Abstract

Cameroon has been plunged into a devastating civil conflict since December 2017 when President Paul Biya declared war on secessionists after the killing of four soldiers and two police officers in the South West Region. This paper approaches the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis from the theoretical premise of remedial secession. It argues that the evolution of the crisis from a moderate return to federalism pursued by “Sisiku” Agbor Felix Nkongho to the radical secession espoused by “Sisiku” Julius Ayuk Tabe can be understood within the framework of remedial secession. The cogency of this argument is examined against efforts made by the Cameroon government to tackle the crisis and the concept of territorial integrity. This paper concludes that the protracted nature of the conflict reflects the theoretical impasse between remedial secession and territorial integrity.

Keywords

Cameroon Anglophone Crisis, Remedial secession, Territorial integrity, Intra-state conflict, Nationalism
INTRODUCTION
The political landscape of Cameroon in recent times has been marked by a conflict that threatens to dismember the territory between its two constituent linguistic communities—Francophones and Anglophones. The current crisis can be traced back to Cameroon’s checkered political history marked by the marginalization of Anglophones from independence to contemporary times. Before expanding recently into a full-blown armed conflict, the Anglophone crisis began as an outcry by the Anglophones against their marginalization in a reunited independent territory, starting in 1961 and continuing to the present day. The marginalization, referred to by some scholars as the “Anglophone Problem” (Eko 2003; Eyoh 1998), describes “the emergence of an Anglophone consciousness derived from the feeling of being ‘marginalized’, ‘exploited’ and ‘assimilated’ by the Francophone-dominated state in Cameroon” (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997, p. 207). This has triggered two principal solution mechanisms in the Anglophone community: dialogue, on the one hand and secession on the other.

To understand the Anglophone crisis, it is imperative to define what “Anglophone” means in the context of Cameroon. There is no conventional definition of what constitutes an Anglophone or a Francophone in Cameroon, but given the etymology of both terms (Dollinger 2020; McArthur 2020) it would be safe to categorize such individuals as members of English-speaking and French-speaking linguistic communities. Therefore, Anglophone in the Cameroonian context refers to Cameroonians originating from the two English-speaking regions of the country (South West and North West), which both constitute former British Southern Cameroons’ territory. British Southern Cameroonians formed part of the British Cameroons colony which made separate decisions about their political destiny in a referendum held on 11 February, 1961. British Southern Cameroonians decided to gain independence by joining the Republic of Cameroon and British Northern Cameroon decided to get its independence by joining the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) of “Sisiku” Agbor Felix Nkongho opted for a strategy of dialogue and negotiation while “Sisiku” Ayuk Tabe of the Southern Cameroonians Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) opted for a secession. The two “Sisikus” (a knighthood title of the Bayangi ethnic group in the South West Region of Cameroon) represent the evolving trajectory of the Anglophone crisis. Sisiku Agbor Felix Nkongho represents the moderate segment of the Anglophone Cameroonian population that was open to dialogue and negotiation with the Cameroonian government at the outbreak of the crisis. Their platform was the return to the Federal system of government adopted by Cameroon at independence in 1961, which explains why Anglophone Cameroonians and others who espouse this opinion are called Federalists.

It should be noted that the call for a return to the Federal system of government in Cameroon emerged in the late 90s and gained momentum among the prominent Anglophone Cameroon Elites at the time. In April 1993, prominent Anglophone elites like Carlson Anyangwe, Sam Ekontang Elad, Benjamin Itoe and Simon Munzu
organized the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) in Buea, over 5000 delegates attended to forge a unified position for convening a national debate on constitutional reform by the government. The Buea Declaration that resulted from the conference highlighted the need to go back to the Federal system of government adopted at independence (Konings, 1999). Federalism has also been embraced by the famous contemporary Francophone Cameroon political leader Prof. Maurice Kamto, who views this governmental system as the solution to the conflict in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon (Takambou, 2020).

“Sisiku” Ayuk Tabe represents the radical segment of the Anglophone Cameroonian population, and he considers secession and independence the only remedy to the Anglophone crisis. Though military confrontation with the Cameroonian government by secessionist factions is new, the idea of secession and the formation of an independent Anglophone Cameroonian state have some historical precedence. The idea of secession and independence of the former British Southern Cameroons gained prominence in 1985 when the first Cameroon Bar Association President Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka declared Ambazonia a state in a pamphlet he published entitled “The New Social Order” (Takambou, 2019). After decrying the marginalization of Anglophones, in an address to the regime of President Paul Biya he underscored that “If the expression ‘Southern Camerooners’ has exposed us to any annexationist ambitions, then we will henceforth call ourselves AMBAZONIA” (Gorji-Dika, 1984). “Ambazonia” is derived from the “Ambas Bay” (a former British protectorate), which refers to a bay in the South West Region of Cameroon. It connotes a separated Southern Cameroonians, distinct from the Republic of Cameroon (Mwakideu, 2017).

This paper examines the origins and evolution of the Anglophone crisis. It approaches the Anglophone Cameroon crisis from the theoretical lens of remedial secession. It examines the dichotomous reaction of Anglophone Cameroonians to their marginalization from the perspective of the theory of remedial secession. The paper argues that the evolution of the Anglophone problem from the moderate stage of dialogue with the government on the resolution of major grievances (pursued by “Sisiku” Agbor Felix Nkongho) to the radical option of secession (espoused by “Sisiku” Julius Ayuk Tabe) can be explained by how a portion of Anglophone Cameroonians perceived secession. Proponents of secession viewed it as the last option for ending their protracted marginalization. The paper starts by providing a historical background to the conflict. Next, it establishes a theoretical and conceptual framework to be used in analysing the conflict before moving to an analysis of the dialectic pathways pursued by two of the key actors in the struggle against Anglophone marginalization. It contrasts the moderate approach taken by Sisiku Nkongho Agbor Balla and the radical option espoused by Sisiku Ayuk Tabe. It also examines the response of the Cameroonian government to the crisis. An attempt was also made to gauge the perception of Anglophone Cameroonians on the existence, nature, reasons, and solutions to the on-going crisis in the Anglophone regions, thereby providing an opportunity for them to share their thoughts on efforts to resolve the problem.
This paper seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. What explains the evolution of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis from a protest against the marginalization of ‘Anglophones’ in the educational and judiciary sectors to its radicalization to a secessionist movement demanding the establishment of an independent state for Anglophone Cameroonians?

