Leonardo:

> She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants: and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, and as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands. The fancy of a perpetual life sweeping together ten thousand experiences, is an old one; and modern philosophy has conceived the idea of humanity as wrought upon by, and summing up in itself, all modes of thought and life. Certainly Lady Lisa might stand as the embodiment of the old fancy, the symbol of the modern idea. (*TMT* 150)

Some of Pater's comments on the mysterious beauty of Mona Lisa clearly reappear in Joyce; "she has been dead many times" becomes the "many lives" reflected on her face; "the delicacy" with which experience has moulded her lineaments modulates to "shadowy delicacy." Thus we may assume with reasonable certainty that, being under the spell of Pater almost to the point of plagiarizing him, Joyce was not unresponsive to meanings inherent in "the old fancy" and "the modern idea" of "a perpetual life."

This, however, is not the whole story. Seen in perspective, what may be the ultimate source of an idea for Yeats and Joyce in Pater is no more than a stopping-off point of the same idea on its journey through time. "The old fancy" is Pater's name for

*metempsychosis* or the transmigration of the soul, one of Yeats's two eternities, "that of soul," in "Ben Bulben"; "the modern idea"—witness the qualifications that follow it—stands for the Hegelian *zeitgeist*. Pater himself will explicitly identify the two only in *Plato and Platonism* (1893)—Yeats left pencilled comments on the relevant page in his copy of that book (Chapman 46)—but the Hegelian quality of the passage on the *Mona Lisa* ("a prose ode to the Hegelian zeitgeist" [McGrath 126]) has long been recognized. Such being the case, the most convincing reading of the Joycean formula of "[t]hat great memory" in which "no life, no moment of exaltation is ever lost" is that it denotes the same idea: collective immortality—the other of the Yeatsian two eternities, "that of race," in "Ben Bulben."

Hegel occupies an important place in Pater's thinking. The observations on Greek sculpture in "Winckelmann" (1867), the last but one essay in *The Renaissance*, reflect his complete acceptance of art history as conceived by Hegel in the *The Philosophy of Fine Arts*; the philosophical and aesthetic premises of the "Preface" to the same book are traceable to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.[4] When he declares that the first duty of the aesthetic critic is to see "[i]n whom did the stir, the genius, the sentiment of the period find itself?" (*TMT* 73), Pater again reiterates his belief in the "modern idea" of the *zeitgeist* as reflected on the face of the lady in Leonardo's portrait. Yet, for all his enthusiasm, he was no uncritical popularizer of the German philosopher. In one essential sense at least he brought Hegel's idea "up to date." "The genius, the sentiment of the period" in the "Preface" is already divested of the transcendental quality that as *zeitgeist* it had. That divestiture has been performed in the Leonardo essay. Immediately prior to the much cited lines we read: "[a]ll the thoughts and experience of the world have etched and moulded there" (*TMT* 150), which places the expression of the face firmly in the psychological instead of the transcendental realm. The sketchy account of the artist cherishing a vision of a certain type of feminine beauty from childhood on until in Il Giocondo's house it becomes corporeal (*TMT* 149), relates the collective experience of humanity to the individual experience of the artist, which manifests itself in the vision. The observation that F. C. McGrath makes after careful examination of the whole *oeuvre* covers the case of the *Mona Lisa* as well: "Pater took Hegel's definition of art as the sensible manifestation of the absolute idea and converted it to a psychological rather than a transcendental notion by having the work of art express in sensible form not an absolute idea but the inner vision of the individual artist" (273).

In his essay on Mangan Joyce is no Romantic idealist either. When he argues that poetry "sets store by every time less than the pulsation of an artery, the time in which its intuitions start forth, holding it equal in its period and value to six thousand years" (*CW* 81), he merely reiterates an article of faith—first expressed by Pater in the "Conclusion"—of early Modernism: that experience is inward and its quality depends on the sensibility of the artist. Owing to its intensity, it takes the form of a vision, which then embodies not only the collective but also the cumulative experience of humanity (six thousand years' worth of wisdom supplied in time less than the pulsation of an artery).

Joyce's evocation of the *Mona Lisa* thus fits fully into the context created by his master and tilts the balance of evidence firmly in favour of the Paterian attribution of his idea of immortality.

My exercise in comparative analysis has yielded one immediate result: it demonstrates that Joyce imbibed a good deal more from Pater than we have been ready to acknowledge. This will look all the more significant if we bear in mind that he obtained most of the few ideas he had in early youth and then clung to them with an unprecedented pertinacity for a long time. The two essays I have discussed are absorbed into *Stephen Hero*, which in turn gets rewritten as *A Portrait*. But the immediate result may not be also the most relevant. Less obvious but from my particular angle more important is the fact that the analysis has highlighted the centrality of Hegel and Yeats to any study of the relationship that there is between Joyce and Pater. Yeats is to be reckoned with as a possible intermediary between Pater and Joyce; Pater as a possible intermediary between Hegel and Joyce. The latter problem, in view of my theme, calls for specific treatment in this study, and will be taken up later.

## Repose, Stasis, and Radiance

A recurrent theoretical problem in *The Renaissance*, one that receives more attention than perhaps any other, is the nature of representation in the major forms of art. Clearly from the start, the book celebrates what it regards as the Greek ideal. Botticelli's greatest achievement, the eponymous essay (1870) tells us, is that, unlike Giotto, Masaccio or even Ghirlandajo, who are "naturalists" because they "transcribe [. . .] the outward image," he handles the data of external life so as to suggest ideas, moods, and visions as well as sympathy in place of morality—virtues which make him, "visionary as he is, so forcible a realist" (*TMT* 107, 108). Botticelli's Venus, "a more direct inlet into the Greek temper than the works of the Greeks themselves," is a "record of the first impression" that the Hellenic spirit "made on minds turned back towards it" after an interval of many centuries (*TMT* 110). Placed well before the seminal "Conclusion" in the order of the book but chronologically rather a late addition, this essay is at once an endorsement and a qualification of that unorthodox closing piece. It is an endorsement as it rests on the same sensationalist/impressionist epistemological premises; it is a qualification,[5] and an illuminating one at that, as it makes clear ideas that are only adumbrated there. As the "Conclusion" has it, "[e]xperience, already reduced to a group of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality [. . .]. Every one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world" (*TMT* 218). The capacity for vision singled out for praise in the Renaissance painter is but the function of the dream of a world to which he is confined by the inadequacies of perception. Literal representation of the object is then no part of the ideal; a phenomenologically conceived reproduction (cf. "its own dream of a world") is.

