Having It Both Ways?
Sympathy and Self-Love in Thomas Jefferson’s Moral Philosophy

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A long-time concern in literary studies, the sentimental conception of sympathy as a subject of scholarly inquiry, has recently also become a subject of American cultural and intellectual history. Derived from eighteenth-century English empirical psychology, the theory of the senses and Scottish moral philosophy, sensibility and sentimentalism soon emerged giving priority to feeling and the senses over reason and rationality. Intertwined with every aspect of human experience, it even affected political thought (Barnes; Burstein, *Sentimental*; Burstein, “The Political”; Howard; Knott; Todd; chapter 2 in Waldstreicher).

A man of many faces, Thomas Jefferson was very much part of his world. A child of the Enlightenment, he became imbued with the spirit of sentimentalism as far as human and political relationships were concerned, which also involved elements pointing outward from the tradition. In this essay, I am going to address the nature of the connection between sympathy and self-interest in Jefferson’s moral philosophy. More particularly, I wish to see whether Jefferson’s attempt to keep separate self-interest and motivations of the self and sympathy for others was successful or not. I hope to show that despite his determined attempt at separating the two in his theory of the moral sense, the latter did return to inform it in a peculiar manner.

Eighteenth-century interest in sympathy evolved as part of moral philosophy and the psychology of the senses originating with John Locke. In his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) he assigned a special role to the senses in learning about the world, excluding the existence of pre-existing ideas. It was his disciple, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury who, influenced by his empirical philosophy, defined the concept of the moral sense as a separate sense for moral conduct. Shaftesbury held that like the five senses, the moral sense provided humans with the capacity of receiving sense impressions to which they responded in a habitual manner. Moreover, it was the moral sense, thought to be universal in humans, which enabled them to feel benevolence for others, as well as inducing them to perform benevolent deeds for others. Shaftesbury’s influence on Scottish moral philosophers was immense, especially his tenet about humans being prone to feel compassion for others through the moral sense, and thereby capable of overcoming selfish dispositions. Frances Hutcheson, Lord Kames (Henry Home), Adam Smith, and David Hume, despite their differences, proved to be unified in their view of humans as social beings naturally feeling sympathy and benevolence for fellow human
beings. Through the concept of the moral sense, benevolent and moral conduct came to be intertwined in their moral philosophy (Todd 24-27; Howard 69-70). The cult of sentimental feeling became so prevalent in the eighteenth century that it came to be identified as the hallmark of humanity (Fiering 196, 198).

With its advocacy of the study of human emotions and related conduct, Scottish Common Sense philosophy ventured to emphasize the individual’s place in social networks of feeling. In doing so, it also influenced literary culture, and through that the whole English-speaking world. Through the works of Samuel Richardson, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Laurence Sterne, and others, philosophical ideas managed to inform major manifestations of sentimental culture, popularized also by local writers in America such as William Hill Brown through his *The Power of Sympathy; or, The Triumph of Nature* (1789) (Howard 70; Barnes 597-610).

Sentimental values began to appear in the New World around the time of the War of Independence, first among heterosexual communities of letter writing and friendly circles (Knott 146-48, 161-63). Furthermore, the cult of feeling strongly informed the discourse of independence: American Patriots arguing for the necessity of breaking ties with Britain did so by means of an overt evocation of sympathy and affective ties among themselves. Thus, national identity from the birth of the nation was conspicuously intertwined with political sympathy. In this project, Thomas Jefferson played a prominent role in a textual sense as well, by phrasing memorable passages of his own first draft of *The Declaration of Independence* informed by Scottish moral philosophy (Burstein, “The Political;” Wills; Coviello, “Agonizing;” Coviello, *Intimacy*, 157-75; Hellenbrand 73). Largely through his insatiable appetite for books that had achieved great popularity in his times, Jefferson familiarized himself with the main tenets of sentimentalism and sensibility by reading Scottish philosophers as well as the literature of the day. The latter consisted most particularly in Sterne and his *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* (in nine volumes, 1759-1767), teaching Jefferson about the role of sentiments in human knowledge, encompassing the self and the world alike. Jefferson could learn from Sterne how feelings would go together with reasoning when it came to processing human sense experience (Burstein, *The Inner* 42-49).