2. How applicable is the doctrine of remedial secession in the Anglophone crisis?

3. What is the general perception among Anglophone Cameroonians concerning the nature, causes, and solution to the Anglophone crisis?

This paper adopts a mixed method in its empirical inquiry into the Anglophone crisis leveraging on both quantitative and qualitative data and analysis to perform a critical analysis of its evolution. Mixed methods procure several advantages in carrying out research on a complex phenomenon like the Anglophone crisis amongst which include: triangulations (the ability to confirm research findings using different methods); and complementarity (using results from one research method to elaborate, clarify, or enhance that from another) (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

The major quantitative method employed in this research was a structured questionnaire-based survey on the perception of Anglophones concerning the Anglophone crisis. The perception survey was carried out using a random sampling approach to ensure adequate representativeness and less bias among the sample population. The sample population consisted of adult Anglophone Cameroonians (defined as those who have the only two Anglophone regions in Cameroon—South West and North West, as their regions of origins) of irrespective of gender, age group, or level of education.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The theoretical framework for this study is remedial secession. Generally, secession refers to a situation where “a territorially concentrated group breaks away from the state in which it is currently included to form its own independent state, thereby tak-
ing away that part of the current state’s territory which it occupies” (Catala, 2013, p. 74). According to Buchanan (1997), theories on secession rights are divided into two basic groups: primary rights theories and remedial rights theories. This paper addresses the latter. Empirical cases of the operationalization of primary rights theories are rare compared to remedial rights theories, which have flourished in international discourse recently, such as the cases of Quebec (Supreme Court of Canada, 1998), Katanga (ACHPR, 1995), and Kosovo (ICJ, 2010).

Buchanan further notes that remedial rights theories are based on two important preconditions: a general right to secede when the group seeking secession has suffered injustice or when there are special rights to secede. These rights are granted by the state and provided by the constitution or an agreement “by which the state was initially created out of previously independent political units included the implicit or explicit assumption that secession at a later point was permissible” (Buchanan, 1997, p. 36). Brando and Morales-Gálvez (2019) underscore two pathways making the remedial right to secession possible: one that is restricted to groups that are victims of “grave injustices and human rights violations or unjust annexation by a state” (Ibid., p. 107) and another that is based on “the infringement of specific collective rights and the lack of constitutional recognition of minorities by the state” (Ibid.). In more explicit terms, Buchanan (2003, p. 335) points out that:

If the state persists in serious injustices toward a group, and the group’s forming its own independent political unit is a remedy of last resort for these injustices, then the group ought to be acknowledged by the international community to have the claim-right to repudiate the authority of the state and to attempt to establish its own independent political unit.

The question that arises from this theory, therefore, is whether the struggle for secession launched by Anglophone separatist can be justified under remedial secession.

Before delving to our analysis, it is important to note that some scholars have added a caveat to the theory of remedial secession to clearly situate the context in which it can be valid or invalid according to international law. One such scholar is Jure Vidmar. In his analysis of the Quebec case and the case of Loizidou vs Turkey, which was brought before the European Court of Human Rights in 1997, Vidmar noted that remedial secession has not been accepted by any judicial body as an entitlement in any specific case. The author added that it was viewed by its academic proponents as an exceptional option or a solution of last resort (Vidmar 2010). Catala (2013) also admits that secession resulting from a unilateral decision not backed by the consent of mother state or sanctioned by the constitution is controversial.

The other important argument against remedial secession is that it constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of a state, which is conceived as “a right of States to maintain their territorial integrity, whether it is against other States or from the threat of broken unity from within the State” (Wedel, 2018 p. 16).
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The term “Anglophone Cameroon” is a linguistic and cultural designation of the two English-speaking regions (Northwest and Southwest) that constitute part of the present-day Republic of Cameroon. To fully understand the present conflict that has embroiled both regions, it is important to revisit the historical evolution of the territory now called Anglophone Cameroon. The history of this linguistic-cultural group dates back to the era of German imperialism in Africa. What constitutes present day Cameroon was annexed by Germany in 1884 (Fanso, 1999). German Colonisation of Cameroon occurred between 1884 and 1914. Though relatively shorter than the British/French Mandate and Trusteeship periods, some scholars have argued that the German colonial period was the historical climax of Cameroon nationalism. LeVine wrote, “The German experience remains, for many Cameroonian, at once a political touchstone and a potent symbol of a half-mythical golden age when the Cameroons were one” (1964, p. 38). The nostalgia of a united Cameroon under the German colonial administration was crucial to the rhetoric of Cameroonian nationalism (Johnson, 1973).

German colonialism in Cameroon ended in 1914 when they were defeated in the territory by British and French forces. What followed was a period of dual governance by Britain and France, which was called “Condominium.” There was a partition of the territory between both countries in 1916 based on the Milner-Simon Agreement, and it was placed under the League of Nations Mandate with British and French control in 1922 and later under the trusteeship system of the United Nations until 1960 (Ardener, 1962). The French acquired three-quarters of the territory of Cameroon, while the British acquired one-quarter (Fanso, 1999; Njumea, 1995). While, scholars like Fru and Wasserman (2017) have traced the marginalization of the Anglophones in Cameroon to this disproportionate partition of the Cameroonian territory, which provided the framework for the emergence of a Francophone majority and an Anglophone minority (Awasum, 2000), other scholars such as Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) pointed out that the Anglophone identity might be distinct and peculiar when the general presumptions of identity formation are taken into consideration. Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) argue that colonial borders, reunification and the post-colonial state project of nation-state formation are responsible for the construction of the distinct identities in Cameroon.