Yet we cannot rest our case here as Pater takes account of a third possibility as well. "Aesthetic Poetry" (1868, 1889), the companion piece of the "Conclusion" with which in 1868 it had formed "The Poetry of William Morris" before Pater split it into two self-contained essays, praises Morris's *The Life and Death of Jason* and *The Earthly Paradise* because "[d]esire here is towards the body of nature for its own sake, not because a soul is divined through it" (*TMT* 525). The virtue that "this Hellenist of the Middle Age" (*TMT* 525) practises is the representation of the world as a sensuous entity, restoring thereby the perception that characterized Greek art at its most perfect, as is exemplified by sculpture, the art that expressed the spirit of Greece (a touch of Hegel again) better than any other. What gives Greek sculpture its distinct quality is

that it "did not express the sensations of the mind," had no antagonism to the body, and if mind *is* there, it is not "anything more than a function of the body," as the lovingly elaborated description of Myron's *Discobolus* in "The Age of Athletic Prizemen" (1894) tells us (*Greek Studies* 286; *GS* in all subsequent references). Luckily, Myron had little interest in "sensations of the mind," the expression of which is "for the most part adverse to the proper expression of youth, to the beauty of youth, by causing it to be no longer youthful" (*GS* 287). It is not without interest that the metaphors for "youthful" and its implied opposite, "mature," are "morning" and "day," respectively, thus by virtue of the time of day—dawn—that appears in it, Botticelli's *Venus*, and by association the Renaissance itself, represents, it is suggested, a return to an earlier and altogether happier phase of human history.

"The Age of Athletic Prizemen" belongs to the final stage of its author's career but Pater gives serious thought to the nature of Greek sculpture already in "Winckelmann" (1867). Assuming that sculpture with its limited means of expression was ideally suited to the conditions of early Greece, he believes that its principal merit, which is then the principal merit of Greek art at its best, is that "it unveils man in the *repose* of his unchanging characteristics" or, to convey the same idea somewhat more transparently, that it "reveals, not what is accidental in man, but the tranquil godship in him, as opposed to the restless accidents of life" (*TMT* 204, emphasis added). "Repose," like "unchanging" or "the tranquil godship in him," suggests the absence of motion, which the closing part of the sentence only confirms. Its use is particularly appropriate in the light of the meaning of the word that Pater most probably intended: "a harmony in the arrangement of parts and colors that is *restful to the eye*" (*Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, emphasis added).

The claim that Botticelli is the inheritor of the Greek ideal which presents "man in the repose of his unchanging characteristics" is, however, one-sided, not to say simplistic, in the form in which I have summarized it. It is so in the first place because Botticelli is not the last word in Renaissance art, which Pater readily admits. But it is simplistic also for the reason that Pater is too committed a Hegelian to ignore the historical element in the study of the arts; neither does he ignore the *classical-romantic* antithesis which for Hegel constitutes the basic division of European art history, with sculpture falling into the former, painting into latter. Pater's account of why sculpture is the ideal art of Greece and what this involves, is in the Hegelian mould; the arguments of the Winckelmann essay for setting sculpture off from painting, music and poetry (*TMT* 202-03) do not run counter to such a reading. Whatever admiration he may feel for that age of the spectacular resurgence of human creativity, he is more than prepared to assess it not only in terms of Hellenism, but also on its own merits. This does not mean that his assessment is original or consistent. As can be expected (and has been anticipated by my discussion of Joyce's use of the *Mona Lisa*), Pater places his arguments within the conceptual frame that he has found in his German idealist mentors. That conceptual frame is presented in the "Preface" which, seemingly in contrast to the monistic and sensationalist "Conclusion," contains the outlines of a tripartite structure of aesthetic perception. The opening dictum comes from Arnold: the aesthetic critic ought "to see the object as it really is." To Pater the sensualist this means that the aesthetic critic has "to know [his] impression as it really is" (*TMT* 71), which is then to be followed by his "analysing and reducing [. . .] to its elements" the virtue by which the object produces its "special impression of beauty or pleasure," the process ending

"when he has disengaged that virtue, and noted it as a chemist notes some natural element, for himself and others" (*TMT* 72). Simple as the theory is, it may easily mislead us as it suggests that by disengaging the special virtue of an object of art we identify "the stir, the genius, the sentiment of the period" (*TMT* 73), in other words, the *zeitgeist*. Within the book, however, and also in essays which antedate the "Preface," the Hegelian concept undergoes a sea-change and acquires those psychological (as opposed to its original transcendental) attributes that I have briefly mentioned in the early part of this study. Leonardo's *Mona Lisa* does indeed reveal "the genius, the sentiment of the period" in its capacity as "the symbol of the modern idea" of the *zeitgeist*, but as her age—"older than the rocks"—and its connotations make it clear, this means no more than cumulative human experience.

But as the repository of the experience of the ages, it is something more as well. If the perfect expression of the Greek genius is sculpture because it "did not express the sensations of the mind," and if Botticelli's *Venus* represents a revival of at least part of that ideal, the *Mona Lisa*, by virtue of the beauty of the lady in the picture, seems to belong to a different class of art:

> It is a beauty wrought out from within upon the flesh, the deposit, little cell by cell, of strange thoughts and fantastic reveries and exquisite passions. Set it for a moment beside one of those white Greek goddesses or beautiful women of antiquity, and how would they be troubled by this beauty, into which the soul with all its maladies has passed! (*TMT* 150)

The difference between Leonardo's ideal of (feminine) beauty and the Greek ideal is the measure of the self-knowledge (European) humanity had obtained during the time that had elapsed since antiquity. For Pater, the portrait typifies the Romantic as opposed to the Classical tendency in art, as is only appropriate within the Hegelian terms of reference employed in the essay. What is not obvious at all is the relative place of the *Mona Lisa* on the scale of values that accords perfection to art only if "it unveils man in the repose of his unchanging characteristics"—a virtue that came so naturally to the Greeks owing to the limitations inherent in their lives. The body in Leonardo's picture, unlike the body in Greek sculpture, is not untroubled by the mind. "[T]he delicacy of thought and feeling, incidental to a consciousness brooding with delight over itself" that the *Mona Lisa* so abundantly has, is the *sine qua non* of "painting, music, and poetry [. . .], the special arts of the romantic and modern ages" ("Winckelmann" *TMT* 203).