Jefferson derived the basics of his moral philosophy including ideas about sympathy and benevolence from Scottish moral philosophy. Scholarship has associated him with its representatives, including Lord Kames (Henry Home), especially, whose emphasis on the development of the moral sense of any given society and humankind in the course of history, or the relationship of morality and reason, among other details of his concept, greatly appealed to him. On a familiar account, the first major proponent of the idea of the moral sense, Francis Hutcheson also made an impact on him, for instance, as far as the link between virtue and the moral conduct of the individual are concerned, as well as the importance of social bonds in society generated by affection (Helo and Onuf 593-609; Holowchak 16; Jayne 79-80; Wills 290). In developing his understanding of the (white) American nation, Jefferson also extended the concepts of sympathy and affection, conceiving of their relation to other races such as blacks and Native Americans, as Peter S. Onuf has shown (*Jefferson's Empire* 18-52, 147-88; “Every Generation;” “To Declare”). Jefferson’s ideas
about sentimental sympathy, on the other hand, were strongly rooted in his moral philosophy, with ramifications having bearing on his construction of a relationship between sentiment and rational calculation. In order to evaluate them, however, it is vital to understand the contemporary notions of sympathy in relation to rationality.

By the nineteenth century, two opposing conceptions of sympathy had evolved in the English-speaking world. One was the “cognitive or intellectual” perspective on sympathy, based on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, which emphasized the impossibility of immediate access to another’s feelings, hence making the role of imagination primary in constructing another’s emotional universe. As such, it was bound to encompass all kinds of feelings as a basis of sympathy. This cognitive understanding of sympathy was vital to the development and functioning of market relations: by calculating others’ feelings and interests one could regulate one’s own conduct in a way to influence others in his/her own interest. Ultimately, then, the cognitive conception of sympathy, by identifying others’ feelings facilitated promoting one’s own interest. As opposed to this conception of sympathy, the “emotive or sentimental” one posited it as direct compassion for others, facilitating the same feeling between self and other. The emotive conception of sympathy also set up a sharp distinction between the ways of generating sympathy, excluding cognitive operations from the mechanism of compassion. According to Wickberg, this kind of sympathy was confined to feeling for the suffering of others. While the cognitive variety presupposed the primacy of self-interest in generating sympathy, the emotive one totally excluded it from sympathetic interaction. All in all, regarding the nature and mechanism, while the cognitive version in the nineteenth century became attached to market relations and the masculine world of business, the emotive one got rather connected to the female world of the private sphere and domesticity (Wickberg 152-53).

To what extent do these two paradigms of sympathy describe Jefferson’s understanding of benevolence to others, or friendship and affection felt for others? Can it be argued that he committed himself to an emotive strategy of sympathetic relations or, to the contrary, his understanding of human relations rather revolved around the cognitive variety? A broad look at the major tenets of his moral philosophy would suggest that his theory of such sentiments aligns him with the emotive one, excluding the cognitive aspect as well as the motive of self-interest in feeling for others. However, a closer examination can reveal the presence of the alternative variety, featuring elements related to self-interest and self-love. The major concept in Jefferson’s moral philosophy that has an important bearing on his understanding of sympathy is the moral sense. In a letter to Thomas Law written June 3, 1824, Jefferson claims the presence of this as necessary to associate with everyone, providing the grounds to exist in society, thus making the human being a “social animal” (Writings 1336). This capacity of the individual enables him/her not only to make a distinction between right and wrong, but also to relate to others (Wickberg 139). In his letter to Law, Jefferson sets a clear contrast between morality which can only be based on the relationship between self and others and “self-love,” arguing that we cannot have “duties” and “obligations” to ourselves, only to others. Consequently, self-love, directed to the individual, does not consist of moral concerns, given that it exists outside the sphere of human relations (Jefferson, Writings 1336). Self-love therefore
cannot form the basis of morality to Jefferson. The moral sense then expresses the unison of ethical behavior and charity: to do good to others is a morally good act (see also Wickberg 139).

But what is it that induces people to fulfill their duties and obligations to others? According to Jefferson, it is the moral sense itself because of its power to generate “pleasure” in the individual as a result of such virtuous actions as performing charitable deeds for others in need. Instead of self-love, it is the “love of others” that can give us pleasure. As he says, “[...] nature hath implanted in our breasts a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct, in short, which prompts us irresistibly to feel and to succor their distresses [...]” (Jefferson to Thomas Law, June 3, 1824, in Jefferson, *Writings* 1337). For Jefferson, then, doing good to others is a moral obligation, the fulfillment of which equals the love of others. Sympathy for others’ pain thus gives us pleasure automatically, as it were, since it is rooted in the fulfillment of the duty to love others and not that of the self. This, however, has an important consequence for the problem of self-interest, as will be seen below.