Interestingly, historical analyses of the Cameroon nation-state project have indicated that while both communities yearned for independence, this unification was agreed upon knowing that it would accom-
modate their post-colonial differences. This was also highlighted by J. O. Fields, the British commissioner of Cameroon, in his address to the Southern Cameroons House of Chiefs prior to the referendum:

The UK and the UN are anxious that before the plebiscite takes place, it should be equally clear what their position would be if they should people choose to join the republic of Cameroon. To this end, my ministers are now engaged in discussions with representatives of the Cameroon Republic with a view to finding a basis of agreement on the constitutional, fiscal, economic and cultural position of Southern Cameroon if it were to become part of the Cameroon Republic. (Fields, 1961)

The British and French Mandate over Cameroon lasted from 1922 to 1945, when the United Nations Trusteeship Mission replaced the League of Nations Mandate Commission as the supervisory authority over Cameroon. While the French administered their own territory as a full-fledged colony, the British administered a portion of Cameroon as part of their Nigerian colony. French Cameroon gained its independence in January 1960 while British Southern Cameroons got its independence in February 1961 after a referendum conducted by the United Nations on the future of the territory (Fru & Wasserman, 2017).

Scholars have argued that through their various era of colonial rule, British and French Cameroon developed two distinct and diverse culture and national identities. In this regard, Fanso (1999, p. 284) notes that “Anglophone nationalism emerged separately from Francophone nationalism.” Anglophone culture (education, language, political philosophy, and other influences of the British colonial administration) constituted the primordial component of Anglophone nationalism (Fanso, 1999), distinct from Francophone nationalism. This assessment was originally highlighted by President Ahidjo in his welcome address at the Foumban Conference:

Gentlemen, the principal object of this gathering is to study together the important outlines of our future Constitution. You know that even before the Referendum and since then during our talks with Mr. Foncha, we chose a federal framework. Why this formula? It was because linguistic, administrative, and economic differences do not permit us to envisage seriously and reasonably a state a state of the Unitary and Centralized type. (Ahidjo, 1961).

Johnson (1973) also argues that despite the German colonial heritage, Cameroon had the trappings of a fragmentary society at independence lacking sufficient historical foundation, national unity, and integration. The collapse of the federal system of government in 1972 and the development of the Anglophone problem (i.e., marginalisation of Anglophones within the reunited Cameroon) only supports Johnson’s claims. Cameroonian in their overwhelming majority voted in favour of transitioning from a federal to a unitary state during a referendum organized on 20 May, 1972.
Out of 3,236,280 registered voters, 3,177,846 (roughly 98%) voted for the motion of dissolving the federation in favour of the establishment of a unitary state. Additionally, 176 people (0.005%) voted against the motion, 56,646 (1.75%) abstained, and 1,612 (0.04%) of the ballots were declared null and void (Chem-Langhëë, 1995).

The perception of marginalization by Anglophones Cameroonians in the unitary state emerged after the dissolution of the Federal system of government on 20 May, 1972. These feelings of marginalization were at alarming proportions when Cameroon’s President Paul Biya, in a presidential decree on 4 February, 1984, unilaterally decided to change the country’s name from the United Republic of Cameroon (the name adopted after the 1972 Referendum) to the Republic of Cameroon (the name adopted by the former French colony of Cameroon during independence in 1960) (Nkwi & Nyamjoh, 2017). This triggered an outburst of frustration and condemnation by Anglophone Cameroonians who perceived it as an unequivocal attempt to destroy their identity and disregard their history. This sense of dissatisfaction was eloquently expressed by Anglophone political groups such as the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) and the Ambazonia Movement. It was termed “The Buea Peace Initiative”, and CAM pointed out that the decision taken by President Biya to rename the country was a betrayal of the reunification of both Cameroons under a two state federation. In its reaction to the decision, CAM underscored that it:

…sounded the death knell of the unification of British and French Cameroons [and] consummated the constitutional secession of East Cameroon from the United Federal Republic which was negotiated in Foumban... in fulfillment of

This sentiment was echoed by the Ambazionia movement:

The constitutional mutation brought about by the United Republic of Cameroon Law 84/01 in January 1984, and it dissolved the illegal union first called Federal Republic of Cameroon (FRC) and later United Republic of Cameroon (URC). It restored our two nations to their original position as separate and independent of each other. So by law, Cameroon’s authority is now limited to the East of the Mongo River. (Ibid.).

Anger against the marginalization of Anglophones pushed one of the founding fathers of Cameroon’s reunification and former Vice President John Ngu Foncha to resign from his post as Vice-President of the ruling Cameroon’s People Democratic Party (CPDM). In his resignation letter on 9 June, 1990, Foncha enumerated several cases that highlighted the marginalization of his people (i.e., Anglophone Cameroonians) and justified his resignation:

All projects of the former West Cameroon I had either initiated or held very dear to my heart had to be taken over, mismanaged and ruined, such as Cameroon Bank, West Cameroon Marketing Board, WADA in Wum, and West Cameroon Cooperative Movement...
The Anglophone Cameroonians whom I brought into the Union have been ridiculed and referred to as “les Biafrians”, “les enemies dans la maison”, “les traites’ [traitres], etc., and the constitutional provisions which protected this Anglophone minority have been suppressed, their voices drowned while the rule of the gun has replaced the dialogue which Anglophones cherish very much.... (Ncha, 2017).

The above reactions can be seen as the remote origins or build-up of events that culminated in the strike organized by Anglophone teachers and lawyers in November 2016, which sparked a series of events that plunged the country into a full-blown conflict between secessionist forces and the Cameroonian military. This conflict has been going on for the past six years (2017 – 2023).