Apparently, we have an unresolved theoretical problem here, yet the difficulty it creates is not insurmountable. There is plenty of evidence in the whole of *The Renaissance* that a work of art bearing the *romantic* stamp may at the same time possess the *classical* quality of repose. Central among the connotations of *repose* is, as we have seen, that it "reveals, not what is accidental in man, but the tranquil godship in him, as opposed to the restless accidents of life." This—still in the words of the essay on Winckelmann but very much in the spirit of Schiller—means that "the basis of all artistic genius lies in the power of conceiving humanity in a new and striking way, of putting a happy world of its own creation in place of the meaner world of common days [. . .]" (*TMT* 205). Greek sculpture meets these criteria in its own specific manner by bringing its essentially limited medium into perfect harmony with its message. Humanity having changed and the "meaner world of common days" having changed, the ways in which art "reveals not what is accidental in man," with all that it implies,

change as well, and arts of a different medium, painting, music and poetry take the place of sculpture. "In exercising this power [of conceiving humanity in new ways, A.S.], painting and poetry have a variety of subject almost unlimited. The range of characters or persons open to them is as various as life itself" (*TMT* 205). *Repose*, the absence of movement in the sense of harmony, of being "restful to the eye," thus becomes a quality of all great art including the *Mona Lisa*.

Aware that there was a problem on his hands in need of clarification,[5] Pater considered it at some length in "Romanticism" (1876), which, with some changes that leave the main argument intact, he turned into "Postscript," the last essay of *Appreciations* (1889). Regarding *classical* and *romantic* as timeless tendencies, he reaches the only sensible position concerning their relationship. In order to be interesting and stimulating, he writes—in full agreement with Stendhal, whose essay on the question he paraphrases—"art and literature must follow the subtle movements of that nimbly shifting *Time-Spirit* or *Zeit-Geist* [. . .] which is always modifying men's taste, as it modifies their manners and their pleasures" (*TMT* 548). Accordingly, all great art is at first romantic, but as no great artist ignores what has been done before him, it absorbs the classical element as well. Romantic artists "by the very heat and vividness of their conception, purge away, sooner or later, all that is not organically appropriate to it, till the whole effect adjusts itself in clear, orderly, proportionate form; which form, after a very little time becomes classical in its turn" (*TMT* 548).[6] So it is only a question of time, of being integrated into the tradition both by the artist and the public, and works of art conceived in the romantic spirit acquire the status of classics.

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It is more or less common knowledge that Pater's tripartite theory of aesthetic perception anticipates Stephen's in *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait*. We must recall, before proceeding any further, that while he is establishing "the qualities of universal beauty" in *A Portrait* (211), Stephen addresses two related problems: "artistic conception, artistic gestation, and artistic reproduction" (209) on the one hand, and "artistic apprehension" (211) on the other. Put less idiosyncratically, he is talking of artistic creation and aesthetic perception—*wholeness*, *harmony* and *radiance* being the phases of both. Much of the time he is discussing the two simultaneously. He describes, for the benefit of Lynch, his benighted friend, the way in which the meaning of a sensible object (a humble appurtenance of quotidian life: a basket, as it happens) becomes apparent to the viewer, but at every turn he applies his ideas to the creative process as well. Stephen's own Thomist obfuscations notwithstanding, as his arguments unfold it comes to light that the shaping spirit behind the theory—like the shaping spirit behind Pater's theory—is Hegel (McGrath 237-44). Whether Hegel reached Joyce directly or through the mediation of the English neo-Hegelians of the latter half of the nineteenth century, including Pater, is a question that cannot be settled with full certainty. As will be remembered, by *wholeness* (integritas) Stephen, in *A Portrait*, means apprehending the object "as *one* thing" (Joyce's emphasis); by *harmony* (consonantia), apprehending the object as "the result of its parts." The third phase, *radiance* (quidditas, whatness), is, as can be expected, the conclusion of a protracted process:

> This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic [sic] image is first conceived in his imagination. The mind in that mysterious instant

> Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal. The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony is the luminous silent *stasis of esthetic pleasure*, a spiritual state very like to that cardiac condition which the Italian physiologist Luigi Galvani, using a phrase almost as beautiful as Shelley's, called the enchantment of the heart.
>
> Stephen paused and, though his companion did not speak, felt that his words had called up around them a thought-enchanted silence.
>
> —What I have said, he began again, refers to beauty in the wider sense of the word, in the sense which the word has in the literary tradition. In the marketplace it has another sense. When we speak of beauty in the second sense of the term our judgement is influenced in the first place by the art itself and by the form of that art. The image, it is clear, must be set between the mind or senses of the artist himself and the mind or senses of others. (213, emphasis added)

The vision of the artist must be made manifest to those who do not have the vision, that is, it must be given sensible form—a concession to the marketplace. The artist's experience of beauty precedes the act of creation by means of which that experience is made available to others. According to the analogous discussion in *Stephen Hero*, the whole operation is made possible through the exercise of the "twin faculties"—"a selective faculty" and "a reproductive faculty"—of the artist (73) who is "the intense centre of the life of his age [. . .]. He alone is capable of absorbing in himself the life that surrounds him and of flinging it abroad again amid planetary music" (75). "Flinging it abroad" is the act of creation, presumably in its finished stage, made possible by the artist's first having the vision of what in that act he embodies in sensuous form; the attendant phenomenon of music, though of the planetary variety, is emblematic of the harmony discovered and reproduced. Still, as the lines cited clearly indicate, the significance of art lies in its being the vehicle of the spirit of the age. The notion of cumulative, collective experience, Hegel secularized, as in "James Clarence Mangan," is back again. The secularization continues in *A Portrait*, where the process of "the human disposition of sensible or intelligible matter for an esthetic end" (207), which is art, also starts with the artist, but he is no longer "the intense centre of the life of his age." By claiming that beauty is dependent exclusively on the vision of the artist, Stephen in *A Portrait* invests the concept with a purely psychological quality (McGrath 273), which removes it even further from its origins. The bird-girl scene at the end of part IV, in which the imaginatively conceived beauty of Stephen's vision takes sensible form, anticipates the theory (McGrath 266).