On a more philosophical level, Jefferson clearly identified the sphere of individual sentiments including self-love and moral sense, with its subject of sympathy and affection felt for others as separate domains of human experience. Consequently, he also discussed the difference between self-love and the love of others. As he explained in a letter to William Short, “Epictetus and Epicurus give laws for governing ourselves, Jesus a supplement of the duties and charities we owe to others” (Jefferson to William Short, October 31, 1819, in Jefferson, *The Writings* X, 144). That is to say, he associated self-interest with the goal of one’s life, which is to find happiness. For him, like for Epicurus, it meant “the absence of pain” in body and mind. Hence, he argues, “The *summum bonum* is to be not pained in body, nor troubled in mind, i.e., indolence of body, tranquility of mind” (146, emphasis in the original). No wonder, then, that Jefferson identified himself at the beginning of this letter as an “Epicurian” (143). All this, however, presumes the dissociation of the operations linked with the conduct of the individual, aimed at achieving happiness from the moral sense. This idea is more fully explored in Jefferson’s letter to Maria Cosway. However, as will be seen, the separation does not seem perfectly achieved there, with him bringing the cognitive aspect into the discussion of the moral sense.

Jefferson placed great emphasis on the power of sympathy and friendship in his letter to Maria Cosway in 1786 and explained such issues in the form of a dialogue between the “Head” and the “Heart” (October 12, 1786, in Jefferson, *Writings* 866-77). Within the context of a friendly Parisian encounter with the Cosways, a married couple of artists from England, he develops an argument about the value of friendship in relation to the general subject of human relations. The personified Head, representing rational calculation, argues against any sort of positive human relationship with others, while the Heart turns every stone to prove its intrinsic worth, vindicating authority in matters of the moral sense, including affection for others as well as friendship.

The organ of the moral sense enabling one to feel such sentiments is the human heart, according to Jefferson. As he explores through its debate with the Head, the former has the capacity to feel compassion for others’ woes and pain. Being a sensor of such feelings, the Heart also has the power to alleviate such negative feelings: “Deeply
practiced in the school of afflictions, the human heart knows no joy which I have not lost, no sorrow of which I have not drunk! [...] Who then can so softly bind up the wound of another as he who has felt the same wound himself?” (Jefferson to Maria Cosway, October 12, 1786, in Jefferson 1984, 870-71). Here is then the paradigm of emotive sympathy as defined by Wickberg: it is based on previous knowledge of a given feeling that is a precondition for sympathy, and the Heart’s capability of the same feeling is taken as given. Such a disposition is the basis of a charitable attitude toward those in need. The examples given by the Heart are bound to suggest that this kind of sympathy consists in the subordination of self-love to benevolence to others with no calculation of self-interest. This explains why the Heart is ready to give a lift to a “wearied” soldier plodding on the road or a woman asking for “charity” to pay for her son’s schooling (874-75).

All this attitude of the Heart in turn is in opposition to that of the Head, which appears in Jefferson’s argument as the domain of self-interest. Furthermore, it argues for the isolation of the self from others when it comes to having its share of others’ pain or pleasure. Human relations, according to the Head, are the ultimate source of possible pain to the individual, who then is to avoid such a pain by being wise enough to avoid friendship. The loss of friends results in pain, hence to prevent it, according to the Head, one must stay away from human relations. “The art of life is the art of avoiding pain,” the Head maintains then continues, “The most effectual means of being secure against pain is to retire within ourselves and to suffice for our own happiness. Those, which depend on ourselves, are the only pleasures a wise man will count on, for nothing is ours which another may deprive us of” (Writings 872). Andrew Holowchack has argued that the position that Jefferson expresses through the standpoint of the Head, including the ideas here, is to be seen as a strong articulation of Epicurean tenets (Holowchack 17-20).

The Head thus clearly occupies the position of rationality, arguing for the primacy of the self when it comes to love and sympathy. Since friendship results in more pain for the self, when sharing the troubles of the amicable ones, it is against the principle of the tranquility of the former. “Friendship is but another name for an alliance with the fallacies and misfortunes of others,” the Head claims. “Our own share of miseries is sufficient; why enter then as volunteers into those of another?” (Jefferson, Writings 872-73). The Heart’s response to this is framed within the emotive model of sympathy—at least as far as the beginning of its argumentation is concerned. It does find pleasure in sharing the pain of others: “And what more sublime delight than to mingle tears with one whom the hand of heaven hath smitten! To watch over the bed of sickness, and to beguile it’s [sic] tedious and it’s [sic] painful moments! To share our bread with one to who misfortune left none!” (Writings 873). One would think that this is where self-love appears in the Heart’s (i.e., Jefferson’s) reasoning. Yet it is not, since, as he claimed in his letter to Law, it is the moral sense that generates such a pleasure based on sharing the pain of others.