TWO SISIKUS AND TWO TRAJECTORIES FOR ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON

There are two main organizations in the Anglophone region that played prominent roles in the on-going Anglophone crisis: The Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), led by Sisiku Agbor Felix Nkongho (popularly known as Agbor Balla); and the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), led by Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe and the Cameroonian Government. As
time unfolded, there was an evolution in the focus, strategy and outcome of the Anglophone crisis following a transition of leadership from the CACSC and Sisiku Agbor Balla to SCACUF and Sisiku Ayuk Tabe. Under CACSC, the crisis continued, and it was characterized by non-violent protest and demonstration. Meanwhile, the crisis took a violent turn with the advent of SCACUF as the leading movement piloting the Anglophone struggle. These three actors (CACSC, SCACUF, and the Cameroonian Government) in the crisis, the strategies they pursued, and the resulting outcomes are analysed below.

**Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC)**

The CACSC, led by Sisiku Agbor Balla, was the first principal actor in the crisis for the Anglophones. The CACSC was established in December 2016 as part of concerted efforts by the Anglophone teacher and lawyer trade unions to form a united front to engage in dialogue with the Cameroonian government (Caxton, 2017). The CACSC stood out as the voice of the Anglophone community and focused its activism on the following demands for Anglophones:

- An end to the marginalisation and annexationist disposition of Yaounde.
- A return to the two-state federation in the management of public affairs in Cameroon that was the basis of the union entered in 1961.
- Preservation of the cherished legal and education systems of Anglophone Cameroon.
- Unconditional release of over 100 bona-fide Cameroonian arrested in connection with the protests in the Northwest and Southwest regions since September 2016, and
- Immediate restoration of internet services throughout the Anglophone regions. (Abouem a Tchoyi as cited in Okereke, 2018, p. 9)

In terms of strategy, the CACSC utilized a sit-down protest and strikes called “Ghost Town” in the southwest and northwest Anglophone regions of Cameroon. After the collapse of talks between the government and the striking Anglophone lawyers and teachers trade unions, on 27 December, 2016, the CACSC issued “Press Release No. 9” that called for the continuation of the teachers and lawyers strikes. They also reiterated their firm resolve to continue with the strike until their call for a two-state federation was heeded by the government:

We are not unaware of violent history of this country or the barbaric methods the government is capable of. But we must, however, reiterate our communal resolve to uphold the strikes until the State of Cameroon provides a viable political framework within which citizens of Former West Cameroon can live in peace, justice and equal opportunity; a two-State Federation where our people will no longer be humiliated, marginalized and treated as second class citizens! ...As from 2 January, 2017, the Teachers’ Strike will extend to all
Concerning outcomes, the strong stance of the CACSC during the negotiation pushed the government to make some concessions, including the recruitment of a thousand bilingual teachers, a 2 billion FCFA grant to confessional schools, and the production of the English version of the OHADA (Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa) Uniform Act, which previously existed only in French (Caxton, 2017). These measures failed to satisfy the CACSC, which doubled down on its call for a two-state federation and continuation of the strike. Their intransigence culminated in a decision by the Cameroonian government to ban the CACSC and arrest its leaders—President Sisiku Agbor Balla and Secretary General Dr. Fontem Neba (AT editor, 2017).

**Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF)**

The Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) was created in February 2017 after a decision by nine Anglophone separatist organisations to merge and form a united front. Meeting in Nigeria (where most Anglophone separatist took refuge after the government banning of CACSC and crackdown on secessionists within Cameroon), the following groups merged to form SCACUF: Republic of Ambazonia, Movement for the Restoration and Independence of Southern Cameroon (MORISC), Southern Cameroons South Africa Forum, Southern Cameroonians in Nigeria (SCINGA), Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), Southern Cameroons People Organization (SCAPO), Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL), and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC) (Amabo, 2017).

In terms of strategy, SCACUF made a milestone move on 1 October, 2017, by symbolically declaring independence from the Federal Republic of Cameroon. In a statement on its Facebook page, SCACUF said, “Today, we reaffirm our autonomy over our heritage and over our territory,” (Essa, 2017). Meeting a day before in Abuja, Nigeria SCACUF adopted a constitution for “Ambazonia”. A fifteen-member interim government was formed in November with Sisku Ayuk Tabe at the helm (ICG, 2017). It is imperative to point out that among the entities that merged to form SCACUF, the AGC has taken a life of its own, opting for a guerrilla type military resistance against the Cameroonian army. The AGC oversees the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) commanded by Lucas Ayaba Cho. It has become the main force in the Anglophone military resistance and fight for independence.

In a prelude to the 56th anniversary of the day (1 October, 1961) both sections of British and French administered Cameroon officially began their reunification under a federal constitution, the AGC encouraged Anglophones to show up for public demonstrations. The climax of the demonstrations was to be the celebration of what was hoped to be the independence of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia). On Sunday, 1 October, 2017, there were mass protests in the southwest and northwest Anglophone regions of Cameroon, and protesters attempted to raise up the Ambazonia flag. These
protests where met with a heavy-handed crackdown by the Cameroonian military with security forces opening fire on protesters in several towns in the Anglophone regions according to local sources. Reports from Amnesty International estimated the death toll at 17 (Atabong, 2017).

The ADF are not the only armed group involved in the Anglophone secessionist struggle. Alongside the independently operating ADF there are two other rebel militias and a dozen “self-defence” groups. The two other militias are the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF) under the leadership of Ebenezer Akwanga and the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SCDF) commanded by Nso Foncha Nkem (ICG, 2017). These military groups have been involved in fierce battles with the Cameroon army with high casualties on both sides.