Neat as the foregoing proposition is, stripping beauty of its transcendental-romantic connotations is not quite unproblematic. In writing of Mangan, Joyce has borrowed the part of Pater's account of the *Mona Lisa* in which beauty is a manifestation of cumulative as well as collective experience. In *A Portrait*, the emphasis is on vision, but apart from the fact that it is not the apprehension of something beyond the senses and that it is located in the imagination, little can be known about it, which is regrettable because to most of us *vision* has an irrepressibly romantic and Neoplatonic aura. But as *vision* is a conceptual tool also of Pater's in "Leonardo da Vinci," we may obtain additional information by adopting the working assumption that Joyce's use of the term

has something to do with Pater's.

As the Leonardo essay has it, the *Mona Lisa* is not realistic representation; the origin of the mystery reflected on the face can only partially be located in the personal history of the model:

> As often happens with works in which invention seems to reach its limits, there is an element in it given to, not invented by, the master. In that inestimable folio of drawings, once in the possession of Vasari, were certain designs by Verrocchio, faces of such impressive beauty that Leonardo in his boyhood copied them many times. It is hard not to connect with these designs of the elder, by-past master, as with its germinal principle, the unfathomable smile, always with a touch of something sinister in it, which plays over all Leonardo's work. Besides, the picture is a portrait. *From childhood we see this image defining itself on the fabric of his dreams; and but for express historical testimony, we might fancy that this was but his ideal lady, embodied and beheld at last.* What was the relationship of a living Florentine to this creature of his thought? By what strange affinities had the person and the dream grown up thus apart, and yet so closely together? Present from the first incorporeally in Leonardo's brain, dimly traced in the designs of Verrocchio, she is found present at last in *Il Giocondo's* house. (*TMT* 149-50, emphases added)

Leonardo, like Stephen Dedalus's ideal artist, has the vision, which he keeps to himself until, by finding the objective correlative, as it were, in La Gioconda, he can present it to "the mind and senses of others." This drifting together of subject and object is like Stephen's encounter with the girl wading in the water by the sea. Thus the aesthetic image—the vision—and the embodiment—the sensible manifestation of that image—are two different things in both Joyce and Pater.

The resemblances, however, close as they are, seem to end here as Pater makes no direct mention of anything even vaguely suggestive of the spiritual state which attends upon the vision in Joyce, the *stasis of esthetic pleasure*. This, however, may be no more than a difference in words rather than in substance. The state of soul which the vision embodied in the *Mona Lisa* represents is peace and contemplation that comes from the sense that one phase in the history of human experience has been completed: "Hers is the head upon which all 'the ends of the world are come,' and the eyes are a little weary" (*TMT* 150). Considering what is implied by the biblical epigraph of *The Renaissance*: "Yet shall ye be as the wings of a dove" (Psalm 68:13), Harold Bloom takes the matter further. Pater teaches "self-reconcilement and self-acceptance, and so Unity of Being," with the corollary that the memorable figures inhabiting his pages are "images of this Unity of aesthetic contemplation" (*Walter Pater* 9). The *Mona Lisa* is an artistic endorsement of this vision, even if it exposes its hopelessness in actual reality (*Walter Pater* 12). Unity of Being is, of course, a Yeatsian concept, and it is as such that Bloom employs it. But it is also a Paterian concept, although we tend to lose sight of the fact. It occurs in *Plato and Platonism* long before Yeats could have thought of it, and is defined in a way that accommodates the sense that Yeats is going to give it in *A Vision*. It is "unity in variety [. . .] *cosmos*—an order that shall satisfy one's reasonable soul—below and within apparent chaos" (52; *PP* in all subsequent references). In one word, "unity of being" denotes harmony in the world, in the soul of man, and between

the world and the soul of man. It is no accident that harmony, both for Pater and Yeats, is objectified by music or the musical relation of the parts of a whole (*PP* 52, *A Vision* 80, respectively).

The related concepts of *vision*, *stasis*, *dream, esthetic contemplation*, *peace* and *harmony* are thus key constituents of whatever in the way of a theory of beauty Joyce and Pater (and, not quite irrelevantly, Yeats) have. This in itself is of course no proof that any Paterian influence is at work in Joyce. Apart from the tripartite structure of aesthetic apprehension and the remark, well before that structure is elaborated, that in the aesthetic emotion of stasis "the mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing," the improper kinetic emotions (205), the immediate context in which *stasis of esthetic pleasure* occurs in *A Portrait* offers no clues as to its possible provenance. Yet the *Mona Lisa* is among the items of Stephen's mind, just as it was once an important item in Joyce's. His explicit mention of the name of the picture to Lynch (214) is followed some pages later by an allusion to it in the form of a metaphor. Stephen thinks of the girl he loves as "a figure of the womanhood of her country, a *bat-like soul* waking to the consciousness of itself in darkness and secrecy and loneliness" (220, emphasis added). The image evoked is not all that different from the woman who "*like the vampire* [. . .] has been dead many times and learned the secrets of the grave."[7] Placed in this context, the word *stasis* speaks more eloquently of Stephen's theoretical orientation than any undisguised connection could. Its opposite, *kinesis* is a quality of art misconceived as a form of action. Bearing that in mind, one may hazard the assumption that *stasis*, the condition of artistic excellence for Joyce, is what *repose* was for Pater.

One stumbling block yet remains. Repose, the ultimate criterion of artistic perfection is, for Pater, a classical quality. In *A Portrait*, Stephen Dedalus does not seem to take any explicit interest in the then much debated distinction between classicism and romanticism.[8] But the tendency of Joyce's thinking on art, from"Drama and Life" onwards, including the essay on Mangan, is determined either by an open commitment to the classical (realistic) ideal, or a strong predilection for it. With him, art is either a representation of truth or is worth very little. In "Art and Life," the fictional version of "Drama and Life" in *Stephen Hero*, the aspiring artist associates classicism—a constant state of the artistic mind—with *security*, *satisfaction* and *patience*, as opposed to romanticism to which the epithets *insecure*, *unsatisfied*, *impatient* pertain (73). The Shelleyan metaphor of the fading coal may, if considered in isolation, seem to call that commitment into question, lending further substance to the accusation that by rejecting *kinesis* Joyce yielded to a "fear of reality" (Goldberg 64). The claim that it is in the artist's imagination that the aesthetic image is conceived appears to work against any such ambivalence by making the image strictly of the human order. The best evidence, however, that the art that Stephen is talking about in *A Portrait* falls within the frame of classicism is his choice of the very word *stasis* for aesthetic pleasure. *Stasis* implies *satisfaction* as well as the attendant qualities of *security* and *patience*. It is the *Mona Lisa* state, and Unity of Being, both in the Paterian and Yeatsian senses.