However, as the Heart moves on in its reasoning, it turns out that, in the first place, it does admit that all the above-mentioned features of friendship amount to troubles, and in the second place, the self can in fact benefit from the act of benevolence. Jefferson’s discourse here turns into that of exchange, shifting to the marketing ethos of the
cognitive version of sympathy, ultimately rooted in self-interest. Besides the “burthens of friendship,” one should be aware of its “comforts,” too, as the Heart asserts,

> When languishing then under disease, how grateful is the solace of friends! How we are penetrated by their assiduities and attentions! How much are we supported by their encouragements and kind offices! When Heaven has taken from us some objects of our love, how sweet is it to have a bosom whereon to recline our heads, and into which we may pour the torrent of our tears. Grief, with such a comfort, is almost a luxury! (Writings 873)

What we have here, then, is Jefferson’s argument for friendship based on the reciprocal exchange of sympathy. More precisely, the self, feeling for the troubles of the observed one, is doing so in the hope of receiving a similar gesture of sympathy. Such an attitude, in turn, is very close to the market-related sympathy that Smith identified with the modern self. Although Jefferson did not consider it as part of the dynamics of market relations, he did conceive of it as a domain of emotional exchange. Sympathy becomes a subject of exchange, in the sense that it appears as an asset of the self, to prepare for a future reception of sympathy. Such a transaction in turn, with the reception of sympathy from the other does not lack the element of self-interest.

That the argument presented by the Heart also points toward market sentiments is shown by the fact that it contrasts the culture of “self-sufficiency” with that of emotional exchange as epitomized by friendship. It is the Heart’s position that the isolation of the self from others equals the lack of such reciprocity of sympathy. “In a life where we are perpetually exposed to want and accident,” says the Heart to the Head, “yours is a wonderful proposition, to insulate ourselves, to retire from all aim, and to wrap ourselves in the mantle of self-sufficiency! For assuredly nobody will care for him who cares for nobody” (Writings 873). According to the Heart, then, the Head’s proposal for the isolation of the self from others, and the consequential lack of sympathy, would only be a strategy viable in a case when there is no surplus to exchange, and hence all are compelled to sustain themselves with no (emotional) resources available to share. Jefferson here fuses the discourse of market relations with that of sentimental discourse on the exchange of emotions. The vision that the Heart associated with the Head is one with no surplus of sympathy that can be exchanged. It is also the condition of scarcity in terms of human sympathy available for friendship. Emotional self-sufficiency comprises a world where there is no demand for each other’s benevolence, meaning that individuals do not feel the necessity to interact with one another in order to receive and give sympathy or benevolence, since they can have none to dispose of. According to the Heart, then, only in a universe based on market relations can sympathy as surplus appear. In addition, the Heart maintains that the world, in fact, is not based on such self-sufficiency, rather it involves reciprocity. Moreover, it points out that the world of friendship is not reduced to pain and suffering to share, but it also contains pleasure. Friendship offers pleasure to its participants (Writings 873). In other words, reciprocity is not confined to the exchange of pain and suffering but it also involves pleasure. Hence friendship also involves the exchange of pleasure. This is
why it feels assured to conclude, “But friendship is precious not only in the shade but in the sunshine of life...” (Writings 873).

The rest of the Heart’s line of argument is a celebration of friendship as a platform for revelry and pleasure, plus the primacy of the moral sense, as represented by the Heart in making judgements about implementing the principle of benevolence and the sacrifice of self-interest to common interest. All these acts involve the ignorance of rational calculation and preference for sympathy. They, the Heart claims, belong to the domain of the moral sense and sympathy (Writings 873). The Heart thus strives clearly to delineate its own sphere of moral duties to others, excluding rationality and self-love. Nonetheless, as I have attempted to show above, the economy of sympathetic exchange does involve the element of rationality and exchange in situations where emotional self-sufficiency does not rule.