The response of the Government of Cameroon to the Crisis
The government of Cameroon has used a carrot and stick approach, switching from dialogue and concessions to crackdowns and military operations. During the negotiations with the teachers and lawyers trade unions at the outset of the crisis, the government offered some concessions including the recruitment of 1000 bilingual teachers, a grant of two billion FCFA to confessional schools, and the translation of the OHADA Uniform Act into English. When these failed to satisfy the demands of the CACSC on the behalf of the teachers and lawyers, the government turned to more aggressive tactics, arresting the leaders of the CACSC (i.e., President Sisiku Agbor Balla and Secretary General Dr. Fontem Neba Aforteka’a) and other prominent Anglophone activists (i.e., Supreme Court Justice Ayah Paul Abina), and a journalist and leader anglophone activist (i.e., Mancho Bibixy) (Caxton, 2017).

After receiving intelligence of the planned demonstrations and declaration of independence by Anglophone Cameroon secessionists on 1 October, 2017, the government declared a two-day curfew banning public rallies and demonstrations in the two Anglophone regions and deployed the military (Kaze & Walton, 2021). Following an ambush attack by ADF on a Cameroon military convoy in the town of Mamfe (South West Region of Cameroon), which led to the death of some soldiers, Cameroon’s Minister of Defence Joseph Beti Assomo declared that “measures will be taken immediately” to “eradicate this inconvenient situation” (Mbom, 2017). His statement echoed the firm resolve of the Cameroonian President Paul Biya to launch a military crackdown on the assailants. Prior to the Defence Minister, President Biya denounced the attacks and assured Cameroonians that “steps are being taken to incapacitate these criminals and to make sure that peace and security are safeguarded” (News24, 2017). These declarations from the President and the Defence Minister were unequivocally interpreted by State radio as a declaration of war on “terrorists who seek secession” (News24, 2017).

In January 2018, the government of Cameroon worked with the Nigerian government towards the arrest and extradition of the SCACUF leader and head of the Interim Government of Ambazonia, Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, along with 46 other separatists. Ayuk Tabe and nine others were apprehended by the Nigerian Intelligence
Agency and Department for State Service in a hotel in Abuja, and the remaining 38 were allegedly arrested at different locations in Nigeria (BBC News, 2018; Kindzeka, 2018). The arrested Ambazonia leaders and other separatists were extradited to Cameroon on 29 January, 2018. Cameroon’s Minister of Communication, Issa Tchiroma, confirmed their extradition and detention in Cameroon, adding that the arrested separatists were going to “answer for their crimes” (Vanguard, 2018). He also lauded what he qualified as the “excellent cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon particularly with regards to security matters” (Kindzeka, 2018).

In the current situation, the Cameroon government has primarily adopted a military strategy that seeks to eliminate the secessionist forces and preserve the territorial integrity of the Cameroonian state. However, it has failed to heed to calls from the international community to engage in dialogue and seek a political solution to the crisis. Recently, the government has made two major decisions to diffuse the situation, which has elicited mix reactions from observers. The first decision was to establish a National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), and second decision was to suspend the prosecution of 289 individuals arrested and facing trials in the military court for involvement in secessionist activities. While some interpret both decisions as gestures of good faith, others see the creation of the NCDDR without a ceasefire as putting the cart before the horse. The decision to release the 289 alleged secessionists has also been criticized as half-hearted for its failure to include the ring leaders of the secessionist struggle, who are still being detained by the government.

The boldest step taken by the Cameroonian government to resolve the Anglophone crisis was the organization of the “Major National Dialogue” from 30 September to 4 October, 2019 in Cameroon’s capital, Yaounde (Köpp. 2019). The forum, initiated by the country’s President Paul Biya and chaired by its Prime Minister Dion Ngute, brought together participants from all ten regions and the diaspora, including civil society, political parties, religious entities, and other major socio-political entities. Before the talks, consultations were carried out by Prime Minister Ngute with Cameroonians across the political and social spectrum to identify an appropriate framework and solicit opinions and contributions (Cameroon Tribune, 2019).
As a special gesture in the wake of the national dialogue, President Paul Biya ordered the release of 333 prisoners arrested for their alleged involvement in the Anglophone secessionist uprising (Aljazeera, 2019). However, the move was dismissed by the secessionist fighters as a political stunt, and they refused to participate in the national dialogue and promised to continue fighting (Aljazeera, 2019). Separatist forces based in the United States and Europe disavowed the talks outlining two conditions that must be met for them to participate in any dialogue—that is held outside Cameroon and mediated by a third party (Kindzeka, 2019). The Major National Dialogue still took place with the following proposals adopted at the end of the event:

- the adoption of a special status for the two Anglophone regions
- the restoration of the House of Traditional Chiefs
- the election of local governors
- the immediate relaunch of certain airport and seaport projects in the two regions
- the rapid integration of ex-combatants into society
- the name of the country be returned to former name, the United Republic of Cameroon
- implement the law that government officials declare their assets in order to tackle corruption. (Chimtom, 2019)

Reacting to the proposals adopted at the Major National Dialogue, President Paul Biya stated that all the recommendations “will be considered attentively and diligently with a view to implementing them, taking into account their relevance and feasibility, as well as the capacities of our country” (Biya, 2020). This promise was kept, and on 23 March, 2020 a presidential decree was issued putting in place a follow-up committee for the implementation of the resolutions of the Major National Dialogue (Teke, 2020).

While the Cameroonian government and its spokesperson and Communication Minister Rene Sadi expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the Yaounde national dialogue forum (Teke, 2019), some pundits do not share same positive attitude. Bone and Nkwain (2019) already predicted that the talks were doomed to fail given the fact that it side-lined the voice of Anglophone representatives who form only a quarter of participants, along with the absence of the secessionists. Anglophone and anti-Ambazonian social media activist, Frankline Njume, also expressed scepticism on the success of the Major National Dialogue, criticizing its lack of inclusiveness of patriots like himself (Azohnwi, 2019). Critics have also casted doubts on the special status granted to the northwest and southwest Anglophone regions, arguing that the level of autonomy is vague because of centralization of power in the Francophone dominated administration in Yaounde, the nation’s capital (Nkongho & Tinsley, 2020).