## Style

As early as "James Clarence Mangan," Joyce emulated Pater, and the object of the emulation was style. Like Yeats in the 1890s, he came under the spell of Pater when he was still in a formative phase of his career, from which he extricated himself only when in *Ulysses*, in the meditations of "Proteus" and the brief Pater parody of the "Oxen of

the Sun" he laid that ghost to rest. That Joyce's style owes much to this "most rhythmical of English prose-writers," as he was dubbed by William Sharp, an early reviewer of *Marius*,[9] in 1885 (Seiler 116), is not in question; what exactly his debt consists in is less clear. John Paul Riquelme, in his essay on Joyce's style in the period before *Ulysses*, contents himself with registering the Paterian "visionary intensity" and the gradual assertion of an original style, culminating at one stage in the convergence of the visionary and the starkly realistic in *A Portrait* (Attridge, *CC* 121). Style, however, is the aspect of Joyce's art that resists generalizations more than any other—one has only to consider the evolution of language within *A Portrait* to grant the truth of that claim. As the common view still is that the hallmark of Pater's prose is its peculiar rhythm, and as Joyce judged the quality of writing in terms of rhythm, discussions of the stylistic relationship between the two writers seldom go beyond acknowledging—in rather broad terms—this undoubtedly important fact. Rhythm, however, can take many forms, and it is by no means certain that its prominence in the early Joyce—with the exception of the Mangan essay—betrays the influence of Pater or, as Riquelme believes, of the Yeats of the 1890s (Attridge, *CC* 121), which, by the way, would come to the same thing as the prose of the Irish poet in that decade was written in conscious imitation of Pater. And where such an influence is apparent in Joyce, we should not take it for granted that it has only *The Renaissance* for its source. *A Portrait* has more in common thematically as well as technically with *Marius* than is generally admitted. Both novels fall into a subdivision of the genre that can most conveniently be called spiritual biography. In both, the young protagonist embarks on a quest for some indeterminate ideal that takes definite form (the God of Christianity for Marius, aesthetic beauty for Stephen) only when it is eventually discovered. Most importantly, there is a conspicuous authorial presence in both books: the biography is transposed autobiography, narrator and hero are closely connected. The autobiographical inspiration poses the problem of control of material, which both authors achieve by distancing themselves from the world of their heroes—Pater by projecting the autobiographical element into the life of a young Roman at the time of Marcus Aurelius, Joyce by imposing upon his narrative a single centre of consciousness from which he then is never deflected. If it is true that "Stephen contrasts with the narrator by being an artist who is not mature," that is, the narrator is the future self of the protagonist (Brivic 12), it is equally true that Marius is distinguished from the narrator of his story not by the trappings of a second-century Roman youth, but by his spiritual uncertainties and doubts. Given the resemblances of the two novels, there can be little doubt that *Marius* and *A Portrait* are central to discussions of the stylistic affinities Joyce may have with Pater.

Let me now return to the question of rhythm. Stephen Dedalus, in the passage about words in part Iv concludes that "it was the poise and balance of the period itself" that fascinated him in language. The question that follows this statement: "Did he then love the rhythmic rise and fall of words better than their associations of legend and colour?" leads to another question which in fact amounts to a statement in the context: as he was "weak of sight" and "shy of mind," of all that language was capable of offering he drew most pleasure "from the contemplation of an inner world of individual emotions mirrored perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose" (167). Stylistic variation is one of the hallmarks of *A Portrait*, and the styles of the parts do reflect "the inner world of individual emotions" always at the level that corresponds to the intellectual and emotional maturity as well as the linguistic competence of Stephen. Language—

the material vehicle of beauty—is shaped from within. Let me recall, for analogy, that the beauty of the *Mona Lisa*, or beauty in general in the reflective, modern state of humanity, is "a beauty wrought out from within upon the flesh," according to Pater; equally relevant to my argument is the fact that this beauty is "the deposit [. . .] of strange thoughts and fantastic *reveries* and exquisite passions" (*TMT* 150, emphasis added). The work Pater is talking about belongs to the visual arts; it requires no stretch of the imagination, however, to realize that, like the *Mona Lisa*, both his own *Marius* and Joyce's *Portrait* are animated by "strange thoughts and fantastic *reveries* and exquisite passions." As Harold Bloom writes, Pater's prose is not an intrusion between the reader and himself, but a part of his vision, and "the marmoreal reveries" of *Marius* blend into "other modernist efforts to subvert the inexorable dualism of form and content" (*Walter Pater* 36). Unassailable as the idea seems that Pater and Joyce had similar views of the use of their medium and of form and content, there is an important difference. *Sight*, this most privileged of the senses, plays a subordinate part in the representational uses of language that Stephen Dedalus endorses. Nowhere is this more in evidence than in the scenes preceding his two climactic experiences, the vision of hell in part III and that other vision, the bird-girl in part IV. These episodes rest on almost identical patterns, as Deborah Pope has convincingly argued (113-19). In both, the most active of Stephen's senses is hearing, the function of the eyes being reduced to a mere recording of blurred images. This is how his surroundings affect him on his way to his room after Father Arnall's sermon:

> *Murmuring faces* waited and watched; *murmurous voices* filled the dark shell of the cave. He *feared intensely* in spirit and in flesh but, raising his head bravely, he strode into the room firmly. A doorway, a room, the same room, same window. He told himself calmly that those *words* had absolutely no sense which had seemed to rise *murmurously* from the dark. He told himself that it was simply his room with the door open. (136, emphasis added)

And this is his state of mind shortly before seeing the girl:

> As he passed on to the thin wooden bridge he felt the planks shaking with *the tramp of heavily shod feet*. [. . .] Soon the whole bridge was *trembling and resounding*. The *uncouth faces* passed him two by two, *stained yellow or red or livid by the sea*, and, as he strove to look at them with ease and indifference, a faint stain of personal shame and commiseration rose to his own face. Angry with himself, he tried to hide his face from their eyes by *gazing down sideways into the shallow swirling water* under the bridge but he still saw a *reflection therein of their top-heavy silk hats and humble tape-like collars and loosely hanging clerical clothes*.
>
> —Brother Hickey.
>
> Brother Quaid.
>
> Brother MacArdle.
>
> Brother Keogh.— (166, emphasis added)

In the subsequent phases—the image of hell and the image of beauty—there is a shift in perception and the scene takes on an emphatically visual character. In representing hell, the tormented imagination of Stephen operates in the best allegorical tradition:

> Creatures were in the field: one, three, six: creatures were moving in the field,

> hither and thither. Goatish creatures with human faces, hornybrowed, lightly bearded and grey as india-rubber. The malice of evil glittered in their hard eyes, as they moved hither and thither, trailing their long tails behind them. A rictus of cruel malignity lit up greyly their old bony faces. One was clasping about his ribs a torn flannel waistcoat, another complained monotonously as his beard stuck in the tufted weeds. Soft language issued from their spittleless lips as they swished in slow circles round and round the field, winding hither and thither through the weeds, dragging their long tails amid the rattling canisters. They moved in slow circles, circling closer and closer to enclose, to enclose, soft language issuing from their lips, their long swishing tails besmeared with stale shite, thrusting upwards their terrific faces. (136)

In its ecstatic state, the same imagination transforms the abstract idea of beauty into sensuous form in terms that reflect the ecstasy:

> A girl stood before him in midstream, alone and still, gazing out to sea. She seemed like one whom magic had changed into the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird. Her long slender bare legs were delicate as a crane's and pure save where an emerald trail of seaweed had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, fuller and soft-hued as ivory, were bared almost to the hips, where the white fringes of her drawers were like feathering of soft white down. Her slate-blue skirts were kilted boldly about her waist and dovetailed behind her. Her bosom was as a bird's, soft and slight, slight and soft as the breast of some dark-plumaged dove. But her long fair hair was girlish: and girlish, and touched with the wonder of mortal beauty, her face. (171)

As the figures are projections of Stephen's mind and not closely observed items of actuality, they do not, despite their strong appeal to sight, undercut the impression of aurality and represent no shift of focus from the subjective to the objective.

With Pater, it seems, the reverse is the case. He has been called "an existential phenomenologist of sight" who "receives visual impressions and translates them back verbally into 'linguistic design' " (Fellows 41). Whatever this may mean, one thing is certain: vision, in more senses than one, is of paramount importance to the hero of *Marius*, Pater's most sustained attempt to create a fictional character. A typical example of this occurs in one of the last episodes in which, in the company of his new friend, Cornelius, Marius meets Cecilia, the epitome of ideal, Christian womanhood. Interestingly from my point of view, this visual experience is also preceded by an aural one: the two young men hear the singing of children in the neighbouring cemetery. It lingers in their ears, but at the time of the encounter it is already a memory:

> The orchard or meadow, through which their path lay, was already gray with twilight, though the western sky, where the greater stars were visible, was still afloat in crimson splendour. The colour of all earthly things seemed repressed by the contrast, yet with a sense of great richness lingering in their shadows. [. . .] Half above, half below the level white mist, dividing the light from the darkness, came now the mistress of this place, the wealthy Roman matron, left early a widow a few years before, by Cecilius 'Confessor and Saint'. With a certain antique severity in the gathering of the long mantle, and with a coif or veil folded decorously below

> the chin, 'gray within gray', to the mind of Marius her temperate beauty brought reminiscences of the serious and virile character of the best female statuary of Greece. Quite foreign, however, to any Greek statuary was the expression of pathetic care, with which she carried a little child at rest in her arms. Another, a year or two older, walked beside, the fingers of one hand within her girdle. She paused for a moment with a greeting for Cornelius. That visionary scene was the close, the fitting close, of the afternoon's strange experiences. A few minutes later, passing forward on his way along the public road, he could have fancied it a dream. (232-33)

Beautiful as the writing is, it is not realistic prose; neither is it an instance of *ekphrasis*. The items—objects as well as human beings—that make up the picture are, in the form in which they appear in the description, products of Marius's sensibility, which in turn is a function of his mind. By calling "[t]hat visionary scene" "the fitting close of the afternoon's strange experiences," by stressing the dreamlike quality of it all, the narrator merely clinches what the style has been suggesting all along. The reader is oriented towards this conclusion by such value-laden expressions as "a sense of great richness" lingering in the shadows of earthly things and "a certain antique severity" as well as decorousness observable in Cecilia's appearance. He is oriented, above all, towards the narrator's judgement by the analogy with and the difference from "the best female statuary of Greece" that Marius discovers in Cecilia's beauty. The way in which his perception operates is the same as the way in which the hero's perception operates in Pater's eponymous unfinished romance, *Gaston de Latour* (1896). Nearing the end of a trip in the country, Gaston is to meet the poet Ronsard. What is he like? he asks himself, as he is curious to see "the degree in which the precious mental particles might be expected to have wrought up the outward presence to their own high quality. A creature of the eye, in this case at least, the intellectual hold on him being what it was, Gaston had no fear of disillusion" (73). The outward form reflects a pre-existent inward power, in accordance with Marius's new found conviction that there must be some reasonable order in the world; for its part, style, the verbal rendering of that form, reflects the degree to which the perceiving consciousness becomes aware of that inward power and the order it imparts to the world. Style, the rendering of forms by verbal means, in Joyce takes its character not from any pre-existent spiritual power manifesting itself in the phenomena of the world, but from the psychological state of the perceiver. Pater enhances certain qualities in the phenomena observed, and by enhancing them, he scales others down. Joyce, depending on the exigencies of the inner world of the perceiving consciousness, blurs or scales some phenomena down whereby he enhances others. Pater is working within the terms of symbolism whereas Joyce has moved into what can best be called psychological realism.