Another instance of the role of self-interest in the Heart’s argumentation concerns the part where there is an invitation for the Cosways and especially the landscape painter Maria Cosway to visit the United States for a sentimental reunion. The visit, the Heart argues, would surely contribute to the artistic fame of the addressee: “Where could they find such objects as in America for the exercise of their enchanting art? Especially the lady, who paints landscapes so inimitably. She wants only subjects worthy of immortality to render her pencil immortal” (Jefferson, Writings 404). Sentimental reunion, then, besides the pleasure of seeing each other, would also hold other benefits for the individual self.

Another instance in the Jeffersonian oeuvre where self-love and self-interest do gain significance is also in relation to the economy of sympathy, as developed by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Smith argues on the basis of ancient Stoic philosophy that the individuals’ attachment to their own person has primacy over others. In Smith’s words, “Every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended to his own care; and every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself than of any other person. Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people” (219). This does not mean that the self has no feelings for others except for him/herself, but the former are weaker than the latter. Smith points out that the next level of sympathetic attachment for the self lies with the family.

This is “the gravitational model of human relations” in historian John Saillant’s phrase (6), that is, the power of human sentiments diminishes with distance away from the individual placed at the center of concentric circles of sympathy. The next level is the family, whose members feel more attached to one another than to those outside their circle. Jefferson also adopted this paradigm, however covertly, in his understanding of human society. Peculiarly enough, he explored it in relation to Native American societies. In Query VII of his Notes on the State of Virginia (1781) he argues that Indian societies are based on affection gradually diminishing in proportion with movement from outside to the individual. Yet, at the same time, Jefferson employs the culturally different Natives as a platform to identify white customs, claiming that the same law of gravitation, strongest at the center, governs white society. He argues how affection among Native Americans weakens as one moves away from the individual, arguing about the Native American male that “his affections comprehend his other
connections, weakening, as with us, from circle to circle, as they recede from the center [...]” (Jefferson, *Writings* 185) This notion, at the same time, also functions to connect the disparate spheres of the moral sense and the individuality whose separation for Jefferson was so vital in the other texts discussed above. The individual, according to this model, feels the strongest affection for him/herself, and hence relational distance results in the weakening of emotional ties between individuals.

Finally, it should be noted, Jefferson’s adherence to the emotive version of sympathy was not confined to the world of domesticity, although clearly separate from that of marked relations. On the contrary, as the Heart’s examples of the workings of the moral sense demonstrate, charity functions outside the domestic sphere, including the aforementioned soldier or the poor woman that the Heart and the Head encounter on the road, or the patriots’ example given by the Heart referring to the sacrifice of self-interest that colonists made for the revolutionary cause (Jefferson to Maria Cosway, October 12, 1786, in Jefferson, *Writings* 875). Needless to say, these do not even approximate the market-related attitude that Smith’s version of sympathy did contain.

**Conclusion**

A fundamental concept of Thomas Jefferson’s moral philosophy was the moral sense, its complex nature involving the notion of care and love for others, with a strong emphasis on feeling for their pain and suffering. Also, its separation from the domain of self-love was made explicit by Jefferson. Nevertheless, in several ways it represented a major difference compared to the emotive paradigm. In the first place, it was not simply suffering and pain that constituted the subject of sympathetic sentiment for him that Wickberg associates with the emotive version of sympathy, but pleasure, too. In the second place, self-interest was also connected to the moral sense through pleasure, its exchange as a positive transaction for the self, generated by his/her having the company of others in suffering. Sympathy in fact became an object of emotional exchange for the Heart.

Finally, the strict separation of the sphere of the moral sense and that of self-love was also contested by the gravitational model of human relations, a concept also subscribed to by Jefferson, with the individual self attached to others and not isolated from them when it came to sympathetic interaction. Although representing a strong commitment to the emotive paradigm, Jefferson hence suggested the presence of self-interest as part of that. If the Head argued for the isolation of the self as the best way of pursuing happiness through the peace of mind and the lack of bodily pain, the Heart advocated the support of others in a reciprocal relationship with the self as far as sympathy was concerned. Therefore, Jefferson represented an idiosyncratic attitude toward the two models of sympathy. However much he wished to keep self-love and sympathy for others separate, he could not achieve that separation fully. Hence, in so far as there was a temporary relationship between the emotive paradigm of sympathy and the rise of the cognitive one, on account of his ambiguous attitude to them Jefferson may be positioned as a transitory figure in the shift from one to the other. This may also have relevance to his ambiguous views on other issues, too, such as slavery – worth exploring in separate studies.
Works Cited