The crisis is almost becoming intractable as both sides have steadfastly argued for their positions and they are unwilling to back down or compromise. The humanitarian damages have been colossal. The most recent statistics (2023) from International
Crisis Group on the humanitarian damages of the crisis puts the total number of casualties from the war at 6000 persons; and the number of refugees and displaced persons at 6000 and 765,000 people respectively (International Crisis Group, 2023).

**The Applicability of Remedial Secession to the Anglophone Crisis**

There are arguments for and against the applicability of remedial rights theories in the case of the Anglophone quest for secession and the establishment of an independent state. These arguments will be analysed based on the requirements highlighted in the theoretical framework. Firstly, proponents of remedial rights theories do admit that remedial secession is an “exceptional, last-resort” (Vidmar, 2010, p. 40). For the Anglophone crisis, the argument can be made that the establishment of SCACUF and the step it took to declare the independence of the Anglophone Regions under the name of the Republic of Ambazonia was a measure of last resort considering the failure of negotiations between the CACSC and the government, as well as its subsequent disbanding by the Cameroonian government. CACSC called for measures to address the grievances of Anglophone lawyers and teachers concerning the destruction of the Anglophone educational and legal (Common Law) systems and a return to the federal system of government adopted by Cameroon at independence.

The petitions of CACSC reflected protracted dissatisfaction among Anglophone Cameroonians concerning their marginalization over the years since independence. The failure of negotiations and the disbanding of CACSC laid the foundation for the establishment of SCACUF and its pursuit of the creation of an independent Anglophone Republic called Ambazonia. While this argument has some cogency, the determination of whether all available options to seek redress against marginalization has been exhausted usually constitute a matter of subjective interpretation and debate, which may differ for both sides involved in the issue.

One of the pathways under which remedial secession is permissible according to Bando and Morales-Galvez is “the infringement of specific collective rights and the lack of constitutional recognition of minorities by the state” (2019, p. 107). Here the argument can be made that the dissolution of the federal system of government in Cameroon was a violation of the constitutional right of the Anglophone minority. This contention is based on Section 10, Article 47 (1), which states that “Any proposal for the revision of the present Constitution which impairs the unity and integrity of the Federation shall be inadmissible” (DePaul University, 2021). The conduct of a referendum to transform the system of governance from federalism to a unitary system has been considered by some scholars (Efuetzi, 2018; Konings, 1999) to be a violation of the provision of Article 47 (1) of Section 10 of the federal constitution. Concerning this article, Konings (1999) underscored that “This important clause had been specifically inserted into the constitution to assure Southern Cameroonian that federation could not be dissolved.” (Konings, 1999, p. 303). The issue of constitutional violation of Article 47 (1) of Section 10 of the federal constitution of Cameroon, prominent Anglophone elite and former president of the Cameroon Bar Association, Barrister Akere Muna, argued that the current Anglophone crisis (i.e.,
the secessionist war going on in the two Anglophone regions in Cameroon) has roots in “the governance or the mismanagement of colonization and the ending of the trusteeship arrangements and the management of the Federal Constitution,” which clearly provided for a two state federation (Muna, 2021).

Proponents of the unitary state may argue that its establishment was the outcome of the practise of direct democracy because it resulted from the conduct of a referendum to seek the approval of the Cameroonian people to terminate the federal system of government. However, this argument can be contested by the fact that clause 4 of Article 47 stated unequivocally that the “Proposals for revision shall be adopted by simple majority vote of the Members of the Federal Assembly provided that such majority includes a majority of the representatives in the Federal Assembly of each Federated State” (DePaul University, 2021). This implies that even if there were to be a constitutional revision that would dissolve the federal system of government, this process could only be completed through an act of parliament. Concerning the choice of a referendum instead of an act of parliament, Konings wrote the following:

The use of a referendum was probably chosen by Ahidjo to avoid any public debate on the new constitution and to secure an overwhelming turnout in its favour. The autocratic nature of his regime helps to explain why the inhabitants of Anglophone Cameroon voted massively for the draft constitution, and hence for the immediate establishment of the United Republic of Cameroon. (Konings, 1999, p. 303)

This argument is also corroborated by Chem-Langhëë who notes:

Since, under Ahidjo, it was politically unwise and even unsafe to hold and express views different from those of the President on any issue, there was no public debate. There was, at this time, no press which cared to debate the details of the constitution: the habit of self-censorship had grown up next to official censorship. No one publicly opposed the creation of the unitary state. No one tried to examine the proposition that the unitary state would contribute greatly to the future political integration, unity and stability of Cameroon, or that bilingualism and multiculturalism were better served by it or raised the question as to why or whether federalism is inconsistent with national integration and stability. Or indeed to debate any of the principal issues involved in a long constitutional document. (Chem-Langhëë, 1995, p. 24)

Therefore, it can be logically argued that the former Federal Republic of Cameroon President Ahmadou Ahidjo’s choice of referendum was not only a violation of the federal constitution but also a savvy political ploy. Another factor that may have contributed to Ahidjo’s political calculations was the overwhelming majority of Francophones (French-speaking Cameroonians) constituting the State of East Cameroon, which makes it very easy for them to impose their will on the minority in
the event of a national referendum based on nationwide vote tally. In this respect, Ngwane (2016) pointed out that “on 20 May 1972 this federal structure was abolished through a referendum in which the numerical majority from East Cameroon foisted a unitary structure over the numerical minority of West Cameroon widely known as Anglophones.”