Rhythm, that taken-for-granted common ground of their respective styles, is not unaffected[1] by these divergent orientations. But this is only natural, as the attitude to phenomenal reality apparent in the representation of that reality determines for each writer the ideal of the basic unit of prose, the sentence. For Joyce, "the contemplation of an inner world of individual emotions" should be "mirrored perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose," where rhythmic ("periodic") construction and clear ("lucid") meaning are functions of one another, as is demonstrated by the following, fairly typical sentence in one of the passages cited above. "The uncouth faces passed him two by two, stained yellow or red or livid by the sea, and, as he strove to look at them with

ease and indifference, a faint stain of personal shame and commiseration rose to his own face." Combined in this sentence are two coordinate clauses—"[t]he uncouth faces passed him two by two" and "a faint stain of personal shame and commiseration rose to his own face"—which embrace a non-finite past participle clause—"stained yellow or red or livid by the sea," in subordinate position to the first—and a clause of time—"as he strove to look at them with ease and indifference," in subordinate position to the last. Of the two main events conveyed by the sentence one is external, objective, the other internal, subjective from Stephen's point of view, which is also the narrator's angle of vision. The first half of the full sentence is a case of mere subordination, an aspect of the action of the main clause is developed by the subordinate one, still, a delaying effect is thus produced as the reader has to relate additional information (the colour of the faces) to meaning (the boys passed Stephen) that he has been under the illusion of having established, so some revision (going back) is inevitable. The second half with the subordinate clause preceding the main one is truly periodic in that it retains the most important information to the very end. Taken as a whole, the sentence displays a veritable "arc of suspension" in that the slowing-down of the pace by the past participle clause, despite the fact that it faces in a different direction, gets added to the sense of delay produced by the subordinate clause of time that follows it, and the effect of the disclosure of Stephen's shame becomes all the greater. Yet, despite the suspensions and delays, the sentence follows a simple logic, as each of its structural blocks contributes, by adding a new element, to the emergent meaning.

Despite appearances to the contrary, Pater's ideal was different. His theoretical expositions of that ideal commend the manner of writing he has been cultivating from the beginning of his career, but he can be equally perceptive and generous about stylistic practices that he had little or no use for personally. Meditating, in "English Literature" (1886), on what makes good prose, he notes that chief among its criteria are "the qualities [. . .] of orderly structure, and such qualities generally as depend upon second thoughts" (*Essays from 'The Guardian'* 7). The implications of this argument are fully developed in "Style," where, proceeding from the assumption that prose is "the special and privileged artistic faculty of the present day" (*TMT* 397), he produces an impressive array of conditions that it should meet. In literature, as in the other arts, "structure is all-important"; chief among those conditions, therefore, is "the architectural conception of work, which foresees the end in the beginning [. . .] and in every part is conscious of all the rest," and by virtue of which "the contingent as well as the necessary" are "subsumed under the unity of the whole"—unity being provided by what has been for Pater the force behind artistic creation since the Leonardo essay: "the vision within" (*TMT* 403-04). Style, in other words, is the expression of the *mind* of the artist. The spatial strategy of "architectural design" can of course be apparent in its entirety only in the finished work and not in any constituent part of it such as the small yet self-contained and *par excellence* temporal building block, the individual sentence, in which, one would assume, it can operate only as a tendency. Still, as Pater finds the metaphor so apposite in delineating his ideal, looking for "architectural design" in his sentence-construction might prove fruitful if we want to establish its rhythmic character as well. For purposes of demonstration let me return to the passage in *Marius* that I have cited above. The rhythm of the sentences follows a pattern which is unlike the predominantly periodic pattern that Joyce's sentence exemplified. As I have argued, the picture painted by these sentences reveals to us more of Marius's mind than of the actu-

al, "objective" reality of which Marius himself forms a part. On the evidence of the passage, Marius makes sense of the world in dialectical terms; perception is almost always balanced, thus modified, by another perception:

(1) The orchard or meadow [. . .] was already gray with twilight, *though* the western sky [. . .] was still afloat in crimson splendour.

(2) The colour of all earthly things seemed repressed by the contrast, *yet* with a sense of great richness lingering in their shadows.

(3) *Half above, half below the level white mist, dividing the light from the darkness*, came now the mistress of this place [. . .].

(4) [T]o the mind of Marius her temperate beauty brought reminiscences of [. . .] the best female statuary of Greece. Quite foreign, *however*, to any Greek statuary was the expression of pathetic care [. . . ].

The clauses (1 and 2) and the complete sentences (4) or the adverbial phrase (3) through which this balancing is effected constitute a veritable system of antitheses, even when one of the antithetical items stands in a subordinate relation to the other (1). What they express has been called an "oxymoronic consciousness that accommodates opposition dialogically" (Fellows 27). The consequences, from the rhythmical point of view, of this kind of sentence-construction are manifold; most significantly, one's impression on reading the passage is that there is little progression; that every movement is reversed by a countermovement; that the appeal of the scene is spatial like that of a picture rather than temporal as would be appropriate for a verbal form of art. Whereas in Joyce the rhythm of the sentence suggests forward movement, however tortuous that movement may occasionally be, in Pater it tends to induce either the absence of movement or circularity. Which, considering his life-long interest in the visual and plastic arts and his advocacy of "architectural design" in literature, and, above all, his conviction that literature is essentially *vision*, is hardly surprising. And it is hardly surprising that sentences patterned like Pater's appear in Joyce where he is at his most "visionary," where space obliterates time: the hell scene and the bird-girl episode. In the former, there is a notable absence of progression throughout: what we have instead is a sense of circularity produced either by repetition or accretion. The allegoric personifications of evil are at first only named "creatures," then their number is stated: six, to be followed by further amplifications such as "goatish creatures with human faces, hornybrowed, lightly bearded and grey as indiarubber." "The malice of evil" that "glittered in their hard eyes" changes into "a rictus of cruel malignity." They move "hither and thither," or "swished in slow circles round and round the field, winding hither and thither through the weeds," etc. The account of the aesthetic encounter with the girl by the sea also exploits the stylistic device of repetition—by the combined use of the rhetorical figure of epanodos, repetition in inverted order, and chiasmus—and for the same end: "Her bosom was as a bird's, *soft and slight, slight and soft* as the breast of some dark-plumaged dove. But *her long fair hair was girlish: and girlish*, and touched with the wonder of mortal beauty, *her face* (171, emphasis added).