However, it would be factually inaccurate to entirely attribute the collapse of the federal system of government to the referendum of 20 May, 1972. One significant factor that contributed to the demise of the federal system of government, rarely mentioned by scholars, is the transition of various government departments in West Cameroon from state to federal status. This contributed to the erosion of its state autonomy as a result of the rational calculations of Anglophone civil servants. Muna (2022) points out that most civil servants working under the state of West Cameroon were attracted to the higher salary paid to workers of the federal government, and they clamoured for their departments to transition from the state to the federal government. This transition implied a transfer of jurisdiction from the state government to the federal government, and therefore a loss of autonomy at the level of the state. A good example is prison administration, which was integrated into the federal government and harmonized based on the more organized West Cameroon system compared to East Cameroon. Other examples of the transfer of jurisdiction from the state to the federal government include the cases of the West Cameroon post office, telecommunication, education, the police, and customs departments. Another net consequence of this transition is that the state of West Cameroon began losing its capacity to generate revenue, which led to its inability to pay salaries and subsequent dependence on subsidies from the federal government.

From the perspective of special rights to secede (through permission by the mother state), there is need for a constitutional provision; or an agreement in the creation of the state that includes implicit or explicit assumption that secession was permissible at a later point. All of these conditions are absent in the Anglophone quest for statehood through secession given that the there is no such provision (as stated above) in the Cameroon constitution. Article 47 (1) Section 10 of the federal constitution of the reunified Cameroon adopted at Foumban in 1961 proscribes secession by unequivocally stating the following: “Any proposal for the revision of the present Constitution which impairs the unity and integrity of the Federation shall be inadmissible.” (DePaul University, 2021). Equally, Article 2 Section 1 of the 1996 Revised Constitution of Cameroon states that “The Republic of Cameroon shall be a decentralized unitary State. It shall be one and indivisible, secular, democratic and dedicated to social service” (National Assembly, 2021). Thus, the Article proscribes the right to secession for any constituent entity. Konings points out that “The final version of the constitution left no room for legal secession from the federation, although some Southern Cameroons delegates had wanted a proviso inserted into the constitution sanctioning the peaceful withdrawal from the federation” (Konings, 1999, p. 301).
Furthermore, the path to remedial secession resulting from “grave injustices and human rights violations or unjust annexation by a state,” as mentioned by Buchanan (cited in Brando & Morales-Gálvez, 2019, p. 108) cannot be factually appropriated in the context of the Anglophone crisis. This is because Buchanan fails to specify what exactly constitute grave injustices. The issue of grave human rights violation may resonate in the current context of military confrontation between the government forces and secessionist fighters but as Human Rights Watch has noted, human rights abuses has been committed by both sides in the conflict (Roth, 2019). Additionally, it is difficult to establish a case of grave human rights abuse systematically targeting Anglophones prior to the escalation of tensions and conflict between the these parties in 2016 and 2017. The case of unjust annexation is invalidated by the fact that the reunification of both Cameroons was the outcome of a United Nations supervised referendum that took place in British Southern Cameroons on 11 February, 1961. The Anglophone Cameroonians (then British Southern Cameroonians) voted to join the Republic of Cameroon (Awasom, 2002).

It is complex to rule one way or the other concerning the applicability of remedial secession in the case of the Anglophone crisis because of the pros and cons analysed above. In such a context, it can be very useful to identify what Anglophone Cameroonians think about the current situation and the way forward. Therefore, we conducted a survey to explore the perceptions of Anglophone Cameroonians and we discuss the survey results in the next section.

PERCEPTION OF CAMEROONIANS ON THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS

One of the most important groups whose views are often neglected in the analysis of the conflict and possible solutions is the community of people directly involved in the conflict. In the context of this study, this group is comprised of Anglophone Cameroonians. Many writers on the Anglophone crisis have focused their attention on Anglophone secessionist militias and activists (Akoh, 2020; Nwati, 2020; Sombaye Eyango, 2018), Cameroon politicians, political parties, and the government of the Republic of Cameroon (Amin, 2018; Okereke, 2018; Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017; Konings & Nyamjoh, 1997). An online public perception survey was conducted to gauge the opinion of Anglophone Cameroonians (individuals who are from the Northwest and Southwest regions of the country) concerning their views on the nature, reasons and solutions to the Anglophone crisis.

Methodology

As mentioned in the introduction, this paper adopts mixed methodology (quantitative and qualitative methods). The qualitative method is essentially focused on text analysis from secondary sources (mostly books and peer-reviewed journal articles). The quantitative method centred on a structured questionnaire survey that was carried out to sample the perception of Anglophone Cameroonians concerning the crisis. The survey was carried out using random sampling to ensure representativeness and reduce bias in the sample population. The sample population comprised
Anglophone Cameroonians (defined in this paper as Cameroonian citizens who hail from the only two Anglophone regions in the country—South West and North West) of irrespective of gender, age group, or level of education. The survey was carried out online using Google forms. It was carried out through a voluntary process in which participants consent was sought and their identity kept anonymous given the sensitive nature of topic of the survey.

**Survey Results**
In terms of participation demographics, the survey registered 203 participants, 124 (61.1%) of whom are of Northwest origins and 79 of Southwest descent (see Figure 1). In terms of gender representation, 147 (72.4%) of the participants were male and 56 (27.6%) female (see Figure 2).

![Figure 1: Respondents’ region of origin. Source: online survey by the authors on Google forms](image1)

![Figure 2: Respondent’s gender. Source: online survey by the authors on Google forms](image2)
A majority of participants were teenagers and young adults (15-30 years old) and middle-aged adults (30-45 years old) (see Figure 3). Most of the participants (94.6%) were university educated (See Figure 4).

Concerning perception on the existence of an “Anglophone Problem” in Cameroon, 86.2% (175) of the respondents strongly agreed (See Figure 5).

Figure 3: Respondents’ age groups. Source: online survey by the authors on Google forms

Figure 4: Respondents’ level of education. Source: online survey by the authors on Google forms

Figure 5: Perception in the existence of an “Anglophone Problem”. Source: online survey by the authors on Google forms
With regards to the nature of the “Anglophone Problem” there was a divergence of views. A sizeable percentage of respondents (33%) believe the problem refers exclusively to the marginalization of the Anglophone Cameroonians, but a majority held the view the problem was a combination of four different factors: the marginalization of the Anglophones, the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry, a lack of regional autonomy (decentralized decision-making) among Anglophones, and the “Francophonization” of the educational and legal systems (see Figure 6).

On why the Anglophone Crisis degenerated into a conflict, the majority of respondent believed that it was as a result of the poor management of the crisis by the government of Cameroon (see Figure 7).

Concerning a short-term solution to the present conflict, 42% of respondent opted for cease-fire and mediation by a third party; additionally, 27% of respondent called for intervention by the African Union and 26% were in favour of a ceasefire and national dialogue (see Figure 8).
With regards to a long-term solution to the crisis in the Anglophone regions, there was significant disparity with 43.8% of respondent’s preferring a return to a federal system of government and 38.3% opting for a referendum among Anglophones to determine their political future (see Figure 9).

DISCUSSION
While Anglophone Cameroonians differed on different aspects of the issue, an overwhelming number of respondents concurred that an Anglophone Problem truly exists. It is a well-known truism that the first step to solving a problem is to acknowledge its existence. In this regard, the consciousness among Anglophone Cameroonians of the existence of an Anglophone Problem and their similar view on the nature of the problem (i.e., marginalization of Anglophone Cameroonians in Cameroon) lays a good foundation for efforts towards its resolution.

Secondly, the responsibility of the government of Cameroon during the outbreak of the conflict in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon was clearly highlighted by respondents. This also places the responsibility of finding a solution more in the hands of the government than the secessionist fighters. As a state that seeks to
protect its territorial integrity and maintain its sovereignty while protecting the life and property of its citizen, Cameroon needs to be more proactive in ensuring that a lasting solution is found that restores long-term peace in these areas. A failure to fully address the prevailing situation may render the state of Cameroon vulnerable to political instability. For short-term solutions, third party intervention seems to have won the support of many Anglophone Cameroonians and therefore merits full consideration by all parties involved in finding a solution. Lastly, Anglophone Cameroonians are indecisive about a return to the federal structure formulated at independence and voting on a referendum among Anglophones about their political destiny.

LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES TO THE STUDY
The security situation in Cameroon has deteriorated to the point most are generally afraid for their lives and the lives of their families if they speak out about the current political situation in Cameroon. Cameroonians are afraid from reprisals from both camps involved in the conflict should they openly express an opinion that favours their opponent. As a result of this it was difficult to recruit willing participants for this study on the ground and hence our decision to undertake and exclusively online anonymous survey which at the end could not get us as many persons as we initially desired. A total of 203 participants finally took part in the online survey. This number could have at least doubled had the security situation in Cameroon permitted us to complement the online survey with a physical survey with Anglophones in Cameroon.

The same insecurity factor, prevented us from conducting interviews which would have greatly assisted us to triangulate the results gotten from the questionnaire-based survey.

It was also very challenging to achieve an age balance among the participants of this study. We observed that there were some difficulties in obtaining some people of a certain age who to provide us with their own perception of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis. Majority of the respondents were youths and the old were largely left out. This can be attributed to the nature of the survey, which was carried out online and most people of old age in Cameroon are not prone to new information and communication technologies.

CONCLUSION
The present research has analysed the evolving trajectory of the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis from a theoretical perspective of remedial secession. After exploring the historical context of the crisis, it established the theoretical framework with a critical review of the theory of remedial secession. This paper traces the current crisis to historical antecedents in the colonial period where the division of the former German colony of Kamerun between two colonial powers (Britain and France) led to the development of separate colonial identities and cultures that increased nationalism. As Willard Johnson (1973) aptly pointed out, the nostalgia of oneness under the
German colonial administration was not enough to create a bond among the heterogeneous and politically fragmented Cameroonian society. The marginalization of the Anglophones developed to what became known as the “Anglophone Problem,” which degenerated into a full-blown conflict in 2017.

Different leaders involved in the struggle had different strategies. A non-violent approach geared towards securing a federation was pursued by Sisiku Agbor Balla and his CACSC, but this transitioned to the radical and violent struggle for secession under Sisiku Ayuk Tabe. From a theoretical perspective of remedial secession, it is possible to interpret this evolution from negotiation towards a return to federalism to a struggle for secession and independence as an alternative or last resort to repair the damage of marginalization. However, there are pertinent arguments for and against the applicability of remedial secession in the case of the Anglophone crisis. The goal of this paper was not to make a determination as to the validity of remedial secession in the case of the struggle for independence launched by Ambazonia separatist. Our aim was to ignite intellectual curiosity and stimulate research and scholarly debates on the theoretical basis of the Anglophone crisis, which has been underexplored before our study. At a time where the conflict remains intractable and attracts the interest of scholars, professionals, and entities dealing with mediation and negotiation, an exploration of the potential theoretical causes of the conflict may provide some useful information to help find a lasting solution to the crisis.

This research exposes critical and structural problems surrounding efforts towards creating a blended Cameroonian identity agreeable to all Cameroonians. While this research portrays strides made by the government to acquire solutions towards the Anglophone Problem, it also exposes the rigid divergence that exist between the warring parties’ needs. One party is adamant on territorial sovereignty and a “one and indivisible Cameroon” while the other insist on a return to a federal structure or complete secession. In considering these options in order to design room for common grounds, a question for further research will: Does a return to federalism (not by decentralisation) negate a one and indivisible Cameroon? And what are the structural and political mechanisms preventing the Cameroonian government from genuinely exploring this option. Further research is needed to answer these interrogations.

Furthermore, the data above indicates that Anglophone Cameroonians are indecisive between a return to the federal structure formulated at independence and voting on a referendum among Anglophones on their political destiny. There is a need for further research on other sustainable models other than these two, applicable to the Anglophone case which expands their options. A recall of history indicates that some Anglophone Cameroonians blamed the UN in 1961 for not providing a third option in the plebiscite questions which narrowed their option. Hence, further research is required on hybrid models of government that incorporates the needs of all parties and can sustain a Cameroonian identity.
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Migráció a 21. században

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