## The Question of Allegory

What I am pleading for is not the rejection of the established wisdom that Joyce's language was shaped, among others, by Pater's. I am merely proposing a tentative rethinking of that view as even random comparisons such as mine accentuate the differences

rather than the resemblances. A rethinking may at the same time have the beneficial side effect of showing us the spirit of Pater at work where, by the usual criteria, we would least suspect it. Allegory is a case in point. Stephen's vision of the girl by the sea and his earlier vision of hell—objective correlatives as they are, respectively, of the climactic moments of his religious and aesthetic crises—occasion remarkable instances of allegoric representation. In view of the almost symbiotic connection of *vision* and *allegory* in the history of literature, this in itself may seem only natural. What is less so is the—by Joycean standards unusual—pictorial and what pictorial implies: static or near static, character of the relevant passages. But allegory, especially where its attendant tendency to literalism was unhindered, fascinated Pater as well, as has been noted by J. Hillis Miller (Bloom, *Walter Pater* 91). Personifications of abstract ideas like wealth, commerce, health, by modern painters or sculptors, Pater observes in "Demeter and Persephone" (1876), are rather a shock to the aesthetic sense; symbolical representations, on the other hand, under the form of human persons as Giotto's *Virtues* and *Vices* at Padua, or his *Saint Poverty* at Assisi are "profoundly poetical and impressive":

> Symbolism intense as this, is the creation of a special temper, in which a certain simplicity, taking all things literally, *au pied de la lettre*, is united to a vivid pre-occupation with the aesthetic beauty of the image itself, the *figured* side of figurative expression, the *form* of the metaphor. When it is said, "Out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword," that temper is ready to deal directly and boldly with that difficult image, like that old designer of the fourteenth century, who has depicted this, and other images of the Apocalypse, in a coloured window at Bourges. Such symbolism cares a great deal for the hair of *Temperance*, discreetly bound, for some subtler likeness to the colour of the sky in the girdle of *Hope,* for the inwoven flames in the red garment of *Charity*. (*GS* 99)

The terminology is somewhat imprecise—the phenomenon discussed is allegory, not symbolism—but the main thrust of the reasoning is obvious. Unlike the symbol, allegory is not an object of the senses. It will not become one even if conceived and executed in the literal manner Pater attributes to Giotto. Owing to its literalism, however, allegory makes an intense appeal to the senses and thereby conveys the incarnated idea no less powerfully than a symbol would. Literalism performs functions for allegory that its naturalism does for the symbol.

Pater's argument may also be read as a late nineteenth-century anticipation of Paul de Man's attempt to restore to allegory the aesthetic position it had held before Coleridge demoted it. The very apparent preoccupation with "the *figured* side of figurative expression" in the central scenes of *A Portrait* provides literary substance to Pater's argument. It is at the same time evidence of an unprejudiced view of allegory on Joyce's part. Of the many links between Pater and Joyce this is probably the weakest as we have no proof that the latter gave any thought to the question. Yet, accidental as the congruence of this aspect of Pater's theory and Joyce's practice may appear, it would not be possible without an underlying kinship of spirit.

## Notes

[1] James's definition of experience as "an immense sensibility" in "The Art of Fiction" (1884), Wilde's insistence, in the guise of Lord Henry in *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1891), that what matters in life is "passionate experience" and "not the fruits of experience," Woolf's definition of the same in "Modern Fiction" (1919) as "a luminous halo" all go back to Pater's "Conclusion" to *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (1873). Impressionism, another aspect of Pater's concept of experience and thus of his epistemology, is equally central to James's and Woolf's, if not to Wilde's, thinking about literature. As to James's ambivalent attitude to Pater, which manifested itself in a certain distancing, Denis Donoghue makes some ineteresting observations in *Walter Pater: Lover of Strange Souls* 11-20, while Perry Meisel's *The Absent Father: Virginia Woolf and Walter Pater* is informative about Virginia Woolf's publicly critical and artistically docile treatment of Pater.

[2] What this signifies in actual artistic practice I discuss in " 'That extravagant style': Walter Pater, W. B. Yeats and Myth," scheduled to be published in *Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies* in 2002.

[3] Symptomatically, Pater substituted "abstract theory" for the phrase in the 1888 edition when, after a period of suppression, the essay was restored to the book (Donoghue 66-67).

[4] Pater's use of Hegel is treated extensively by Wolfgang Iser in *Walter Pater: Die Autonomie des Ästhetischen,* see especially "III. Kunst und Geshichte." For Pater's reading, including Hegel, and for his use of that reading, see Billie Andrew Inman's *Walter Pater's Reading: A Bibliography of His Library Borrowings and Literary References, 1853-1873,* and "The Intellectual Context of Walter Pater's 'Conclusion,' " *Prose Studies* 1.4 (May 1981), repr. Bloom, *Walter Pater.* The Hegelian elements of Joyce's aesthetics and the role that Pater may have played as mediator are noted by Jacques Aubert in his *Introduction a l'esthétique de James Joyce,* especially 20-21, 25. The whole question of Pater's relation to Joyce is brilliantly, though not exhaustively, explored by F. C. McGrath in *The Sensible Spirit: Walter Pater and the Modernist Paradigm*; McGrath reviews the philosophical origins of the theories that Stephen discusses with Lynch in *A Portrait,* including aesthetic apprehension, beauty, and literary forms in the chapter "Stephen's Aesthetic Theory" (237-55), where he also demonstrates Hegel's seminal influence.

[5] Clarification was necessary for purposes of self-defence against malignant attacks on "that disease we call Romanticism" *The Renaissance* was seen as peddling. See Gerald Monsman, *Walter Pater's Art of Autobiography* 153-54.

6 This view of romanticism maturing into classicism was unacceptable to the Joyce of the Mangan essay (*CW* 74).

[7] I am indebted for this insight to Don Gifford's *Joyce Annotated: Notes for* Dubliners *and* A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 265.

[8] How much alive the issue still was at the time is indicated by the probable date—1913 or 1914—of T. E. Hulme's "Romanticism and Classicism," which discusses the political implications of the dichotomy.

[9] Joyce had a copy of the first volume of *Marius the Epicurean* that was published by Macmillan in 1911; the date is of little consequence, however, as the copy of *The Renaissance* that Joyce also had was the Macmillan edition of 1912. See Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce* 124.

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